Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD2145
2007-06-29 13:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

READ OUT FROM JUNE 26 MCNS

Tags:  IZ MARR MOPS PINR PINS PNAT PREL 
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VZCZCXRO9602
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2145/01 1801335
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291335Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1939
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002145 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PINR PINS PNAT PREL
SUBJECT: READ OUT FROM JUNE 26 MCNS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002145 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017 TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PINR PINS PNAT PREL SUBJECT: READ OUT FROM JUNE 26 MCNS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Maliki presided over the June 16 meeting of the Ministerial Committee for National Security, during which: --Commander in Chief Joint Forces General Babakir al-Zebari gave an operational update on Baquba. Commanding General MNF-I David Petraeus expanded on the summary, providing an update on the surge offensive ongoing throughout Iraq against Al Qaeda. Petraeus pressed the need for the Government of Iraq to follow through on non-security lines of operation for the cleared communities. --National Security Advisor Mowafak al-Rubaie asked General Petraeus the status of Maliki's request at the June 19 MCNS to use Iraqi forces to secure the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MeK) at Ashraf. --Minister of State for National Security, Shirwan Waeli said his staff had completed a study on improving communications security through better regulation of mobile phone companies and distribution of SIM cards, as well as through the monitoring customer usage. --Rubaie announced that the two committees established to investigate the Samarra bombing had completed their work and handed the written reports to Maliki for review. --Maliki said the Iraqi Security Forces sent to Samarra were in dire straits due to increased attacks by well-armed terrorists and inadequate life support and logistics. Petraeus advised Maliki to direct the relevant commanders to take more responsibility for improving the situation and that the forces in Samarra were also confused from the lack of a clear mission and inadequate command-and-control mechanisms. --Maliki announced that he would request the Sadrists delay their planned July 5 march to Samarra by sixty days because of the current danger and lack of adequate ISF to protect the marching Iraqis. --National Security Advisor Rubaie announced the formation of two separate committees for National Reconciliation. DPM Zoubai objected to the "Technical Committee" in favor of keeping just the "Political Committee." --Maliki told Petraeus that the Ministry of Finance had already transferred funds to cover both the continued operation of the Rule of Law Complex in Rusafa and the 5000 new corrections guards for the Iraqi prison system. --Deputy National Security Advisor, Dr
. Safaa summarized a proposal that would create an overarching coordination committee for the national security structure. END SUMMARY. Military Progress -------------- ¶2. (C/REL MNF-I) Commander in Chief Joint Forces General Babakir summarized the military operations over the past week in Baquda. General Petraeus stressed that Baquba is just part of the overall intensified campaign against Al Qaeda. He said Coalition forces were taking down "the enemy" all over Iraq, including in Baghdad and its suburbs, north and south of Fallujah, and throughout the Euphrates River Valley. He said these operations have yielded substantial gains, including a reduction in the number of car bombs. Petraeus then emphasized that the GOI must do its part on the non-security side by ensuring basic services are provided and reconstruction is carried out in cleared areas. Maliki agreed, pointing out that the he is working closely with the Minister of Trade to ensure deliveries of basic food stuffs, such as flour, get to communities affected by military operations. Maliki went on to predict that Baquba revitalization might occur quicker than Anbar because of existing local organizations. MeK -------------- ¶3. (C/REL MNF-I) National Security Advisor Rubaie asked General Petraeus if he had a response to Maliki's request to turn security responsibility of the MeK in Camp Ashraf over to the Iraqi Security forces. General Petraeus said that prior to this meeting he had provided a letter responding to Maliki's overall concerns with the MeK. Petraeus recommended a discussion be postponed until Maliki had reviewed the letter. BAGHDAD 00002145 002 OF 003 Regulating Cell Phones -------------- ¶4. (C/REL MNF-I) Minister of State for National Security, Shirwan Waeli said his staff had completed a study on improving communications security through better regulation of mobile phone companies and the distribution of SIM cards, strict checking of buyer ID cards, as well as through monitoring of customer usage. Waeli stressed that these measures would disrupt terrorist activity. Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh stressed that any new regulations, including government monitoring of cell phone conversations, would need to be consistent with Iraqi law. Samarra Bombing Investigation Completed -------------- ¶5. (C/REL MNF-I) Rubaie passed out copies of the findings from two committees established to investigate the Samarra mosque bombing. Maliki said he understood that the investigation had determined that the Facility Protection Service was responsible for the bombing and that four members were arrested for their role. Rubaie said that only one of the four had been arrested because three were fugitives. Maliki questioned the role of the local police who were patrolling the street outside of the mosque. Rubaie responded that the committees' reports answer this question. Saleh asked if the commission had investigated the intelligence failure associated with the bombing, noting that the intelligence community had warned of a plot to blow up the mosque's minarets two weeks prior to the attack. Rubaie said he believed the committees did examine this issue. Maliki Reports Trouble for ISF in Samarra -------------- ¶6. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki complained that the Iraqi Security Forces in Samarra were "suffering", arguing that if their situation did not change, they will be destined for defeat, making the Government look weak. The forces, he said, are outgunned by the enemy, are taking significant casualties, and are not receiving adequate logistical support. Maliki gave an example of a VBIED that hit an IP station and killed seven police because there were no concrete barriers. He turned to General Petraeus for assistance, particularly asking for aerial support and vigorous offensive operations. Petraeus assured Maliki that the Coalition forces were always willing to provide military support. He added, however, that they needed actionable intelligence upon which to act. Petraeus also stressed that, while coalition forces would do all they could to assist with logistics, it was critical for security force commanders in Samarra to take more responsibility to ensure their troops obtain food, water, shelter, and adequate w eaponry -- a point vocally supported by Deputy Prime Minister Zoubai. Petraeus said he was also concerned that the missions of the various Iraqi units in Samarra were not clear. The US forces in the area had reported these deficiencies to Petraeus, noting that they had "no idea who is in charge" in Samarra and that no Iraqi seemed to know what they were to do on a daily basis. (Note: These issues have been largely resolved since the MCNS. End Note.) Samarra March to be Delayed by Sixty Days -------------- ¶7. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki announced that he would request that the Sadrists delay their July 5 march to Samarra by sixty days. He said the road to Samarra is too dangerous and that the GOI does not have sufficient force to protect the crowds that such an event would attract. National Reconciliation -------------- ¶8. (C/REL MNF-I) NSA Rubaie announced that the PM had formed two committees to foster national reconciliation. One would be headed by himself and be called the "Political Committee" and the second (to be headed by Dr. Bassima of OCINC though this was not stated) would be called the "Technical Committee." Both committees would work in close coordination with MNF-I to take advantage of the "golden opportunity" to reconcile tribes and former armed groups. DPM Zoubai said that the Technical Committee might make "mistakes" and urged the MCNS to drop this committee entirely in favor of only the Political Committee. (Note: Zoubai is concerned that the Technical Committee would inhibit reconciliation with Sunni tribes and armed groups. End Note.) BAGHDAD 00002145 003 OF 003 Iraqi Detainee Operations -------------- ¶9. (C/REL MNF-I) Petraeus reiterated that the Rule of Law Complex would be funded by MNF-I only through July and that the Prime Minister must act quickly to ensure it keeps operating. Maliki said that Ministry of Finance had already transferred ID63 billion for the ROL Complex support and another ID64 billion for the hiring of the needed 5000 Iraqi Corrections Service Guards. Intelligence National Security Legislation -------------- ¶10. (C/REL MNF-I) Deputy National Security Advisor, Dr. Safaa summarized a proposal that would create an overarching coordination committee for the national security structure. This committee would be in line with the national constitution and laws. The committee would not be an executive body, serving instead as an advisory and coordination cell for all intelligence entities within the Iraqi government. All attendees seemed a bit confused by the plan and asked for time to review and comment on the proposal. Saleh said the overall intelligence structure was already too complicated, and that adding another entity would only add to the disarray. He stressed the current system was comprised of too many organizations with overlapping responsibilities and unclear missions. Zoubai supported Saleh's assessment, stressing that developing a well-defined and coordinated intelligence system was critical to Iraq's long-term success. CROCKER

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