JULY 15 MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002437 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2017 TAGS: IZ MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SUBJECT: JULY 15 MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY REF: BAGHDAD 2399 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: At the July 15 meeting of the Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS),ministers: -- heard about the poor security situation in Basrah from both the Basrah Operational Commander and the Chief of Police -- discussed the need to move forward quickly with a plan to remedy the problems identified, including the proposal of a target date for transfer of security responsibility; -- learned that over 21,000 Iraqi Security Force personnel were being taken out of other security operations in order to serve as Personal Security Details for GOI officials; -- listened to the Minister of Defense's concerns that contracting problems are slowing down the equipping of the Iraqi Army; -- discussed the recent increased danger from indirect fire attacks against the International Zone; -- received an update on the situation in Diyala, with MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus commenting on the success in Baqubah; -- were informed by Petraeus that planning had started for security during the 7th Imam celebrations; and, -- learned of the death by friendly fire of a young man who had often served as a GOI notetaker at the MCNS. A discussion of Turkey and the PKK was reported reftel. END SUMMARY Situation in Basrah -------------- ¶2. (S) Basrah Operational Commander General Mohan and Basrah Police Chief Major General Jalil Khalaf Shueil briefed the July 15 meeting of the Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) on the situation in Basrah. Noting that they had completed a very detailed assessment of the situation and developed recommendations which they hoped to present in full later, Mohan said that the situation in Basrah was qualitatively different from that in much of Iraq because terrorism was not the chief concern. Instead, he said that Basrah faced challenges on two fronts: security and political. He also cited the lack of the rule of law and lack of respect for the government as major problems. ¶3. (S) Mohan said that the GOI had insufficient forces in the province and that those forces that did exist were not of high quality. For example, he said that the 5th Brigade of the Iraqi Army's 10th Division was "born a stranger," having been formed from the worst soldiers of the 8th Division. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Babakr al-Zibari agreed and claimed that he had been "screaming for two years" about the need to build additional forces in Basrah, adding that additional equipment such as helicopters and weapons were also needed. He also pointed out that the troop shortfall was exacerbated by the deployment of 10th Division elements in support of the Baghdad Security Plan. Similarly, Major General Jalil Khalaf Shueil -- who noted that one of his family members had been kidnapped and that he had been the target of an assassination attempt -- said that despite having thousands of police on the books, he was lucky if he can send even one company out to do operations. He said that the police were controlled by the province's political forces, adding that the police were intimidated by threats to their safety and to that of their families. Mohan agreed, noting that both the police and army were under pressure from "the political stream" and that as a result they had lost their confidence. When Shueil pointed out that local officials often used the police as bodyguards, Mohan added that police patrol vehicles had been distributed among the political parties and that he had evidence some had been used in terrorist operations. Shueil concluded that the police needed to be reformed from scratch. PM Nuri al-Maliki said that one or two good battalions of police should be created and that afterwards the rest of the police force should be BAGHDAD 00002437 002 OF 003 fired. He dismissed concerns that the fired police might become a militia, arguing that they were already a militia. ¶4. (S) Mohan claimed that the province's borders and ports represented additional security challenges. Minister of State for National Security Waeli said that what was coming through from the sea was not controlled and represented both a terrorist and an economic threat. ¶5. (S) Waeli and FM Hoshyar Zebari argued that Basrah's problems were predominately political in nature. Maliki, however, believed that so-called political elements were in fact largely criminal and/or foreign in nature. As a result, he argued that 90 percent of the problems in Basrah were security-related. ¶6. (S) The PM did note, however, that on the political side the provincial council had made a legal decision to remove the governor and that he should now "withdraw" quietly. Maliki said that a decision would need to be taken to "drag the governor out of his office" if he refused to go peacefully. Mohan reminded ministers that the Basrah governor was supported by 8,000 Ministry of Oil Facility Protection Force (FPS) personnel that were controlled by the Fadhila party. Maliki responded that these FPS were bandits, and that the security forces should find a way to "hit them hard." ¶7. (S) Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zubaie thanked Mohan and Shueil for the transparency of their briefing, adding that it was the first time for a briefing at such a high level. Zubaie went on to argue that that the Ministers of Defense and Interior should be held responsible for the poor state of their forces in the region. Minister of Defense Abdul Qader reacted angrily to this charge, noting that Iraqi Army forces in Basrah report to the Basrah Operational Command, not to the MoD. ¶8. (S) UK