SADRISTS RETURN TO IRAQ'S COUNCIL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000224 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: SADRISTS RETURN TO IRAQ'S COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES; QUORUM ACHIEVED REF: A. 2006 BAGHDAD 4721 ¶B. 2006 BAGHDAD 4461 ¶C. 2006 BAGHDAD 4405 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Sadrists ended their "temporary withdrawal" from Iraq's Council of Representatives (CoR) on January 21. Their return coincided with the first quorum since December 10. While the exact circumstances of their return are still unclear, it appears that after a round of negotiations that took place January 20, they forwarded a series of demands for consideration by a committee of CoR members, who will in turn present them in the form of a resolution that will be voted on by the CoR at an unspecified future date. This deal represents a clear pulling back from their earlier demand for the establishment of a timetable for coalition withdrawal as a condition for their return, and several CoR members suggested that the Sadrists came away almost empty-handed. The fact that the CoR achieved quorum only once during their absence, however, may empower the Sadrists in further negotiations with CoR leadership. End summary. -------------- Sadrist MPs Return -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 21, Sadrist MPs returned to the assembly room in the CoR for the first time since November 28. They "withdrew temporarily" from the CoR and Council of Ministers (CoM) to protest Prime Minister Maliki's November 30 meeting with President Bush in Amman. The CoR met 17 times during the period of the Sadrists' "temporary withdrawal," achieving a quorum only on December 10. The CoR achieved quorum on January 21, with approximately 175 members signing in. (Note: A quorum is 138 members. The Sadrists control 30 seats. The CoR does not publish attendance records, so it is impossible to know how many Sadrists attended the January 21 session. End note.) -------------- Sadrists Reduced Demands -------------- ¶3. (C) The Sadrists' return to the CoR represented the culmination of lengthy negotiations between the Sadrists and various CoR blocs (particularly the Shi'a coalition, and within the Shi'a coalition particularly Dawa; ref A). The Sadrists appear to have lowered their conditions for return during the period of their temporary withdrawal. What began as a threat for a complete boycott with no clear conditions for return became a "temporary withdrawal" with return contingent on the establishment of a timetable for coalition withdrawal. The Sadrists then reduced their stated demands to the CoR leadership forwarding to the floor a resolution setting a timetable for coalition withdrawal. ¶4. (C) What the Sadrists actually achieved for their return is unclear. CoR Speaker Mahmoud Mashhadani announced on January 18 that a committee was in the final stages of negotiations with the Sadrists on their return. Abdulkarim al-Anzy (Dawa Tanzim),one of the committee's members, said that the Sadrists were going to present their demands to the committee for consideration by the CoR. Sunni IIP's Salim Jabbouri told poloff January 18 that the Sadrists' conditions included: returning Iraq's sovereignty; strengthening the ISF; the passage of a resolution calling for MNF-I withdrawal from Iraq; and non-renewal of any UNSCR legalizing MNF forces in Iraq. According to Jabbouri, the committee would then present a resolution that will be voted on the CoR at a future unspecified date. Jabbouri opined that the Sadrists' conditions were really "non-conditions" in that everyone wants to strengthen Iraqi sovereignty and ISF. He argued that any politically viable resolution calling for MNF-I withdrawal would call for a "gradual" withdrawal once Iraqi forces had become self sufficient. On January 21, Shi'a coalition members Rida Jawad Taqi (SCIRI) and Hassan al-Shammari (Fadila) also downplayed the significance of the Sadrists' conditions for return. Taqi suggested that the committee's work would be "nothing more than a piece of paper", and al-Shammari said that the Maliki government and other CoR members had convinced the Sadrists to return without achieving their desired objectives by emphasizing that the MNF was necessary to train ISF and that no one wanted the MNF to stay longer than necessary. -------------- Sadrist Ministers' Status Unclear -------------- BAGHDAD 00000224 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The status of the three Sadrist Ministers (health, transportation, and agriculture) and two Sadrist Ministers of State is also unclear. While government spokesperson Ali al-Dabbagh told the DCM that the Sadrists are returning to the Council of Ministers, there is every indication that Prime Minister Maliki intends to replace them in his long-anticipated cabinet reshuffle, and he has named "acting" ministers in place of the three full ministers. Official replacement of these ministers, however, would require a yes vote from an absolute majority of CoR members. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Had the CoR achieved quorum with regularity between the beginning of the Sadrist "temporary withdrawal" and their return, the "temporary withdrawal" episode would have represented a major defeat for the Sadrists in that they gained little of practical value for their return. The deal under which they returned offers the prospect, albeit in a way not yet fully defined, for them to present their views to the CoR. However, they have always used the CoR floor as a soapbox to demand the withdrawal of coalition forces. (Note: In the Sadrists' absence, the CoR scarcely registered the passage of UNSCR 1723; had the Sadrists been present, they would have made an impassioned statement denouncing it at the very least. End note.) Furthermore, according to the CoR's bylaws, ten members of the CoR can submit legislation to the CoR presidency for consideration. The Sadrists, despite their numbers, have never managed to get legislation through the presidency and committees for consideration by the CoR. Yet although the Sadrists appear to have gained little of practical value, they did demonstrate that their attendance is an important factor in the CoR achieving a quorum. This fact may give them additional bargaining power in presenting their demands to the CoR leadership in the future. ¶7. (C) We do not have a clear read on why the Sadrists decided to return to the CoR with little to show for their "temporary withdrawal." CoR members have repeatedly noted to us that many of the Sadrist MPs disagreed with the decision to withdraw. Muqtada al-Sadr, who according to Ali al-Dabbagh ordered the return, may be feeling pressure from these CoR members, and more importantly responding to calls from senior Shi'a leaders to support, or at least not obstruct, the Shi'a-led Iraqi government. He may also be feeling pressure from recent operations carried out by MNF and ISF against Sadrists and JAM members suspected of involvement in sectarian and anti-ISF and MNF violence. We plan to explore these hypotheses with our contacts over the next several weeks. End comment. KHALILZAD