PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002026 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: IZ PREL SOCI SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES (PRDCS) - ITAO PROGRAM UPDATE Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) Since mid-2005, Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees (PRDCs) have worked alongside provincial governments across Iraq. Developed to build capacity of newly elected provincial governments, PRDCs continue to provide assistance throughout the provinces. They are a premier program to improve Iraqi provincial governance. Pursuing that goal has necessarily meant a relatively slow disbursal of funds compared to programs with no formal Iraqi consultation. However, part of the program's success can be seen in that the provinces have now submitted more approved projects than current funding can support. End Summary. PRDCs -------------- ¶2. (U) Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees (PRDCs) are comprised of provincial council members, governor appointees, local directors general of national ministries, local business interests and community members at-large. Initially funded by IRRF, but now also funded by ESF, our goal remains the same; to strengthen the ability of provincial governments to set priorities, deliver basic services to their communities, and improve economic development at the provincial and local levels. PRDC Process -------------- ¶3. (U) Each PRDC creates a prioritized list of reconstruction projects that addresses provincial needs. The projects lists are then discussed in a public forum, during which time the PRDC further vets, prioritizes and finalizes the projects with its constituents. ¶4. (U) Following PRDC review, the projects lists are submitted to the Provincial Council (PC) for review and approval. ¶5. (U) Projects approved by the Provincial Council are then forwarded to the Provincial Reconstruction Team's (PRT's) Provincial Program Manager (PPM). Provided the PPM concurs based on USG policies and legal limitations, the list proceeds to the Embassy's Iraq Transition and Assistance Office (ITAO) for review and approval. ¶6. (U) The ITAO Budget Office - in conjunction with ITAO Essential Services, the Office of Provincial Affairs, and other Mission subject matter experts - reviews the projects to ensure they meet ESF and other applicable guidelines. The National Embassy Team (NET),made up of the same stakeholders, provides final approval. This can take between 7 to 10 days. ¶7. (U) Upon approval the lengthiest part of the process lies ahead. Projects must then be scoped, estimated, bid and finally awarded, which can take upwards of 5 months to complete. To date, seventy-nine projects have been awarded; work has commenced on 18 of those projects. Some project starts have been hindered, most notably due to security. Initial Challenges -------------- ¶8. (U) PRDCs were given significant autonomy to create and govern themselves; a necessary tool to respond to unique, localized issues and needs. ¶9. (U) This emphasis on local autonomy; however, resulted in time being spent by provincial officials to stand up PRDCs, leading to subsequent delays in actually implementing PRDC activities. Moreover, the ad hoc terms and conditions of PRDC membership has at times fostered a lack of accountability and transparency, with some PRDC members focusing their efforts solely on party, tribal and/or religious affiliations. ¶10. (U) Several other factors presented obstacles to the PRDC initiative with the first IRRF funded program in FY06, including mid-stream changes in the NET submission process and IRRF sector-specific funding constraints, both of which made the process less responsive to the PRDCs. In addition, a first-come first-served approach to funding project cost growth without regard to provincial allocations meant that provinces that submitted projects late did not receive contracts to their full allocation. Numerous process changes in the ESF PRDC process have improved responsiveness to and engagement with the PRDCs. BAGHDAD 00002026 002 OF 002 PRDC Successes -------------- ¶11. (U) After a bumpy start, the PRDC initiative has gained momentum and continues to show progress. For example, over the last six months PRDCs have reviewed and approved 258 projects. One of these projects is the Musayib Maternity Hospital. ¶12. (U) The Musayib Maternity Hospital, located in Babil province's embattled and predominantly Sunni northern region, is representational of the successes found in the PRDC initiative. Babil - a Shi'a governed province with no Sunni representation on the Provincial Council (PC) - received $8.9M in FY06 ESF. Yet at the request of the Babil PRDC, the PC agreed to approve the Musayib Maternity Hospital at a cost of $6.3M; or 70% of Babil's FY06 ESF budget. Moreover, in order to ensure that Musayib Maternity Hospital by quickly and properly implemented, the PC tasked a team of Iraqi engineers and supervisors to work with the USG. This level of Iraqi ownership in a USG-funded and managed project - a level of cooperation and commitment that clearly crossed the Sunni/Shi'a sectarian divide - came about as a direct result of the PRDC initiative. Comment -------------- ¶13. (U) Not intended as principally a reconstruction effort, but as a means to stimulate engagement and capacity building at the provincial government level, PRDCs have provided a mechanism for local and provincial participation and management of assistance funds. These young governments have gained valuable skills in democratic decision-making through the PRDC process, a process that evokes conversation, debate and compromise. As an increasing number of the approved projects are completed, constituents are expected to have an enhanced quality of life to include; more effective local governments, improved delivery of electricity, water and sewage collection services. ¶14. (U) The PRDC effort also highlights the tension between spending money quickly and spending it well. If we had elbowed provincial authorities aside and had dispensed with the local consultation process, we could have spent more of the funding dedicated to PRDC projects more quickly. There are some circumstances in which a PRT should move forward quickly, which is why FY07 "Quick Response Fund" will use a more expedited process. However, taking the time to allow local processes and Iraqi "buy in" to develop means that the PRDC system may be able to continue in the future as a purely Iraqi-funded and operated process. As of June 2007, the PRDCs have now submitted projects (which have withstood our review process) in numbers and amounts that exceed our available funding. It has been worth the wait. CROCKER