KURDS STILL STANDING BY MALIKI GOVERNMENT - FOR NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002184 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: KURDS STILL STANDING BY MALIKI GOVERNMENT - FOR NOW REF: BAGHDAD 2115 Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'fari is trying to cultivate support and position himself as an alternative to Prime Minister Maliki. He claims to have assembled an informal group that has backing from some Shi,a and Kurdish Council of Representatives (CoR) members. The extent of this group,s support is hard to ascertain. While one Kurdish CoR member claims some Kurdish CoR members favor Ja'fari, neither Kurdish leaders nor the rank-and-file currently favor Maliki's removal - until there is a plan that can succeed. END SUMMARY. Former PM Ja'fari Makes His Pitch -------------- ¶2. (C) In a June 25 meeting with Meghan O,Sullivan, Former Prime Minister Ja,fari claimed that Council of Representatives (CoR) members from the Dawa Party, Tawafuq Front, Fadhila, along Sadrist bloc and the Kurdish Alliance members, had created a new political "alliance" and hoped to form a new government. Ja,fari cited the current government,s sectarian make-up as a major obstacle to efficiency and said the new group would only appoint "technocrats" to the cabinet. Ja,fari claimed 40-60 CoR members meet "every other Tuesday" to discuss a single policy theme, but deflected direct questions about the group,s leadership. He provided O,Sullivan with an English-language version of the alliance,s program entitled "Rescue of Iraq" which calls for removing the Maliki government through a no-confidence vote in the CoR. O,Sullivan strongly reiterated U.S. support for Prime Minister Maliki and underscored how damaging delays attendant on any change of government would be for Iraq. Kurdish CoR Member Claims a Political Alliance Led by Ja'fari -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) On June 27, Kurdish CoR member Abdullah Saleh said that members of the Kurdish Alliance, with Dawa and ISCI elements, had been meeting for "several months" and named Ja'fari as the group,s leader. Saleh said Ja,fari was a natural choice because his leadership style was more inclusive, and because he had more pan-Arab credentials than the current PM. Saleh claimed the new alliance already had enough members to form a majority in the CoR. Asked about overall Kurdish support for the Ja,fari group, he answered ;that his association was "personal" and admitted that this did not have buy-in from top Kurdish leadership. ¶4. (C) Saleh expounded on Ja'fari's comments on the make-up of the new government, saying that when it was formed, the alliance would give the Arab Sunnis 20 percent of the ministerial positions. Using the phrase "they are either with us or against us," he added these positions would not go to Sunnis in Baghdad, but to Sunnis who were working against al Qaeda in the provinces and had proven that they had real influence with the people. The alliance would present their program to these tribal leaders and if the leaders accepted the program they would be asked to join the government. Saleh said sectarian divisions were paralyzing the current government, with disastrous consequences for the country. Ja'fari Group Reaching Out to Sadrists -------------- ¶5. (C) Saleh told PolOffs he would travel as part of a Kurdish group on June 28 to Najaf to engage with Muqtada al Sadr on linking a timetable for the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq with the progress of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). According to Saleh, as the ISF reach certain benchmarks for numbers trained and demonstrate their competence and effectiveness, Coalition Forces would rotate to support roles and eventually rotate out of the country. ¶6. (C) Saleh said Sadr was the "most important" political player in Iraq and could be a constructive force if "approached properly" (NOTE: Saleh has known Sadr since he was a child and was a friend of both his father and his uncle. END NOTE.) Although Saleh initially denied the plan to change the government would be on the agenda, he said he would raise several of the group,s ideas, including peshmerga protection of the Samarra,s Golden Mosque, which he thought might placate Sadr and perhaps "bring him along." Saleh underscored that he was not traveling as the representative of the Kurdish leadership. Currently Little Kurdish Support for Ja'fari -------------- BAGHDAD 00002184 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Despite Saleh's position, other Kurdish CoR contacts said that neither senior Kurdish leadership nor rank-and-file Kurdish Alliance members support removing the Prime Minister, nor did they think Ja'fari would be the right person to replace him. Some suggested this position might change, particularly if the Prime Minister,s Da'wa party began calling for Maliki,s removal, but underscored any support for changing the government would come at a price, probably involving Article 140. Others dismissed the movement as merely the Baghdad manifestation of the struggle for political power in the southern part of Iraq between Sadrists and Abdul Aziz al Hakim,s ISCI. ¶8. (C) Respected Kurdish independent Mahmoud Othman told Poloff June 28 that the Kurdish leadership would not openly back a plan that replaced the Maliki government -- until it was clear it could succeed. He observed that, while the PM is weak and ineffective (as was the rest of the government), finding a candidate to replace him would be very difficult. He did say that plans were in the works to replace all of the ministers with those that were competent and could work together - not those that simply fill a party quota - and to shrink the number of ministers to 20. ¶9. (C) Othman also condemned the Group of Four's (KDP, PUK, ISCI, Da'wa) efforts to form a moderate front and former Prime Minister Allawi's efforts to form an opposition front with the Sunnis, saying that this was exactly the wrong thing to do to encourage reconciliation. Two opposing sides were forming instead of working together to break down sectarian barriers, and nothing good would come of it, he said. Da'wa-ISCI Push Back Against Ja'fari, Hatch their Own Plots -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Othman pointed out that Da'wa and ISCI had formed a strategic council without Ja'fari (reftel) consisting of senior members of both parties to facilitate cooperation and (he claimed) to stave off Ja'fari's attempts to regain the position of prime minister. Maliki, Ali Adeeb and two others would represent Da'wa, while VP Adel Abdel Mehdi, Humam Hammudi and two others would represent ISCI. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Saleh took care not to suggest senior Kurdish support for Ja'fari's group or for Maliki's removal, but Kurdish leaders are aware of Saleh's involvement and have not forbidden his participation. Over the last few months, Kurdish CoR members have consistently asked about continued U.S. support for the Maliki government. CROCKER