IRAQI PM ON BAGHDAD SECURITY, PROPOSED BORDER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000211 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER PBTS IZ IR SY SUBJECT: IRAQI PM ON BAGHDAD SECURITY, PROPOSED BORDER CLOSURES WITH IRAN AND SYRIA Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In a January 17 meeting with MNF-I Commanding General (CG) Casey and the Ambassador, Iraqi PM Maliki agreed to proposals for traffic controls in Baghdad to prevent suicide and vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks. The CG told the PM he is satisfied so far with Iraqi Baghdad commander General Aboud; the PM asked the CG to inform him if there are any problems with Aboud. The PM approved temporary closure of border points of entry (POEs) with Iran and Syria; the POEs will be re-opened gradually, as better inspection procedures and equipment are put in place. The Ambassador raised the Council of Representatives' (CoR) persistent failure to achieve quorum. The PM said he had called CoR Speaker Mashadani into his office, blamed him for the problem, and the PM will address the CoR on this issue and on security, but has not yet set a date. The PM told the CG and Ambassador it would have been better if the GOI had been informed beforehand about the January 16 detention of two Wasit Provincial Council (PC) members. End Summary. -------------- Baghdad Security -------------- ¶2. (S) CG Casey showed PM Maliki a map of suicide and VBIED attacks in the center of Baghdad since July, noting that most occurred in mixed Sunni/Shiite neighborhood of east Baghdad between the army canal and the Tigris River. This is the place to take action, the CG said, including traffic control measures, checkpoints on bridges, and some street closures. The PM agreed; "if this is necessary for the plan, we will do it." ¶3. (S) The PM suggested that all checkpoints include armored vehicles not possessed by militias, such as tanks or humvees, so that real checkpoints could easily be distinguished from illegal militia checkpoints. The CG agreed to work the idea. ¶4. (S) The CG informed the PM that Iraqi Baghdad commander General Aboud's headquarters would reach an initial capability by February 1 and five districts would be occupied by February 5. The PM asked the CG whether he was satisfied with Aboud. The CG replied that so far there had been no problem; the PM asked the CG to inform him if there are any problems. ¶5. (S) The PM noted that the Iraqi National Police had some personnel shortages and suggested 9700 extra police could be brought in from Diwaniyah. The CG replied that it would be difficult to ascertain whether they were reliable without inspecting them; they could be infiltrated by militia. He agreed to work with the MOI on it. -------------- Border Closings -------------- ¶6. (S) The CG raised the proposed plan for border point of entry (POE) closings. The idea, being worked with the MOI and MOD, he explained, would be to close all POEs with Iran and Syria, but not Jordan, for 72 hours and re-open them gradually as they became prepared with better inspection procedures and equipment. The PM approved of the idea. The Ambassador urged that consideration be given to the effect POE closure would have on the economy and on pilgrims, especially as the Ashura holiday approaches. ¶7. (S) The PM noted the difficulty of closing Zurbatiyah POE between Iraq and Iran; this is the POE from which Iraq receives a great deal of kerosene needed to heat homes in the winter. The PM also noted that, in the north, most of the kerosene for the Mosul area comes through the Rabea'a POE, which he proposed only be open to fuel tankers. ¶8. (S) The CG asked the PM to consider a closure from January 28 to February 1; this would be after Ashura pilgrims had entered Iraq but before they would leave. The PM said the Ministry of Interior (MOI) wanted to close most POEs permanently, pending improvements in security and anti-smuggling efforts. It would do little good, the PM added, to re-open POEs without scanning equipment; he asked the CG to facilitate the arrival of scanning equipment. ¶9. (S) On POEs bordering Iran, the PM confirmed that the policy would be that people and cargo would have to switch BAGHDAD 00000211 002 OF 002 from Iranian to Iraqi vehicles; no Iranian vehicles would be permitted to enter Iraq. The PM expressed concern over the possible Kurdish reaction to the POE closures; the CG recommended the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) be notified of the proposed closure. -------------- CoR Failure to Achieve Quorum -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asked the PM about his plans for addressing the CoR about their persistent failure to achieve quorum. The PM said he had not yet set a date but had called in CoR Speaker Mashadani and "blamed him and held him accountable" for CoR inactivity which, the PM noted, is delaying key legislation. The PM said he would address the CoR on both the quorum issue and on security; Mashadani should announce the date when it was decided. Ambassador will meet Mashadani on January 18 to finalize the date. -------------- Wasit Detentions -------------- ¶11. (S) The CG raised the January 16 detentions of two Badr Corps-affiliated Wasit PC members, saying MNF-I had good intelligence that both belong to a network responsible for financing, importing and distributing materiel for explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) used against Coalition Forces (CF). The two also have connections with Iran's Qods Force (QF). The CG told the PM that one detainee had telephone contact with a supposed Iranian "diplomat" detained in December for EFP activity. In fact, Badr is using the Zurbatiya POE to smuggle EFP materiel into Iraq. ¶12. (S) The PM replied that killing CF is "a violation" no different that killing Iraqis. However, the PM added, it would have been better if MNF-I had notified the GOI about the Wasit operation beforehand. The Ambassador and CG took the PM's point. The CG noted this was an Iraqi Army operation using MNF-I intelligence, but nonetheless the GOI should have been notified. -------------- MOD/MOI Operational Reserve Ready -------------- ¶13. (C) The CG informed the PM that the MOD and MOI operational reserve battalions are now assembled, trained, and had performed an operation. KHALILZAD