TALABANI OPTIMISTIC ABOUT HYDROCARBON LAW,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002047 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ TU SUBJECT: TALABANI OPTIMISTIC ABOUT HYDROCARBON LAW, CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During a June 12 lunch with Deputy Secretary Negroponte, President Talabani said he would engage SIPDIS the Turkish Government in an attempt to reduce tensions along Iraq's northern borders but dismissed the idea of GOI military action against PKK elements in Iraq. President Talabani remarked that poor communication between PM Maliki and the United States military command impacted the effectiveness of the Iraqi Army. While Talabani seemed optimistic that key hydrocarbon legislation would pass in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) "before the end of the month", he suggested the only way to ensure passage of other legislative and reconciliation benchmarks would be for Iraq's top five political leaders to meet and make the decisions themselves, bypassing the assembly. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The meeting took place at the President's official residence. United States representatives included the Deputy Secretary, Ambassador Crocker, S/I Satterfield and the PAO. SIPDIS Iraqi participants included President Jalal Talabani; Minister of Water Resources Dr. Latif Rashid, and CoR Kurdish Alliance Chairman Fuad Massoum. -------------- -------------- TURKISH BORDER ISSUES-DIALOGUE WITH TURKEY, BUT NO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST PKK -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Negroponte emphasized the Government of Iraq (GOI) needed to do "the utmost" to avoid giving Turkey even a pretext for a cross-border operation. President Talabani replied that the Turkish Army was engaged in a propaganda campaign and, in an election year, wanted to portray itself as "the defender of the Turkish public". Talabani added the GOI was cooperating with Turkey and that it had shut down PKK offices in Kurdistan's major cities at Turkey's request. However, Talabani ruled out Iraqi military action against the PKK saying the Iraqi Army could neither successfully fight the PKK in the mountainous terrain of northern Kurdistan nor spare the assets for such an operation. Talabani said that the Turkish military is behind Turkey's bellicose stance, but that the civilian leadership, and in particular the MIT (Turkish CIA equivalent) opposed a military operation on the grounds that it would quickly become a quagmire for the Turkish Army. Talabani noted the Turks refused to work with a tri-partite commission (United States, Iraq, Turkey) established to deal with northern border issues, because one of the assistants to the Iraqi representative is a Kurd. Talabani closed by saying he would talk with the Turks and that he thought of the PKK generally as "trouble makers." -------------- -------------- SECURITY ISSUES--PROBLEMS AT THE TOP ARE A CONCERN -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) President Talabani said that he had observed some progress in the security situation in Baghdad. He attributed this progress to both the Iraqi Army's (IA) improved effectiveness and a greater reliance on Kurdish units to conduct security operations in Shi'a and Sunni areas. However, he said gains were often temporary because insurgents invariably returned to cleared areas as soon as military assets moved on. Of greater concern to Talabani seemed to be what he described as a "lack of consultation" between Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and Commanding General David Petraeus. Talabani said that Maliki viewed some of the people with whom General Petraeus wished to work as unreformed Ba'athists, particularly in Ninewah province. He also blamed equipment, communications, and transport shortages on inefficiencies at the highest command levels. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Crocker pointed out that he and the CG met with the PM weekly. Ambassador Crocker noted that the USG had provided equipment far beyond what the PM had described to Talabani, but that it was likely that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense still had not distributed them. Talabani countered by citing initiatives stalled by poor coordination at the highest command levels: the IA's pending efforts to recruit and train an additional thirty thousand soldiers and plans to form another Republican Guard unit. Ambassador Crocker said practical considerations limited the number of new recruits the IA could train and added that with current shortfalls in the IA's officer corps would limit the growth of the IA. However, both Deputy Secretary Negroponte and Ambassador Crocker reiterated USG support for a 12 division Iraqi army. Talabani said he thought Maliki was unsure whether senior US commanders backed this objective. ¶6. (C) President Talabani mentioned that Al-Qaeda controlled a number of areas in Baghdad, and Iraqi Christians