COR SPEAKER MASHADANI WEARY BUT NOT LETTING GO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002099 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: COR SPEAKER MASHADANI WEARY BUT NOT LETTING GO REF: A. BAGHDAD 1935 ¶B. BAGHDAD 1934 Classified by PolCouns Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Departing PolCouns paid a farewell call on the embattled Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker June 25, hearing his side of a political struggle that continues to threaten his job. The Speaker lamented the loss that his departure would mean for the Sunnis and complained of Iran's dominance of Baghdad politics. In spite of internal rifts in most of Iraq's political blocs, he said new alliances and an apolitical cabinet could help improve the policy landscape. He continues to argue that his ouster is inappropriate without a reconsideration of the overall political agreement by which the PM and President were also chosen. When the Speaker called for a slower timeline on benchmark legislation and cited U.S. ambivalence for Sunni causes, PolCouns reminded him of our robust efforts, both rhetorically and practically, to assure Sunni issues received consideration and to encourage Sunni participation within the context of an open political process in which we hoped all parties would participate actively. End summary. ¶2. (C) Prior to her departure from Baghdad, PolCouns paid a farewell call on the embattled CoR Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani on June 25, asking his thoughts on the current situation in Baghdad. Rather than address the question directly, the Speaker lamented the image of a Sunni speaker being pressed to resign, yet another loss for the "Arab Sunni" in Iraq who are unable to "maintain their pride" in the face of "illegal" Shia excesses. He said Iran's national security relies on a strong Shia coalition in Iraq. (Note: Recent sessions have been chaired by Deputy Speaker Khalid al-Attiya, an independent Shia, often with Mashadani in the CoR building but avoiding the session room because his entry would spark a Shia walk-out. The Sunni bloc boycotted the June 24 and 25 sessions in protest of the Speaker's absence. End note.) ¶3. (C) Citing internal rifts in most of Iraq's political coalitions, and toying rhetorically with a number of theoretical alliances between these somewhat fractured blocs, the Speaker said the Sunni (Tawafuq) group could work with Fadhila and those Sadrists who resist Iranian influence more than it could cooperate with others in the Shia coalition. He promoted his oft-cited desire for a cabinet of technocrats not allied with any party, stressing that the parliament (CoR) should be the political arbiter while the executive branch should focus on professional administration of executive functions. The cabinet needs to be independent of politics to be effective, he argued, suggesting that PM al-Maliki has "turned the GoI into Dawa." He complained that the PM was not an honest broker and that an "explosion" was coming unless the GoI gained more balance. ¶4. (C) Returning to his own fate as Speaker, Mashadani said his appointment was part of a broader political equation and that the PM and Presidency should be reconsidered if he was to be removed. All had agreed that "one plus one equals two" and now some were suggesting that "one plus one equals ten," he insisted, citing the unconstitutional nature of the effort to oust him. (Note: The Speaker cited Article 49-5 of the constitution which calls upon the CoR to "promulgate a law dealing with the replacement of its members on resignation, dismissal, or death." A Tawafuq CoR member told PolOff later that evening that just such a law was under consideration and might pave the way for the Speaker's resignation. The idea was to forward the law quickly and allow the Speaker to chair one or more sessions before his actual resignation. End note.) ¶5. (C) Mashadani said U.S. pressure on the CoR to produce laws on oil and other key benchmarks was working against "both our interests." A strong GoI is a clear U.S. goal, he said, and pressure to produce an oil law quickly makes the GoI look weak. He argued for a six-month timeline ("what is six months between friends?"). Security also needs time to succeed, he said, and would not be improved by quick passage of an oil law. ¶6. (C) The Speaker said the USG stood by as if it were unconcerned while the Shia pressed forward with constitutionally questionable activities. He said the U.S. is too comfortable with Iran's influence on the GoI and resists Sunni efforts to seek help from its Arab neighbors. The GoI has lost the trust of the Iraqi people, he lamented, as too many operational functions of the GoI were "under Iranian rule." PolCouns reminded the Speaker of our oft-stated and very evident support for the GoI, an open political process, and participation by all parties in Iraq. Mashadani appreciated the expression of solidarity with the Iraqi people but remained skeptical of the depth of U.S. engagement in behalf of Sunni causes. BAGHDAD 00002099 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Before the meeting closed, Mashadani's mood became temporarily angry as he also complained that the U.S. was doing nothing to help its friends, clearly suggesting that the U.S. should intervene to save his job. Pol/C made clear that the U.S. supported the current government, respected the right of the members of the Council of Representatives to exercise their constitutional rights, and hoped that the current crisis in the CoR would be solved on the basis of what was in Iraq's interests. She added that she hoped Mashadani would continue his role as a Sunni political leader and to work toward reconciliation. The meeting ended on a cordial note. CROCKER