U.N. UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL VANESS DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000237

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: U.N. UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL VANESS DISCUSSES
STAFFING AND BASRAH


Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a January 19 meeting, United Nations
Undersecretary General (U/SG) for Safety and Security David

C. Vaness and Special Representative to the Secretary General
(SRSG) Ashraf Qazi discussed with the Ambassador UNAMI
mission staffing, Basrah facilities, oil revenue sharing, and
the new Baghdad security plan. End Summary.

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Staffing Should Be Driven By Mission, Not Security
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2. (C) U/SG Vanness explained that at this time last year the
UN prepared a report on security and engagement in Iraq. The
focus was to determine how the UN would rely on the
Government of Iraq (GOI) for security, once a conventional
relationship emerges. However, since events did not unfold
in 2006 as expected, they are now repeating the exercise.
The new report will cover calendar year 2007.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked what will be the role of the
UNAMI mission on the political side. He noted there is much
more UNAMI can do, and expressed concern that UNAMI staffing
was going in the wrong direction. SRSG Qazi needs to have
the people to do the job, he stressed.


4. (C) U/SG Veness confirmed that UNAMI would remain engaged
on constitutional review, elections, and border disputes
involving Kirkuk. The latter, he observed, must be resolved
before provincial elections can be held. The Ambassador
agreed and underlined their importance, since in some areas
the Governing Councils are not representative of the local
population.


5. (C) U/SG Veness explained that the number of staff was
driven by security considerations and the number of hardened
living accommodations available (Note: UNAMI has 55 hardened
living accommodations). The Ambassador pointed out that a
staffing timeline for elections, constitution review, and
Kirkuk is easily predicted.


6. (C) U/SG Veness answered that staffing would follow as
soon as they could provide extra shelters; they planned to
move into their permanent facility in early 2008, a few
months after the U.S. moves into its new embassy compound.
The current staffing problem, U/SG Veness continued, is
temporary and short term. The Ambassador asked Veness to
think of ways in which the USG could be helpful.

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Revenue Sharing
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7. (C) SRSG Qazi warned that although there is progress on
the hydrocarbon law, legislation will not solve what he
perceives to be a deep structural problem with the
constitution: that any such revenue sharing laws, which are
not enshrined in the constitution, are at risk of being
either re-written by subsequent legislation or in effect
overruled by regional laws. The constitution review process
needs to reflect and memorialize the current revenue sharing
compromises.

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Terrorists Should Not Push Us Out of Basrah
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8. (C) U/SG Veness inquired about our plans for Basrah - if
there is a way for the U.S. to stay in the palace, they would
very much like to participate. The Ambassador explained that
strategically, we want a significant presence in Iraq's
south. For example, Najaf is especially important as the
center of Shia religious leadership and for its strong ties
to Iran. As for Basrah, the Ambassador explained that the
USG is in discussions with our British colleagues about
whether to stay in the palace. Abandoning the palace under
terrorist pressure would not be a good signal to send the
terrorists, he pointed out. U/SG Veness agreed that moving
to the Basrah Air Station would not be good for the long term.

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Baghdad Security Plan
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9. (C) U/SG Veness asked whether the new Baghdad security
plan would create the political space everyone needs. The
Ambassador outlined the key highlights: pursue lawbreakers
with no sanctuary, no GOI political interference with the
rules of engagement, and political, economic and services

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components in addition to the security effort. Operations
are now allowed against senior militia leaders, and we are
focusing on the Syrian and Iranian networks. This is not a
narrow security plan, but a comprehensive stabilization plan.
U/SG Veness hoped the next several months would be favorable.
KHALILZAD