AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S JULY 21 MEETING WITH PM MALIKI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002434 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2017 TAGS: IZ PGOV SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S JULY 21 MEETING WITH PM MALIKI Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: The Ambassasdor pressed Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on the need to demonstrate meaningful political progress. Maliki agreed, but pointed at the Sunni Tawaffaq bloc as the key obstacle. Maliki said he thought a leadership meeting between himself, Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barzani, Tariq al-Hashimi, and Adel Abdel Mehdi was a "good idea" and agreed that the meeting would need careful preparation. Maliki said that attempting to reach agreement on major problems might lead to a deadlock; his preference was to tackle smaller problems first in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to political concessions. Ambassador Crocker emphasized the importance of making progress on the Congressional benchmarks and cautioned Maliki that the strength of the U.S.-Iraqi strategic partnership in the medium to long term was contingent upon making meaningful progress in the short term. End summary. Pressing for Progress -------------- ¶2. (S) In his July 21 meeting with Prime Minister Maliki, Ambassador Crocker recounted his recent Congressional testimony and reminded Maliki of the intense domestic and Congressional pressures on the U.S. Administration. Maliki expressed full agreement, saying it was also in Iraq's interest to advance the political process. He quickly added that he himself was under intense political pressure from the U.S., the Shi'a religious establishment, the United Iraqi Alliance (i.e., the Shi'a coalition),and Iraq's Arab neighbors. In light of those pressures on Maliki, Iraq's Sunnis felt they could hold the political process hostage. "Tawaffaq (the Sunni bloc) is the biggest problem," said Maliki, who complained that the Sunnis had made it impossible for him to accomplish even minor things. The status quo, Maliki continued, cannot continue: Iraq's political process is too fragile to bear the weight of constant sectarian violence. "Frankly, our (Sunni) Arab brothers are not ready to accept us as brothers," he lamented. ¶3. (S) Maliki added that he would like to hold provincial elections but could not proceed given the current security situation. He expressed alarm about the increasing tensions in Kirkuk, suggesting that the disputed city might become the flashpoint for a full-scale civil war. In addition, he noted the need for a comprehensive political deal that would resolve an array of problems ranging from elections to the distribution of oil and gas revenues. Leadership Meeting -------------- ¶4. (S) Turning to a proposed meeting of Iraq's political leadership, Maliki said the idea was a good one. He said the initial participants should be himself, President Jalal Talabani, Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, and Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi. The meeting could then be expanded to include thirteen participants representing key Iraqi political parties, including three representatives from Tawaffaq (the Sunni bloc),seven from the United Iraqi Alliance (the Shi'a bloc),and three representing the Kurds (including Hizb al-Islam al-Kurdistani). ¶5. (S) Maliki agreed that such a leadership meeting would require careful preparation, and he noted that there were several ways to proceed. One option would be to "start with the big problems" in the hope that if those were solved, everything else would fall into place. Maliki said although he initially favored such a holistic approach, upon consideration his preference was to instead begin by tackling smaller problems. The resolution of smaller problems (including the appointment of some deputy ministers and ambassadors and the passage of non-controversial legislation) would serve to release Iraqi domestic political pressures and thus create a new political environment in which it would be easier for the parties to make political concessions. He added that he was optimistic that such an approach would work given the widespread recognition of the need for progress. Maliki promised to discuss preparations for the leadership meeting (including preparation of the agenda and the drafting of working papers and possible agreements) with his counterparts on July 22. ¶6. (S) Steering Maliki back towards the Congressional benchmarks, Ambassador Crocker stressed the need to reach agreement on key pieces of legislation, including an elections law and the provincial powers law, as well as on constitutional reform. He cautioned Maliki that the strength of the U.S.-Iraqi strategic partnership in the medium to long term was contingent upon making meaningful progress towards political reconciliation in the short term. BAGHDAD 00002434 002 OF 002 Mashadani's Return -------------- ¶7. (C) Regarding the return of Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani, Maliki confirmed his understanding that Mashadani would facilitate passage of a pensions law (of which Mashadani would be a beneficiary) and then resign. Maliki indicated that Adnan Dulaimi was working on identifying Mashadani's successor; likely candidates were Ossama al-Tikriti (IIP) and Ayad Samara'i (IIP). Maliki added that neither candidate was bad, but that he preferred al-Tikriti. (Comment: Maliki's comments track generally with what we have heard from other CoR sources. However, there is no indication that Maliki is personally involved in the deliberations. End Comment.) CROCKER