Ambassador Asquith said that the discussion had clearly brought out the urgency of the situation. He said that it was important that any gaps identified by Mohan and Shueil be filled quickly. He also said that it was important that the generals get support from the central government when they go after bad actors in the province. He suggested that Mohan, Shueil, and the MND-SE commander should report to Baghdad on a regular basis. He argued that it would be useful as a forcing function to set a target date for when Basrah would be ready for the transfer of security responsibility, proposing late September. Speaking on behalf of the ministers, National Security Advisor Mowafuk Rubaie agreed to the target date, as well as the need for regular briefings. ¶9. (S) Noting that Mohan and Shueil were scheduled to brief the Crisis Action Cell (CAC) on July 16, Deputy National Security Advisor Safa'a suggested that the CAC should develop a plan for moving forward in Basrah. Maliki agreed, stressing the need for the plan to be developed quickly. Personal Security Details (PSDs) -------------- ¶10. (S) Rubaie reported that over 14,000 MoD personnel and 7,000 MoI personnel were being used as Personal Security Details for Iraqi officials. In addition to drawing 21,000 personnel out of the front lines of the fight, this was costing the two ministries over 14 billion dinars a month in salaries. Rubaie said that a joint MoD-MoI-National Security Council-Iraqi National Intelligence Service paper had some suggestions on how to deal with this issue, including specifying the number of PSD personnel each official would be allowed. It also included a proposal to not provide permanent details to officials who lived in the International Zone. Any movements they might make into the Red Zone could be handled by specially trained battalions. Ministers agreed that they needed time to review the paper and its recommendations before making any final decisions. Continuing Problems with Defense Contracts -------------- ¶11. (S) Minister of Defense Qader said that many contracts necessary for the arming and equipping of the Iraqi Army were encountering significant difficulties getting through the BAGHDAD 00002437 003 OF 003 contracting process. He complained about the Finance Ministry's regulations requiring unused funds each year to be returned to the national treasury, arguing that such a regulation was not practical for multi-year defense contracts. Pointing out that Iraq had the same contracting procedures for importing wheat as for importing weapons, Qader called for an independent budget for arming and equipping. In response to a question, Qader said that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases did not have these problems. He warned, however, that there were those in the contracting process who were pushing for FMS cases to have to go through the same procedures other contracts went through. MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus agreed with Qader that there had to be a better way to handle contracting. IDF Attacks on the Green Zone -------------- ¶12. (S) Maliki noted that those launching Indirect Fire (IDF) attacks, such as rockets and mortars, against the International Zone were improving every day. As evidence, he pointed to the recent barrage of over 30 rounds fired into the IZ in a matter of minutes. (Note: This mortar attack was on 10 July. End Note.) He said that these attacks demoralized people. ¶13. (S) The representative of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service noted that several people responsible for the coordinated attack described above had been captured. Petraeus added that 7 IDF teams had been captured or killed in recent weeks. He also said that there were clear links between Iran and the IDF attacks. Minister of State for National Security Waeli agreed, reporting that the issue had been discussed in the Crisis Action Cell. Diyala Update -------------- ¶14. (S) Petraeus said that operations in Baqubah were going quite well, resulting in the capture or death of approximately 250 Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorists. He also said that there were signs of success in Arab Jabour where the local tribe had led Coalition forces to three top AQI leaders. NSA Rubaie said that a detailed report should be prepared on Diyala which would assess what was working and what was not. He also said that issues such as food and medical supplies should be examined. Petraeus argued that it was also important to tell the story of what was happening in Diyala to the Iraqi people. Preparations for the 7th Imam Celebrations -------------- ¶15. (S) Petraeus informed ministers that initial planning had begun for security during the celebration of the 7th Imam. He said that it was important for the chain of command to be clearly identified. In the ensuing discussion, the members of the MCNS acknowledged that the Baghdad Operational Command would be responsible for security inside the city. However, some thought the PM needed to issue a brief order making clear who would be in charge for security outside Baghdad and along the routes into the city. Maliki said that the MoI would control the roads, but the MoD would be responsible for the gates into the city. Death of a GOI MCNS Notetaker by Friendly Fire -------------- - ¶16. (S) National Security Advisor Rubaie closed the meeting by reporting on the July 13 death by friendly fire of a young man who had often taken notes for the GOI at the MCNS. His 70-year old father was also killed. Rubaie announced that the room in the PM's residence where the MCNS is held would be named in his honor. Rubaie said he had asked the Coalition to investigate the circumstances of the death and report back. (Note: The incident was investigated by the Coalition and a full explanation was provided to Rubaie by Coalition leaders. End Note.) CROCKER