ISCI SECURITY COMMITTEE STRESSES TRIBAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002282 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017 TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER SUBJECT: ISCI SECURITY COMMITTEE STRESSES TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT, ISCI DETAINEES Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During the fifth meeting of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (ISCI) Security Committee meeting on July 2, Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi reemphasized the importance of tribal engagement, popular committees, and detainee issues. Badr Organization Secretary-General Hadi al Ameri described a recent tribal conference he said ISCI had sponsored in Najaf as "disciplined and peaceful," with over 3,500 tribal leaders and scholars from across Iraq gathering to promote peace and security. Abdel Mehdi claimed popular committees could take advantage of the tribal system without turning tribes into another militia force. He asserted that "political forces" can serve as essential interlocutors between the local tribal groups and the Government of Iraq (GoI). The ISCI delegation manifested strong dissatisfaction with recent answers to their inquiry concerning ISCI detainees, demanding evidence of wrongdoing and transparency in the detention process. MG Scott (MNF-I/STATEFF) asked for ISCI's support in halting publication of false articles in pan-Arab papers regarding recent operations in Diyala. END SUMMARY -------------- Ameri Discusses Tribal Engagement -------------- ¶2. (C) During the fifth meeting of the ISCI Security Committee on July 2, Badr Organization Secretary-General Hadi al Ameri described the recent tribal conference in Najaf as "disciplined and peaceful." He asserted that over 3,500 tribal leaders and scholars from all over Iraq, including Sunni and Kurdish provinces, participated in the gathering to promote peace and security. Following the conference, the leading Sheikhs issued statements pledging support to the government and asking for help from the GoI in creating security and stability as has been done in al Anbar. ¶3. (C) Acting Pol-Mil Counselor Sidhu noted that while we are benefiting from the tribal action against Al Qaeda in al Anbar, neither the Iraqi government nor the Coalition initiated the movement. Anbari sheikhs had taken great personal risks to stand against Al Qaeda. He observed that if ISCI had the ability to bring tribes together to reach common ground, it might be useful to gather information on the attendees for possible engagement initiatives. ; -------------- Popular Committees Based on Tribal Alliances -------------- ¶4. (C) Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi stressed the historical importance of tribal groups, recalling that in 2003, when Iraq had no constitution and no ISF, local groups maintained peace and security in their own neighborhoods. Popular committees could take advantage of this natural tribal order, noted Ameri, by organizing people to secure local roads and infrastructure while employing disenfranchised youths who might otherwise turn to militias or terrorist activities. ¶5. (C) Abdel Mehdi emphasized that these tribal forces should not be given precedence over the ISF, adding that the Iraqi government should always maintain command and control of the committees to make sure that they don't become another militia force. He also noted that while tribal forces can coalesce to protect local areas, they often "disappear" when faced with larger problems. He concluded that a strong ISF force was, therefore, still very important for Iraq's overall security. -------------- Importance of "Political Forces" -------------- ¶6. (C) Abdel Mehdi asserted that "political forces" could serve as essential interlocutors between the local groups and the GOI. He explained there were five or six "real" political forces in Iraq that truly had the ear of the Iraqi people. The Badr Corps, he noted, became the Badr Organization because its leadership anticipated the necessity of reforming from a rogue group outside of the government to an active political force for fermenting legitimate change. Abdel Mehdi encouraged Scott to engage the Badr Organization, promising they can provide important information regarding BAGHDAD 00002282 002 OF 002 the facts on the ground. Abdel Mehdi warned that when the Coalition only interacts with the high levels of the Iraqi Government, "you don't arrive at the right conclusions or solutions." He noted President Bush had dealt openly with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and other political forces. -------------- Popular Committees Approved Under PM Jafari -------------- ¶7. (C) Abdel Mehdi grew exasperated at the question as to whether the idea of popular committees had been addressed with other Iraqi government officials. He claimed the security committee under the al Jafari government approved the use of popular committees, even agreeing that popular committee members could carry pistols. He said the current government had been elected before the decision could be implemented. Abdel Mehdi expressed understanding of MNF-I's reluctance to create auxiliary forces outside of the ISF, but also argued that the whole country could not join the police force. He said local groups should remain localized but coordinate their actions with the ISF or Coalition forces in the area. The heaviest weapon he would recommend they be allowed to carry is an AK-47. He said they should least be allowed a pistol. ¶8. (C) Abdel Mehdi promised to provide the US delegation with written answers to all their questions at the next meeting, but stressed that action must be taken soon. He noted this had become "a tiring process" because he had answered all these questions to various US and Coalition officials in the past. Scott promised more continuity in ISCI's interlocutors, adding that the U.S. was committed to moving forward with this dialogue. -------------- ISCI Detainees "Top Priority" -------------- ¶9. (C) The ISCI delegation then turned its attention to a letter MNF-I Commanding General Petreaus had provided to ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim in response to Hakim's inquiry concerning twenty-seven detained ISCI members. The delegation expressed its dissatisfaction with the letter, demanding to see evidence against the ISCI members and arguing for transparency in the detention process. Abdel Mehdi claimed that ISCI was working hard to build a strategic relationship with the U.S. and provided the Coalition with threat information. He argued that therefore, ISCI members should not be detained. Deputy Badr member Tahssen al Azawi asked the U.S. delegation, "This is how you treat your friends?" Abdel Mehdi also read from a unidentified document stating that names of ISCI members acting badly would be passed to Mahdi for the party to deal with internally. He insisted this should happen, or ISCI will have to seriously reconsider its friendship with the U.S. ¶10. (C) Scott said he appreciated the Vice President's frankness and said he understood ISCI's position, but acknowledged that he did not have any further information on the issue and would have to look into it. -------------- Diyala Operations Going "Very Well" -------------- ¶11. (C) Scott asked for ISCI's support in preventing the publication of negative articles in pan-Arab papers that were undermining ISF activities in Diyala. He showed the Iraqi delegation a story board on recent operational successes there, highlighting progress in security and food shipments. Ameri was unaware of any negative press from ISCI-affiliated outlets and stressed the Coalition must stop listening to "bad information" from sources such as the MEK. He added that operations in Diyala were, in his view, going very well. CROCKER