COR SPEAKER MASHADANI IS BACK -- BUT FOR HOW LONG?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002411 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR IZ SUBJECT: COR SPEAKER MASHADANI IS BACK -- BUT FOR HOW LONG? REF: BAGHDAD 1935 BAGHDAD 1934 Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The cloud hanging over Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani since his June 10 dust-up with a Shi'a MP was temporarily lifted on July 19 when Mashadani again chaired a session of the CoR. His return was accompanied by the return of the Sunni Tawafuq bloc, which (in addition to the return of the Sadrists two days earlier) facilitated a quorum in the CoR and the resumption of "business as usual" in a cordial and productive cross-sectarian atmosphere. How long the Speaker can keep his seat however, is uncertain. Many Shi'a MP's give him a few days to enjoy his position before he must resign, although Mashadani is a survivor who may not go so easily. The Sunnis Arabs' inability to arrive at a decision on a replacement has complicated negotiations for Mashadani's departure, as has Mashadani's insistence that his position is inherently tied to those of the PM and President. End summary. ¶2. (C) CoR Speaker Mashadani returned to chair a refreshingly calm and productive CoR session July 19, with a substantial quorum. Among the 160-plus MPs in attendance, there was no visible anxiety about the firebrand speaker taking the reigns again. All blocs made positive statements about their desire for deeper cooperation within the legislature, seven draft laws were voted on, other routine business was conducted smoothly, and the CoR had the feel of a functioning parliament. ¶3. (C) Mashadani had been unable to chair a session of Parliament since the June 10 incident in which his security guards brushed roughly against a Shi'a politician and calls for his removal escalated quickly into an informal June 11 vote to send the Speaker on indefinite leave. Uncertainty continued for some days thereafter as Deputy Speaker Khalid al Atiya (independent Shia Islamist) took the chair, with Mashadani in the building but not appearing in sessions to avoid an unpleasant scene. Tawafuq used that time to try to persuade Mashadani to retire gracefully. Tawafuq also sought to determine a replacement for Mashadani acceptable to the non-Sunni Arab blocs but whose selection would also maintain unity within Tawafuq. They were not successful on either account, as Mashadani continued to insist that his appointment was part of a larger political agreement by which the Prime Minster and President were also chosen. He asserted that his departure required changes on those positions as well, calling his ouster unconstitutional. ¶4. (C) Tawafuq eventually realized that a graceful transition was not in the cards and walked out of the parliament June 24 vowing not to return unless Mashadani were chairing the session. That walkout, combined with a Sadrist boycott which ostensibly stemmed from anger over the June 13 Samarra bombings, prevented the CoR from assembling a quorum for a number of sessions (but fortunately not until they had already voted to extend sessions through July). ¶5. (C) In the days preceding Mashadani's July 19 return to the CoR, major political blocs had been in intense discussions to determine the parameters of a temporary return -- very temporary in the eyes of the Shi'a, quite limited in the eyes of the Kurds, and for an unspecified period in the eyes of many Sunni politicians. We heard no mention of a limited duration during the session in which Tawafuq and Mashadani eventually returned on July 19, bringing into question whether diverse definitions of "temporary" will clash in coming days. Whether the Speaker clings to the chair through the remainder of July, and whether his presence angers non-Sunni players, are factors that bear watching closely. Scenarios include: 1) Mashadani chairs a few more sessions and gracefully resigns (and the CoR continues business as usual with the temporary leadership of Deputy Speaker Khalid al-Atiya); 2) Mashadani continues in the chair through the end of July but with clear indications that he understands the temporary nature of the welcome mat on which he is stepping (the CoR could function without too much distraction if his departure is perceived imminent); 3) Mashadani shows no signs of leaving and the Shi'a get anxious (distracting the CoR yet again as it grapples with key benchmark legislation); or 4) Mashadani asserts that he has no plans to leave (and the CoR loses focus in the waning days of the current term). ¶6. (C) Any scenario that involves Mashadani's departure will eventually require his replacement, although al-Atiya has proven his capacity to lead the CoR as acting Speaker and could easily continue that role for an interim period. Any replacement will of necessity almost certainly be Sunni BAGHDAD 00002411 002 OF 002 Arab for political reasons, but selecting one who can both lead the CoR effectively and satisfy the internal political balance of the Sunni Arab Tawafuq bloc will be a challenge. Mashadani himself hails from the small group within Tawafuq of Khalaf al-Ayan, many of whose members are seen by the Shi'a as having terrorist ties and therefore unacceptable as speaker. Naming someone outside that group, however, such as one of the more respected figures from the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),could easily tear apart the Tawafuq bloc unless a significant concession(s),like a ministerial slot(s),is granted to al-Ayan's group. ¶7. (C) The Mashadani crisis -- like all things Mashadani in the past -- will not be over until it is over; his calm return could be a prelude to temporary normalcy and/or the calm before the storm. Tawafuq has not proven that it can compel him to resign quietly and is still working from a narrow field of candidates to name a potential replacement, with no clear frontrunner. The names circulating include: IIP stalwart Osama al-Tikriti (carries the weight of experience and age),Ayad al-Samara'i (respected political coordinator with recent experience on the Constitutional Review Committee),a lesser figure from IIP (Salim al- Jeboori has a strong reputation for example, and his name came up as a long-shot candidate in June),or Khalaf al- Ayan himself (his nomination could maintain internal balance within Tawafuq but would cause angst among other blocs). Ref A noted Adnan Duleimi, Hajim al-Hassani, and even Mashadani as wild card candidates -- Mashadani's staying power to date suggests that he may continue to cling to the post and complicate Tawafuq's apparent commitment to secure his resignation. The decision could well continue to challenge Tawafuq and the CoR for some time. CROCKER