BADR HEAD ACCUSES COALITION OF TARGETING ISCI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002400 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017 TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER SUBJECT: BADR HEAD ACCUSES COALITION OF TARGETING ISCI REF: A. BAGHDAD 1837 ¶B. BAGHDAD 1742 ¶C. BAGHDAD 1882 ¶D. BAGHDAD 2282 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C/REL-MNF-I) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The continued detention of persons affiliated with the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (ISCI) dominated discussion in joint ISCI-US Security Committee meetings (ref). In an effort to bolster our relationship with ISCI, at the 9 July Committee meeting, General Lacquement (DCS Intel) briefed the Committee members on the Coalition's decision not to release eleven detainees personally requested by ISCI Leader Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim. Badr head Hadi Al-Ameri argued strongly against the continued detention of three on the list, claiming Sunnis and the MEK were feeding the Coalition faulty evidence, and contested several others. He blamed the Coalition for targeting ISCI members because of the organization's historic ties with Iran. The US attendees took Hadi Al-Ameri's statements to be an opening salvo and attempted to gain some bargaining leverage. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶2. (C/REL-MNF-I) The Joint ISCI-US Security Committee met on 9 July at Vice President Adil Abd Al-Mahdi's residence in the International Zone. ISCI participants included Badr Organization leader Hadi Al-Ameri, and Badr members Tahseen Al-Azawi and Khadum Al-Jabery. U.S. attendees included Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries, MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Brigadier General Lacquement, and MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects Major General Scott. -------------- -------------- General Lacquement Explained MNF-I Position on Detainees -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C/REL-MNF-I) ISCI Leader Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim several months ago requested information on twenty-seven ISCI-affiliated detainees held by the Coalition. MNF-I replied by letter that several did not appear in our detainee system, some had already been released or turned over to the GOI, and eleven were in Coalition custody but would not be released for security reasons. The issue remains a contentious subject and often dominates ISCI Security Committee meetings. In an effort to bolster our relationship with ISCI, Brigadier General Lacquement briefed the Committee members during the 9 July meeting on the Coalition's decision not to release the eleven detainees and allowed ISCI to review a releasable version of each detainee's case. ¶4. (C/REL-MNF-I) Lacquement explained that a review board consisting of three Iraqi officials and two coalition officers carefully reviewed each case and then provided a recommendation to Task Force 134's Commander, Major General Stone, who makes final decisions on detainees' status. In the case of these eleven, both the review board and Stone concluded there was too much incriminating evidence and that they should remain in Coalition custody, to be reevaluated within the next 6 months. -------------- -------------- Al-Ameri Dismisses Coalition Evidence Against Detainees -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C/REL-MNF-I) The Iraqis said they found the evidence offered unconvincing and pointed out what they asserted to be logical flaws in the Coalition's presentation. One detainee was convicted of planting IEDs in a Sunni neighborhood in Najaf. Al-Ameri quickly shot back that there are no Sunnis in Najaf and demanded the name of the neighborhood. Al-Ameri then oddly asserted that Shia insurgents do not use IEDs, claiming that IEDs are traditionally used by al-Qaida. ¶6. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri claimed that two of the detainees had been conducting arrests and surveillance activities as legitimate functions of their law enforcement positions within the provincial governments. In another case, he asserted the only evidence MNF-I offered against one young detainee was that his father and two older brothers were alleged to be insurgents. (Note: Lacquement noted that TF-134's commander was personally looking into the possibility of releasing this detainee because of a lack of direct evidence and his young age. End Note.) BAGHDAD 00002400 002 OF 002 -------------- -------------- Al-Ameri Claims U.S. Intentionally Targeting ISCI -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C/REL-MNF-I) Noting that almost all the detainees were alleged to have Iranian ties, Al-Ameri accused the Coalition of believing all Shia were Iranian spies. Al-Ameri focused on the personal story of one detainee, Sadun Ibrahim Rashid al Hamdani, whom he said the Coalition claimed had been kidnapped by Iran and then released on the promise he would work for them. Al-Ameri claimed Sadun had in reality been imprisoned under Saddam for five years before escaping to Iran in the mid-1980's. According to Al-Ameri, Sadun later joined the Badr Corps and worked closely with both Al-Ameri and Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi. Following the fall of Saddam, Sadun came back to Iraq with Madhi and took over Diyala security before Diyala had a governor. After the Coalition's arrival, Sadun was "unjustly" arrested several more times but remained committed to Diyala and worked as a member of its Provincial Council. Al-Ameri insisted Sadun was a peaceful person who did not resent the Coalition and would not have taken part in any attacks against them. Of the nine reports the Coalition claimed to have against him, Al-Ameri claimed five must be from the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and four from the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK). -------------- Detainees "Only Acting in Self Defense" -------------- ¶8. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri claimed to personally know 5 of the 11 detainees, and he insisted the 5 were only doing what was necessary to protect themselves and their neighborhoods. There is no functioning Iraqi government, he asserted angrily, and the Coalition is not protecting the people; therefore, the Shia must defend themselves against terrorists and militias. He announced that because the Coalition had tied the hands of the Shia, many were fleeing the growing sectarian violence in Diyala. -------------- INIS and MEK the Source of "Lies" -------------- ¶9. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri adamantly asserted any evidence against the detainees had been concocted by the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) or the MEK. He claimed that although he could bring Lacquement "one hundred sources" accusing Sunni Tawafuq member Adnan al-Dulaymi of crimes, the Coalition won't arrest him. Likewise, he could find "one hundred sources" blaming the U.S. for perpetrating terrorism, but he would not believe it. This relationship requires "thinking together and trusting each other," he stressed. Lacquement said the decision to arrest and hold any detainee is carefully made and based on several sources not necessarily listed on the slides, including U.S. intelligence sources. -------------- -------------- Al-Ameri Demands Detainees Are Turned Over to the GOI -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri said that if the Coalition has such confidence in its evidence against these detainees, it should hand them over to the Iraqi Criminal Court. ISCI would hire them a lawyer. He asserted that he was tough on criminal behavior among his party members, even those who target Sunnis. If the evidence is convincing, they will be appropriately prosecuted; as Hakim has noted many times, ISCI does not harbor criminals or terrorists. -------------- -------------- Focus on Common Vision for a Safe and Secure Iraq -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri stressed the most important issue is the joint Committee's common vision for security in Iraq. The detainee issue will continue to be a problem, he concluded, but more importantly, both sides must learn to trust the other. CROCKER