MUTHANNA VIOLENCE SUBSIDES, BUT CONFLICT REMAINS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002498

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: MUTHANNA VIOLENCE SUBSIDES, BUT CONFLICT REMAINS
UNRESOLVED

Classified By: PRT Muthanna Team Leader Phil Egger for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna cable.

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Summary
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2. (S) Fighting in Samawah and Rumaitha between Jaysh
Al-Mahdi (JAM) and local security forces has ended for the
time being and the curfew has been lifted. Muthanna's
Governor Hassani (Badr) claims he did not make a deal with
the militia to suspend the violence, but some suggest
otherwise. The underlying problem of JAM resorting to
violence to exert influence in Muthanna province remains
unresolved. Violence is likely to recur when JAM finds an
advantageous opening or pretext to act against local police.

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Unclear Catalyst
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3. (C) From the late evening of 4 July to the afternoon of 8
July, fighting between local Iraqi forces and JAM in Muthanna
led to the deaths of two policemen and five militia members
or civilians. Sixty people were injured, the majority of
whom were members of the Iraqi police or other Iraqi security
services. There were conflicting reports on casualties and
deaths so these figures should be taken as approximate. The
conflict began in Rumaitha and later included Samawah. On 5
July the government imposed a curfew that was respected for
several days. The origins of the fighting are unclear.
Neither side disputes that on 4 July Ali Al-Khirsani, who was
sent from Najaf to be the leader of JAM in Muthanna, traveled
with about fifty armed militia members to Rumaitha. Beyond
that, opinions differ. JAM sympathizers allege that ten days
earlier an associate of Colonel Ali (Commander of the
Criminal Intelligence Unit) was caught trying to bury an IED
targeting JAM, which had to defend itself. Supporters of the
government claim that Al-Khirsani began mortaring a Samawah
government building without provocation, necessitating police
action. Perhaps most plausibly, police may have tried to
arrest Al-Khirsani and his entourage for having illegal
weapons as they were en route to a memorial for an associate.

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Attempts to Quell the Violence
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4. (C) Sources indicate at least two negotiating teams were
sent to forge a consensus between JAM and the Governor. One
was led by Nasar Al-Rubaie, a Sadrist member of the Council
of Representatives, accompanied by members of Da,wa and
ISCI. The other delegation was led by Salah Al-Ubaydi, a
Najaf-based Sadr spokesman. Neither group was successful in
negotiating a solution.

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Violence Ceases, Deal Probably Made
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5. (S) In the initial clashes, JAM had the upper hand
against the security forces, causing numerous casualties.
However, at 1630 on 7 July the fighting paused and local
forces swept through the conflict area. Unlike earlier days,
there were few casualties, indicating that JAM had withdrawn.
Governor Hassani exercised control of security forces
throughout the clashes. According to a source claiming
access, who has been reliable in the past, Hassani told a
closed session of the Provincial Council (PC) on 10 July
that, "The law will be enforced. There was no deal (with
JAM)." The source says that a majority of the PC preferred a
more robust response to JAM,s violence. This same source
says there was, in fact, a deal between the Governor and the
Sadrists, facilitated by ISCI leader Ammar Al-Hakim. The
alleged terms were that: 1) JAM would withdraw and permit
security forces to enter all neighborhoods; 2) In exchange,
Sadrist headquarters would not be entered nor would senior
JAM leaders be arrested; 3) The Sadrist office in Samawah
would not be permitted to re-open until JAM in Muthanna was
led by someone from Muthanna. Lending credence to the view
that a deal was struck, only about sixty JAM members were
arrested, none of whom were high-ranking, and half were later
released. The Sadrist office in Samawah remains closed
though security forces have not entered it; JAM in Muthanna
has yet to name a leader from Samawah.

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Sympathy for JAM Ebbs in Muthanna
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BAGHDAD 00002498 002 OF 002



6. (C) Over the past two months, JAM members have killed
members of the powerful Albu-Hassan and Zayad tribes,
engendering ill-will among the populace within the province
that is arguably Iraq,s most tribal. During the fighting
and subsequent curfew some residents were unable to work or
leave their homes for four days, which had a deleterious
effect on JAM,s standing in the community. In addition, JAM
in Muthanna provides far fewer social services than it does
in other provinces, so many view its attacks on government
forces as illegitimate. Nonetheless, JAM remains popular in
certain areas, such as the Jumhuriyah and Al-Eumal
neighborhoods of Samawah, and among the demographic of
uneducated young adult males, especially from lower classes.

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Comment
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7. (C) In this fight, neither side attained a convincing
victory. The performance of the security forces was
adequate, but the lack of a definite resolution means JAM may
begin conflict anew when it finds a fortuitous pretext for
attacking government forces. The best prediction of future
conflict may come from Salah Al-Ubaydi, who told Al-Hayat,
"(in the central and southern provinces) serious attempts are
being exerted by Sadr to rearrange the security situation.
(We seek to install) local security commanders who do not
submit to the authority of local governments." So long as
Muthanna security forces - a substantial fraction of whose
leadership comes from former Badr corps members - work to
maintain the status quo with allegiance to the Governor, and
the Sadrists endeavor to sever that link, the conflict will
continue. End comment.
BUTENIS