DDR - TIMING IS NOT YET RIPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002140 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR USAID/ANE/IR, NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2017 TAGS: IZ PARM PGOV PREL SUBJECT: DDR - TIMING IS NOT YET RIPE Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The political and security environment in Iraq among the contending parties does not make it possible to pursue a doctrinal demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program for militia members at this time. A DDR Proof of Principle Reintegration effort can begin with detainees at this time. Instead, Coalition and GOI resources and attention are being directed toward engagement and reconciliation efforts with specific contending groups as envisioned in the new Joint Campaign Plan. Post supports the DDR Proof of Principle Reintegration efforts as presented by DoD and recommends DOS support funding these programs. At the same time, MNF-I coordinated with Embassy elements to develop an appropriate program to utilize the $155 million provided in FY 07 Supplemental Appropriation to support DDR efforts. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Recognizing the serious negative influence militia groups have over the security and political environment in Iraq, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and U.S. Mission-Iraq (USM-I) have devoted considerable energy to developing plans for a demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program. These initiatives would be designed to draw young men away from militias and return them to normal civilian life. MNF-I,s plans have prompted considerable discussion within the country team over the feasibility of initiating a major DDR program in the current political and security environment. ¶3. (C) GOI capacity and commitment to move forward on DDR at this time is also a significant concern. Although the Iraqi government has appointed a lead on DDR, he has no staff nor an office, and is making no progress towards implementing a disarmament program for militia members. The CoR included $150 million in its 2007 budget for DDR efforts, but the Ministry of Finance is waiting to release the funds pending development of an Iraqi government plan for DDR. The CoR has not moved on legislation to establish a disarmament program, nor are senior Iraqi officials or political party leaders focused on passing such a law. ¶4. (C) In response to the Ambassador,s concerns with these realities, a USAID-led and Embassy-sponsored DDR Assessment Mission was conducted in mid-May 2007 to review the prospects for going forward with a DDR effort. The first line of the Assessment Mission,s report states clearly that, "Now is not the time to be moving forward with a demobilization or disarmament effort in Iraq." It further argues that if the goal is reducing violence, then efforts need to focus in the short term on &ceasefires with individual groups that will lead them to stand down long enough for a broader political process to begin.8 ¶5. (C) Other bilateral donors and UN colleagues have also expressed strong objections to pushing DDR at this time. They agree that the resources and personnel currently dedicated to the DDR effort would be best used in a process of engagement and reconciliation which will ultimately lead armed groups to lay down their arms. In the meantime, other programs which give communities and young men alternatives to supporting militias, such as a vigorous vocational training program, micro-financing opportunities, jobs creation programs, and other economic development programs should be pursued. ¶6. (C) Such an approach is consistent with the strategic emphasis on supporting reconciliation efforts that is found in the new Joint Campaign Plan (JCP). Steps are already being taken to assign staff in support of the new JCP, including enhancing Embassy support to MNF-I engagement efforts, and will be further supported with the arrival of the new head of the Embassy,s PolMil section. A key recommendation of the DDR Assessment Report ) expanding the role of the U.N. in reconciliation efforts ) has our support and we hope we will have the Department,s help in ensuring that appropriate language for such a role is included in the new UNSC resolution extending UNAMI,s mandate in Iraq. The U.N. is ideally suited to lead Track Two engagements with the communities from which militia groups draw their support that will help cement Track One negotiations concluded with specific armed groups. ¶7. (C) An immediate concern among our DOD colleagues is programming the $155 million for DDR provided to them under the recently passed FY07 supplemental appropriation. Language in the appropriation states that use of these funds is subject to DOS concurrence. We understand MNF-I is working through various options for using the funds and will be presenting its ideas soon for Mission and Departmental BAGHDAD 00002140 002 OF 002 concurrence. Post supports the DDR Proof of Principle Reintegration efforts as presented by DoD. ¶8. (C) Given the above, it is the post,s intent to set aside discussion of DDR for the time being, and instead focus on supporting engagement and reconciliation efforts in partnership with MNF-I and hopefully with UNAMI. Post will continue to evaluate when DDR efforts can begin and consider the time required to develop the institutional capacity for a successful DDR program. Elements of the existing assistance portfolio, including USAID,s successful Community Stabilization Program and its new agriculture and provincial economic development activities, as well as the Quick Reaction Funds that will be available to PRTs, can in many cases be targeted to support communities from which militia are based if and when circumstances are appropriate. CROCKER