COR SPEAKER MASHADANI IS BACK -- BUT FOR HOW LONG?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002411

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: COR SPEAKER MASHADANI IS BACK -- BUT FOR HOW LONG?

REF: BAGHDAD 1935 BAGHDAD 1934

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 1.4. (b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary: The cloud hanging over Council of
Representatives (CoR) Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani since his
June 10 dust-up with a Shi'a MP was temporarily lifted on
July 19 when Mashadani again chaired a session of the CoR.
His return was accompanied by the return of the Sunni
Tawafuq bloc, which (in addition to the return of the
Sadrists two days earlier) facilitated a quorum in the CoR
and the resumption of "business as usual" in a cordial and
productive cross-sectarian atmosphere. How long the
Speaker can keep his seat however, is uncertain. Many
Shi'a MP's give him a few days to enjoy his position before
he must resign, although Mashadani is a survivor who may
not go so easily. The Sunnis Arabs' inability to arrive at
a decision on a replacement has complicated negotiations
for Mashadani's departure, as has Mashadani's insistence
that his position is inherently tied to those of the PM and
President. End summary.


2. (C) CoR Speaker Mashadani returned to chair a
refreshingly calm and productive CoR session July 19, with
a substantial quorum. Among the 160-plus MPs in
attendance, there was no visible anxiety about the
firebrand speaker taking the reigns again. All blocs made
positive statements about their desire for deeper
cooperation within the legislature, seven draft laws were
voted on, other routine business was conducted smoothly,
and the CoR had the feel of a functioning parliament.


3. (C) Mashadani had been unable to chair a session of
Parliament since the June 10 incident in which his security
guards brushed roughly against a Shi'a politician and calls
for his removal escalated quickly into an informal June 11
vote to send the Speaker on indefinite leave. Uncertainty
continued for some days thereafter as Deputy Speaker Khalid
al Atiya (independent Shia Islamist) took the chair, with
Mashadani in the building but not appearing in sessions to
avoid an unpleasant scene. Tawafuq used that time to try
to persuade Mashadani to retire gracefully. Tawafuq also
sought to determine a replacement for Mashadani acceptable
to the non-Sunni Arab blocs but whose selection would also
maintain unity within Tawafuq. They were not successful on
either account, as Mashadani continued to insist that his
appointment was part of a larger political agreement by
which the Prime Minster and President were also chosen. He
asserted that his departure required changes on those
positions as well, calling his ouster unconstitutional.


4. (C) Tawafuq eventually realized that a graceful
transition was not in the cards and walked out of the
parliament June 24 vowing not to return unless Mashadani
were chairing the session. That walkout, combined with a
Sadrist boycott which ostensibly stemmed from anger over
the June 13 Samarra bombings, prevented the CoR from
assembling a quorum for a number of sessions (but
fortunately not until they had already voted to extend
sessions through July).


5. (C) In the days preceding Mashadani's July 19 return to
the CoR, major political blocs had been in intense
discussions to determine the parameters of a temporary
return -- very temporary in the eyes of the Shi'a, quite
limited in the eyes of the Kurds, and for an unspecified
period in the eyes of many Sunni politicians. We heard no
mention of a limited duration during the session in which
Tawafuq and Mashadani eventually returned on July 19,
bringing into question whether diverse definitions of
"temporary" will clash in coming days. Whether the Speaker
clings to the chair through the remainder of July, and
whether his presence angers non-Sunni players, are factors
that bear watching closely. Scenarios include: 1)
Mashadani chairs a few more sessions and gracefully resigns
(and the CoR continues business as usual with the temporary
leadership of Deputy Speaker Khalid al-Atiya); 2) Mashadani
continues in the chair through the end of July but with
clear indications that he understands the temporary nature
of the welcome mat on which he is stepping (the CoR could
function without too much distraction if his departure is
perceived imminent); 3) Mashadani shows no signs of leaving
and the Shi'a get anxious (distracting the CoR yet again as
it grapples with key benchmark legislation); or 4)
Mashadani asserts that he has no plans to leave (and the
CoR loses focus in the waning days of the current term).


6. (C) Any scenario that involves Mashadani's departure
will eventually require his replacement, although al-Atiya
has proven his capacity to lead the CoR as acting Speaker
and could easily continue that role for an interim period.
Any replacement will of necessity almost certainly be Sunni

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Arab for political reasons, but selecting one who can both
lead the CoR effectively and satisfy the internal political
balance of the Sunni Arab Tawafuq bloc will be a challenge.
Mashadani himself hails from the small group within Tawafuq
of Khalaf al-Ayan, many of whose members are seen by the
Shi'a as having terrorist ties and therefore unacceptable
as speaker. Naming someone outside that group, however,
such as one of the more respected figures from the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP),could easily tear apart the Tawafuq
bloc unless a significant concession(s),like a ministerial
slot(s),is granted to al-Ayan's group.


7. (C) The Mashadani crisis -- like all things Mashadani
in the past -- will not be over until it is over; his calm
return could be a prelude to temporary normalcy and/or the
calm before the storm. Tawafuq has not proven that it can
compel him to resign quietly and is still working from a
narrow field of candidates to name a potential replacement,
with no clear frontrunner. The names circulating include:
IIP stalwart Osama al-Tikriti (carries the weight of
experience and age),Ayad al-Samara'i (respected political
coordinator with recent experience on the Constitutional
Review Committee),a lesser figure from IIP (Salim al-
Jeboori has a strong reputation for example, and his name
came up as a long-shot candidate in June),or Khalaf al-
Ayan himself (his nomination could maintain internal
balance within Tawafuq but would cause angst among other
blocs). Ref A noted Adnan Duleimi, Hajim al-Hassani, and
even Mashadani as wild card candidates -- Mashadani's
staying power to date suggests that he may continue to
cling to the post and complicate Tawafuq's apparent
commitment to secure his resignation. The decision could
well continue to challenge Tawafuq and the CoR for some
time.
CROCKER