MUTHANNA VIOLENCE SUBSIDES, BUT CONFLICT REMAINS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002498 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: MUTHANNA VIOLENCE SUBSIDES, BUT CONFLICT REMAINS UNRESOLVED Classified By: PRT Muthanna Team Leader Phil Egger for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna cable. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶2. (S) Fighting in Samawah and Rumaitha between Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) and local security forces has ended for the time being and the curfew has been lifted. Muthanna's Governor Hassani (Badr) claims he did not make a deal with the militia to suspend the violence, but some suggest otherwise. The underlying problem of JAM resorting to violence to exert influence in Muthanna province remains unresolved. Violence is likely to recur when JAM finds an advantageous opening or pretext to act against local police. -------------- Unclear Catalyst -------------- ¶3. (C) From the late evening of 4 July to the afternoon of 8 July, fighting between local Iraqi forces and JAM in Muthanna led to the deaths of two policemen and five militia members or civilians. Sixty people were injured, the majority of whom were members of the Iraqi police or other Iraqi security services. There were conflicting reports on casualties and deaths so these figures should be taken as approximate. The conflict began in Rumaitha and later included Samawah. On 5 July the government imposed a curfew that was respected for several days. The origins of the fighting are unclear. Neither side disputes that on 4 July Ali Al-Khirsani, who was sent from Najaf to be the leader of JAM in Muthanna, traveled with about fifty armed militia members to Rumaitha. Beyond that, opinions differ. JAM sympathizers allege that ten days earlier an associate of Colonel Ali (Commander of the Criminal Intelligence Unit) was caught trying to bury an IED targeting JAM, which had to defend itself. Supporters of the government claim that Al-Khirsani began mortaring a Samawah government building without provocation, necessitating police action. Perhaps most plausibly, police may have tried to arrest Al-Khirsani and his entourage for having illegal weapons as they were en route to a memorial for an associate. -------------- Attempts to Quell the Violence -------------- ¶4. (C) Sources indicate at least two negotiating teams were sent to forge a consensus between JAM and the Governor. One was led by Nasar Al-Rubaie, a Sadrist member of the Council of Representatives, accompanied by members of Da,wa and ISCI. The other delegation was led by Salah Al-Ubaydi, a Najaf-based Sadr spokesman. Neither group was successful in negotiating a solution. -------------- Violence Ceases, Deal Probably Made -------------- ¶5. (S) In the initial clashes, JAM had the upper hand against the security forces, causing numerous casualties. However, at 1630 on 7 July the fighting paused and local forces swept through the conflict area. Unlike earlier days, there were few casualties, indicating that JAM had withdrawn. Governor Hassani exercised control of security forces throughout the clashes. According to a source claiming access, who has been reliable in the past, Hassani told a closed session of the Provincial Council (PC) on 10 July that, "The law will be enforced. There was no deal (with JAM)." The source says that a majority of the PC preferred a more robust response to JAM,s violence. This same source says there was, in fact, a deal between the Governor and the Sadrists, facilitated by ISCI leader Ammar Al-Hakim. The alleged terms were that: 1) JAM would withdraw and permit security forces to enter all neighborhoods; 2) In exchange, Sadrist headquarters would not be entered nor would senior JAM leaders be arrested; 3) The Sadrist office in Samawah would not be permitted to re-open until JAM in Muthanna was led by someone from Muthanna. Lending credence to the view that a deal was struck, only about sixty JAM members were arrested, none of whom were high-ranking, and half were later released. The Sadrist office in Samawah remains closed though security forces have not entered it; JAM in Muthanna has yet to name a leader from Samawah. -------------- Sympathy for JAM Ebbs in Muthanna -------------- BAGHDAD 00002498 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Over the past two months, JAM members have killed members of the powerful Albu-Hassan and Zayad tribes, engendering ill-will among the populace within the province that is arguably Iraq,s most tribal. During the fighting and subsequent curfew some residents were unable to work or leave their homes for four days, which had a deleterious effect on JAM,s standing in the community. In addition, JAM in Muthanna provides far fewer social services than it does in other provinces, so many view its attacks on government forces as illegitimate. Nonetheless, JAM remains popular in certain areas, such as the Jumhuriyah and Al-Eumal neighborhoods of Samawah, and among the demographic of uneducated young adult males, especially from lower classes. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) In this fight, neither side attained a convincing victory. The performance of the security forces was adequate, but the lack of a definite resolution means JAM may begin conflict anew when it finds a fortuitous pretext for attacking government forces. The best prediction of future conflict may come from Salah Al-Ubaydi, who told Al-Hayat, "(in the central and southern provinces) serious attempts are being exerted by Sadr to rearrange the security situation. (We seek to install) local security commanders who do not submit to the authority of local governments." So long as Muthanna security forces - a substantial fraction of whose leadership comes from former Badr corps members - work to maintain the status quo with allegiance to the Governor, and the Sadrists endeavor to sever that link, the conflict will continue. End comment. BUTENIS