VP HASHEMI SEEKS GREATER INVOLVEMENT IN BAGDHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000241

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: VP HASHEMI SEEKS GREATER INVOLVEMENT IN BAGDHAD
SECURITY PLAN


Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting on January 20, National Security
Adviser Mowafaq Rubaie and the Ambassador asked Vice
President Tareq al-Hashemi to participate in the Baghdad
Security Plan (BSP) by leading the mobilization committee, a
committee designed to invigorate public support for the plan.
Hashemi said he had no objections to the plan in principle
but asked to see it in writing. He expressed concerns that
he had not been invited to participate in drafting the BSP
from its inception and asked for the Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP) to have input in the operations scheduled for Sunni
Arab areas, saying he feared the operations would target the
wrong people. Hashemi and Rubaie agreed to discuss how to
implement a joint monitoring system to ensure the BSP
military commanders act in a nonsectarian manner and to add
an additional Sunni member to the BSP crisis cell leadership.
END SUMMARY.

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Hashemi Seeks Help With IIP Security
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2. (C) Vice President Hashemi opened the meeting by
expressing his condolences for the American NDI worker killed
on January 17 while leaving the IIP headquarters in Yarmouk.
Hashemi said he felt guilty and wanted to work with MNF-I to
figure out how to attack back at such perpetrators. The Vice
President continued, saying the Ministry of Interior refuses
to provide weapons licenses for IIP guards, and he felt the
GOI was weakening the IIP. The Ambassador responded that
U.S. officials had finished an examination of the IIP
headquarters and had suggested approximately $86,000 worth of
changes to improve the office's security. He said he asked
MNF-I troops to keep an eye on the IIP headquarters. The
Ambassador and the Vice President also arranged a meeting for
IIP officials to share with MNF-I officials their information
on al Qaeda members in Yarmouk, Ameriya, and Ghazaliya.


3. (C) National Security Adviser Rubaie joined the meeting as
the Ambassador and Vice President were making the
arrangements. Rubaie offered to help in obtaining weapons
licenses for the IIP and to send a senior representative from
his office to the meeting between IIP and MNF-I officials.
Rubaie supported Hashemi's concerns, saying al Qaeda is
entrenching itself in the more affluent neighborhoods of
Baghdad and terrorizing the moderate Sunni Arabs. He said
the middle class is consequently leaving Baghdad, eroding
what used to be the backbone of the Iraqi state.

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Mobilization Committee To Drum Up Support for BSP
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4. (C) Rubaie explained the new BSP to Hashemi by outlining
the six functional committees that comprise it - security,
political, economic, services, media, and mobilization.
Rubaie assured Hashemi the plan would be nonsectarian and
said the guiding principle is for all lawbreakers, Sunni or
Shia, to be stopped and for the plan to continue until there
is security. Rubaie asked Hashemi to lead the mobilization
committee, which would drum up public support for the BSP.
The mobilization committee, for example, would facilitate
delegations of Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish officials visiting
together the markets, mosques, and streets of Baghdad in a
show of unity. Rubaie also suggested the political leaders
could appear on television channels not associated with their
own ethnic groups to show that politicians are setting aside
their sectarian differences. Rubaie said the goal is to have
Baghdad citizens join the political parties and leave the
insurgents behind. Rubaie mentioned the Prime Minister was
also considering Ahmed Chalabi to help with the mobilization
committee, but said he was open to Hashemi's input on this
point.

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Hashemi Supportive, Wants More Involvement in BSP
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5. (C) The Vice President responded he supports the BSP in
principle but wants to see the details of the plan in
writing. Hashemi said he wants to be an equal partner and
shareholder in the plan and wished to be involved from the
beginning. He queried Rubaie on the specific plans for each
sector of Baghdad, saying he wants the IIP to verify the
names of al Qaeda targets in Sunni areas because if the wrong
people were attacked, the local Sunnis would hold his party
responsible. Rubaie explained the military commanders for
each sector would produce their own plans and assured Hashemi
that if the commanders were behaving in a sectarian manner,

BAGHDAD 00000241 002 OF 002


the top political leadership would find out. Hashemi
suggested implementing a joint monitoring system for the
commanders. Rubaie agreed a monitoring system was a good
idea and said the two should think about mechanisms to
implement one.


6. (C) The Vice President and National Security Adviser then
discussed the composition of the crisis cell, which was
formed to assist the Prime Minister in making decisions about
the BSP and its operations. Rubaie explained the checks and
balances on the BSP command structure, saying that only the
Prime Minister, for example, can authorize entrance into
mosques in particularly sensitive areas. Hashemi
nevertheless expressed concern that another Sunni Arab be
added to the crisis cell to send a message that the cell is
balanced. (Note: The crisis cell contains the PM, the
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, the National
Security Adviser, the Chief of Staff of the Army, BSP
Commander General Abud, and the CG. End note.) Hashemi asked
for Deputy Prime Minister Zubai to be added to the crisis
cell. Rubaie agreed, but said the Minister of Defense would
oppose Zubai, so the two men agreed someone else senior from
Zubai's office could attend the meeting as Rubaie's aide.
KHALILZAD