JUNE 13 ISCI POLITICAL COMMITTEE DIALOGUE FOCUSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002277

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: JUNE 13 ISCI POLITICAL COMMITTEE DIALOGUE FOCUSES
ON U.S. COMMUNICATION WITH MARJAIYA

REF: BAGHDAD 1848 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In the fourth session of the ISCI-U.S.
political committee on June 13, both sides agreed to review
common objectives of the dialogue and at the next meeting
come up with practical, concrete steps to achieve these
shared goals. Discussions focused on improving communication
between the U.S. and the marja'iya, which ISCI believes could
lead to Najaf playing an important moderating role in the
fight against extremism in Iraq. End summary.

Common Goals and Concrete Steps
--------------


2. (C) Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi opened the meeting by
calling for the political committee to come up with common
goals and concrete steps to achieve them. He suggested that
the next meeting focus on finalizing a list of shared
objectives. PolCouns agreed.

Communication with the Marja'iya
--------------


3. (C) PolCouns asked the ISCI members to elaborate on their
call in the last meeting for better USG communications with
the marja'iya. Humam Hamoudi reiterated his view on the
importance of transparency, saying the marja'iya gets
conflicting messages from USG political leadership and
commanders on the ground. If Najaf understood and was
comfortable with U.S. strategy for the future in Iraq, it
could use its influence to play a moderating role, he argued.
Jalaladeen al-Sagheer said there were three requirements for
the U.S. to gain the trust of the marja'iya: transparency of
U.S. intentions; inclusion in decision making on issues that
effect the Iraqi people; and consistency between stated
policy and actions on the ground. Al-Sagheer complained
that, based on what is happening on the streets of Diyala,
for example, the U.S. is not implementing its policy
coherently.


4. (C) "There may be a lack of information and communication
on both sides," added the VP, explaining that Sistani has had
good communications with President Bush and agrees with his
convictions, "but that the field commanders behave contrary
to stated U.S. policy." Abdel Mehdi complained that U.S.
forces were not neutral in there actions on the ground, and
accused Coalition Forces (CF) of standing by while Shia were
being eradicated from Diyala. PolCouns pointed out that what
we are dealing with are perceptions of what is happening on
the ground. U.S forces are not practicing a sectarian
agenda, they confront any and all violence regardless of
sectarian ties. PolCouns pointed out that the Sunnis also
complain that they are being targeted unfairly.


5. (C) PolCouns noted that, unfortunately, U.S. communication
with the marja'iya have so far been one way. The Embassy and
MNF-I, she said, are open to any direct communications with
elements of the marja'iya, with whatever discretion is
required. On misperceptions in Diyala, PolCouns welcomed any
concrete ideas or names of local leaders and CF could talk to
who might help increase our understanding of the local
dynamics; she suggested also raising this potential
"localization of our dialogue" in Diyala with the U.S.-ISCI
Security Committee as well. PolCouns said these are
practical problems of communication which can be solved.
CROCKER