AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S JULY 21 MEETING WITH PM MALIKI

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S JULY 21 MEETING WITH PM MALIKI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: The Ambassasdor pressed Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki on the need to demonstrate meaningful political
progress. Maliki agreed, but pointed at the Sunni Tawaffaq
bloc as the key obstacle. Maliki said he thought a
leadership meeting between himself, Jalal Talabani, Massoud
Barzani, Tariq al-Hashimi, and Adel Abdel Mehdi was a "good
idea" and agreed that the meeting would need careful
preparation. Maliki said that attempting to reach agreement
on major problems might lead to a deadlock; his preference
was to tackle smaller problems first in order to create an
atmosphere more conducive to political concessions.
Ambassador Crocker emphasized the importance of making
progress on the Congressional benchmarks and cautioned Maliki
that the strength of the U.S.-Iraqi strategic partnership in
the medium to long term was contingent upon making meaningful
progress in the short term. End summary.

Pressing for Progress
--------------


2. (S) In his July 21 meeting with Prime Minister Maliki,
Ambassador Crocker recounted his recent Congressional
testimony and reminded Maliki of the intense domestic and
Congressional pressures on the U.S. Administration. Maliki
expressed full agreement, saying it was also in Iraq's
interest to advance the political process. He quickly added
that he himself was under intense political pressure from the
U.S., the Shi'a religious establishment, the United Iraqi
Alliance (i.e., the Shi'a coalition),and Iraq's Arab
neighbors. In light of those pressures on Maliki, Iraq's
Sunnis felt they could hold the political process hostage.
"Tawaffaq (the Sunni bloc) is the biggest problem," said
Maliki, who complained that the Sunnis had made it impossible
for him to accomplish even minor things. The status quo,
Maliki continued, cannot continue: Iraq's political process
is too fragile to bear the weight of constant sectarian
violence. "Frankly, our (Sunni) Arab brothers are not ready
to accept us as brothers," he lamented.


3. (S) Maliki added that he would like to hold provincial
elections but could not proceed given the current security
situation. He expressed alarm about the increasing tensions
in Kirkuk, suggesting that the disputed city might become the
flashpoint for a full-scale civil war. In addition, he noted
the need for a comprehensive political deal that would
resolve an array of problems ranging from elections to the
distribution of oil and gas revenues.

Leadership Meeting
--------------


4. (S) Turning to a proposed meeting of Iraq's political
leadership, Maliki said the idea was a good one. He said the
initial participants should be himself, President Jalal
Talabani, Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud
Barzani, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, and Vice President
Adel Abdel Mehdi. The meeting could then be expanded to
include thirteen participants representing key Iraqi
political parties, including three representatives from
Tawaffaq (the Sunni bloc),seven from the United Iraqi
Alliance (the Shi'a bloc),and three representing the Kurds
(including Hizb al-Islam al-Kurdistani).


5. (S) Maliki agreed that such a leadership meeting would
require careful preparation, and he noted that there were
several ways to proceed. One option would be to "start with
the big problems" in the hope that if those were solved,
everything else would fall into place. Maliki said although
he initially favored such a holistic approach, upon
consideration his preference was to instead begin by tackling
smaller problems. The resolution of smaller problems
(including the appointment of some deputy ministers and
ambassadors and the passage of non-controversial legislation)
would serve to release Iraqi domestic political pressures and
thus create a new political environment in which it would be
easier for the parties to make political concessions. He
added that he was optimistic that such an approach would work
given the widespread recognition of the need for progress.
Maliki promised to discuss preparations for the leadership
meeting (including preparation of the agenda and the drafting
of working papers and possible agreements) with his
counterparts on July 22.


6. (S) Steering Maliki back towards the Congressional
benchmarks, Ambassador Crocker stressed the need to reach
agreement on key pieces of legislation, including an
elections law and the provincial powers law, as well as on
constitutional reform. He cautioned Maliki that the strength
of the U.S.-Iraqi strategic partnership in the medium to long
term was contingent upon making meaningful progress towards
political reconciliation in the short term.

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Mashadani's Return
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7. (C) Regarding the return of Council of Representatives
(CoR) Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani, Maliki confirmed his
understanding that Mashadani would facilitate passage of a
pensions law (of which Mashadani would be a beneficiary) and
then resign. Maliki indicated that Adnan Dulaimi was working
on identifying Mashadani's successor; likely candidates were
Ossama al-Tikriti (IIP) and Ayad Samara'i (IIP). Maliki
added that neither candidate was bad, but that he preferred
al-Tikriti. (Comment: Maliki's comments track generally with
what we have heard from other CoR sources. However, there is
no indication that Maliki is personally involved in the
deliberations. End Comment.)

CROCKER