BARZANI AGREES TO PUSH FOR NEW GOI ARTICLE 140

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002466 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2017 TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL TU SUBJECT: BARZANI AGREES TO PUSH FOR NEW GOI ARTICLE 140 COMMITTEE CHAIR, INVIGORATE COMMITTEE Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In his July 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani spoke passionately about the Kurdish right to Kirkuk and the dangers of failing to hold the referendum on time. Barzani and the Ambassador agreed it would be useful to try to reinvigorate the Government of Iraq (GOI) Article 140 committee, beginning with sending a representative to Baghdad to engage the Prime Minister to appoint a new chair of the committee. The Ambassador had met with members of the commission branch team on July 18 in Kirkuk where they had highlighted the need to get a new chairman. END SUMMARY. Laying out the Issues -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 19, the Ambassador laid out to KRG President Massoud Barzani the need for the transparent implementation of constitutional Article 140, particularly as it pertains to Kirkuk, to ensure that it is viewed as legitimate at all levels. Right now, this issue is moving in the wrong direction, the Ambassador said. The U.S. wanted to work with the KRG to address some of the contentious issues to calm nerves on all sides, so that when the referendum is held, all sides can accept the outcome. ¶3. (C) Barzani initially flared, thinking the U.S. was backing away from the Article 140 process. He underlined that a reason for the Kurds' participation in the 2003 war against Saddam was to secure Kirkuk. The Kurds have tried to provide legitimacy to the Article 140 process, he noted. He disparaged the legitimacy of those opposing the Kurds pushing the process forward. Pointing to the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF),Turkey, and the Ba'athists, he asked rhetorically why they were trying to make the process fail. The Kurds agreed to the Transitional Administrative Law and the Iraqi Constitution, and made concessions in order to receive in return an assured legal solution to the Kirkuk problem. Both former Prime Ministers Allawi and Jafari refused to move the Article 140 process forward, and the Kurds almost decided not to take part in the December 2005 elections to protest this, Barzani claimed. ¶4. (C) Barzani pointed to messages from President Bush, then Deputy Secretary Armitage, and former Ambassador Negroponte assuring him that the U.S. was committed to implementation of Article 140. Barzani asserted that the Kurds had remained restrained despite terrorism directed against them in Kirkuk. If Article 140 is not implemented there will be a reaction from the Kurds, he warned. He hinted that the Kurds might reconsider their participation in the Iraqi government. Solutions to a Stalled Process -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador replied that the USG was still committed to the Article 140 process, but that the process had stalled. He suggested two possible solutions: reinvigorating the GOI Article 140 Committee or looking to the international community for assistance. He said the national committee was not working and did not have a chairman. The Ambassador also noted that the Article 140 branch committee in Kirkuk had told him on July 18 that of the thousands of Wafideen Arabs (those transferred to Kirkuk under Saddam's plan to Arabize the region) who had applied for compensation, not one had been approved. The way to deal with the Arab settlers is to make the compensation and resettlement process work, stated the Ambassador. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador suggested that if the national committee is not working, perhaps the U.S. and Kurds should consider an international commission as provided for in TAL article 58. Barzani dismissed this proposal and focused on the Iraqi national committee. He complained about the committee's lack of work; if it had made a genuine effort and then required more time, shifting the timetable to 2008 would have been acceptable. Instead the committee has taken no serious steps and now the public was confused while it also faced threats from Turkey. He said his greatest concern was the extreme Kurdish sensitivity on this issue. Barzani added that he and President Talabani had been attacked for being too soft on this issue. The Kurdish public, Barzani concluded, is beginning to believe that outsiders will prevent the return of Kirkuk to the Kurds. ¶7. (C) Barzani recalled the three stages to the Article 140 process: normalization, a census, and a referendum. At least one, he said, should move forward. If there was some movement towards implementation, it would be easier to justify delaying the referendum. He said the PM is in a BAGHDAD 00002466 002 OF 002 position to move forward on this issue. Barzani then warned that if Maliki does not move the process forward, then the Kurds would have difficulty supporting him as PM. (Barzani said Maliki had proved not much better than Jafari on the Kirkuk issue.) Barzani urged the Ambassador to pressure Maliki to move Article 140 forward. A New Chairman for the Article 140 Committee -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador steered Barzani back to the GOI committee, asking if the appointment of a new chairman would enable the committee to start moving. Barzani agreed that the committee needed a new chair, noting that the Kurds had proposed National Security Advisor Muwaffuk Rubaie but had been rebuffed. Barzani thought only an active chairman who had backing from the PM could reinvigorate the committee. The chair should also not be a minister so that he could devote his full time to Article 140. Barzani and his aides at the July 19 meeting suggested five names: Hamid Musa, Mundir Raways, Nasir Chardarchi, Safia Suhail, and Tofik Yasari. Barzani agreed to send his confidante Rowsch Shaways to Baghdad to discuss with the PM nominating a new chair. ¶9. (C) Comment: Article 140 and Kirkuk are old issues that seem not to move unless the U.S. decides to get involved, even if from a distance. It has the potential to be destabilizing if not handled adroitly with a measure of approval from the Kurds, Arabs, Turcoman and other communities. For this reason, prime ministers in Baghdad and other non-Kurds with political ambition have treated Article 140 with the greatest circumspection. Barzani, though he spoke passionately about the Kurdish right to Kirkuk, appears ready to accept a delay in the referendum provided he has something to show as evidence of progress. Post will follow up with Barzani's team to get Rowsch Shaways to talk directly with the PM as quickly as possible. After he does, Post will talk to other key Iraqi leaders to encourage them to look at how to reinvigorate the Article 140 committee. CROCKER