BAGHDAD 00002047 002 OF 003 were among the groups they specifically targeted. Talabani added that many had fled to Kurdistan. Ambassador Crocker noted recent efforts to use local groups to counter the Al-Qaeda threat. President Talabani reacted strongly saying under no circumstances should we work with "gangs of criminals" that we ultimately will not be able to control. Talabani argued the IA could be doing the fighting and emphasized how important it is in counter-insurgency/counter-terrorist operations to maintain the support of local populaces and command of whole areas. -------------- -------------- BENCHMARK LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW--PARTY LEADERS MUST MAKE THE DEALS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador Crocker asked whether the political leadership supported the May 23 Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) recommendations. CRC Vice Chairman Fuad Massoum answered that the committee had done everything it could and that a summit between President Talabani, KRG President Barzani, Vice Presidents Hashimi and Abdel Mehdi and Prime Minister Maliki was really necessary. At the conclusion of the working lunch, Massoum added that he would be leaving for Kurdistan within 48 hours, with plans to return to Baghdad in two weeks "only if there was work to be done." -------------- Hydrocarbons Law -------------- ¶8. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte said agreement on a hydrocarbons law, and in particular its revenue-sharing provision, was important because it demonstrated that the different branches of the GOI could reach across sectarian lines and agree on issues of national interest. President Talabani countered that the Council of Ministers had agreed on the content of the revenue-sharing provisions, but had not yet sent the bill to the CoR. When the Deputy Secretary emphasized the need to pass this law quickly, Talabani responded that he thought the legislation could pass as soon as late June -- in advance of the July deadline for the preliminary benchmark reports to Congress. -------------- Article 140 -------------- ¶9. (C) President Talabani said a referendum on the status of Kirkuk in the time-frame dictated by the constitution is impossible because constitutionally-mandated "normalization" (the compensated, voluntary resettlement of people introduced into Kirkuk and the disputed territories by the former regime) had not proceeded on schedule. Talabani concluded that because this condition had not been met, the referendum schedule would automatically extend past the December 31, 2007 deadline without amendment to the constitution or other action by the GOI. To Ambassador Crocker's concerns about Kurdish Regional Government President Masud Barzani's reaction to a delay, Talabani, a one-time rival of the Barzani clan, replied "what can he do?" -------------- MASHADANI--DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN -------------- ¶10. (C) President Talabani said former CoR Speaker Mashadani had been "fired" and that the Tawafiiq (Sunni) coalition had been offered the opportunity to present another candidate. Talabani cited several names including Adnan al-Duleimi and Osama al-Tikriti, but emphasized that any nominee would require CoR approval. Massoum added that Mashadani was claiming his removal was illegal. S/I Satterfield noted these were the same names mentioned the previous year during the formation of the government. Talabani said he did not think Duleimi was interested in serving as CoR speaker. -------------- ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES--WHO GETS THE PALACE? -------------- ¶11. (C) President Talabani asked Deputy Secretary Negroponte when the Embassy would "give (the GOI) the Palace". Ambassador Crocker said that construction on the new embassy complex was "going well." He added the USG was conducting both a civilian and military surge and that the number of Americans arriving in Baghdad would continue to grow. Crocker concluded that under these circumstances, the USG would probably keep the palace for some time. Talabani said he welcomed both surges and that the GOI had recently BAGHDAD 00002047 003 OF 003 completed construction of a new presidency complex in the Karada district directly outside the International Zone (IZ). Talabani said he thought Iraqi security forces were now capable of securing this area and because it is one of Baghdad's most important commercial and recreational hubs, he would like to see it linked to the IZ. Echoing some of his comments on the current security situation, Talabani observed US military authorities have been slow responding to his requests. Without providing a timeline, Talabani added he expected all ministers, ministries and the CoR to move out of the IZ, saying they could provide their own security and that presence of their security forces could help secure the surrounding area. ¶12. (U) This reporting message has been cleared by the Deputy Secretary's Staff. SIPDIS CROCKER