Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD202
2007-01-18 17:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
FORMER PRIME MINISTER JAFARI OFFERS HIS ADVICE ON
VZCZCXRO1814 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #0202 0181713 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 181713Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9162 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000202
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER JAFARI OFFERS HIS ADVICE ON
THE FUTURE
Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad per 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000202
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER JAFARI OFFERS HIS ADVICE ON
THE FUTURE
Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad per 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: During a dinner with the Ambassador on
January 15, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari
evaluated Iraq's development since 2003 and shared his
opinions on future policies the Government of Iraq (GOI)
should make. He criticized the Sunni Arabs in government
and characterized many of the current ministers as weak.
Jafari thought the United States should continue to
emphasize its commitment to democracy in Iraq, and he said
Iraqi leaders need to be strong and support their
government. He also offered his assistance in dealing with
Tehran and Muqtada al-Sadr. END SUMMARY.
--------------
Jafari Reviews Past Mistakes
--------------
2. (C) Jafari opened the conversation by saying he believed
the upcoming surge in U.S. troops would be helpful, but he
thought the decline in security from 2006 to 2007, despite
the steady number of U.S. troops, suggested new problems in
Iraq. Jafari said the Sunni Arabs who joined the
government in 2006 have sectarian beliefs, have not helped
improve the security situation, and are working against
their own government. He cited Tawafuq leader Adnan
al-Dulaymi's recent comments in Istanbul as an example of
Sunni leaders inflaming sectarian tensions. The Ambassador
disagreed with Jafari, saying he believed the fundamental
change in 2006 was a loss of Shia patience following the
bombing
of the Askaria Shrine in Samara and the rise of militias
taking
matters into their own hands; this caused most gains
following
the elections to disappear.
3. (C) Jafari said another problem was the Presidency was
not given to a Sunni Arab, and consequently, no Arab or
Muslim leader has made official visits to Iraq. He thought
Iraq should have friendly relationships with all its
neighbors, including Iran and Syria. Jafari said the
United States should have pressured the GOI to choose
stronger, more technocratic ministers. He said the GOI
failed to develop a political plan to contain the growth of
militias and instead allowed militias to integrate into the
Iraqi security forces (ISF). Jafari noted that allowing
Bayan Jabr to be the Minister of Interior was particularly
problematic. The Ambassador suggested that the Iraqi
political system, with its excessive diffusion of power,
might be
another problem. Jafari agreed and noted that over time,
the constitution is likely to change to address Iraq's
situation much like the U.S. constitution was amended.
--------------
And Gives His Advice for the Future
--------------
4. (C) Jafari characterized the Iraq Study Group report as
having many positives, a few negatives, and some gaps. He
said the U.S. Government should have asked Iraqi leaders for
help in filling in the gaps and then should have developed
an implementation plan. Jafari said the United States
should continue to focus on democracy in Iraq and should
not allow changes to the political structure that are
undemocratic, such as coups. He said leaders must stop
criticizing or weakening the government when they are part
of it. Jafari said national reconciliation should be
transformed from conferences with media statements to a
program that addresses difficult issues like detainees and
militias. He said the Prime Minister should have complete
control of the security forces and the Coalition should be
in supporting roles to the ISF. He added that the Ministry
of State for National Security should be made into a
full-fledged ministry.
--------------
Jafari Offers His Assistance
--------------
5. (C) Jafari opined that Washington needed to work out its
problems with Tehran. He said he might go to Iran in
February and offered his assistance on dealing with Iran.
Jafari said he had not seen Muqtada al-Sadr in some time
but offered to encourage Sadr to focus on constructive
politics if he travels to Najaf soon.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER JAFARI OFFERS HIS ADVICE ON
THE FUTURE
Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad per 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: During a dinner with the Ambassador on
January 15, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari
evaluated Iraq's development since 2003 and shared his
opinions on future policies the Government of Iraq (GOI)
should make. He criticized the Sunni Arabs in government
and characterized many of the current ministers as weak.
Jafari thought the United States should continue to
emphasize its commitment to democracy in Iraq, and he said
Iraqi leaders need to be strong and support their
government. He also offered his assistance in dealing with
Tehran and Muqtada al-Sadr. END SUMMARY.
--------------
Jafari Reviews Past Mistakes
--------------
2. (C) Jafari opened the conversation by saying he believed
the upcoming surge in U.S. troops would be helpful, but he
thought the decline in security from 2006 to 2007, despite
the steady number of U.S. troops, suggested new problems in
Iraq. Jafari said the Sunni Arabs who joined the
government in 2006 have sectarian beliefs, have not helped
improve the security situation, and are working against
their own government. He cited Tawafuq leader Adnan
al-Dulaymi's recent comments in Istanbul as an example of
Sunni leaders inflaming sectarian tensions. The Ambassador
disagreed with Jafari, saying he believed the fundamental
change in 2006 was a loss of Shia patience following the
bombing
of the Askaria Shrine in Samara and the rise of militias
taking
matters into their own hands; this caused most gains
following
the elections to disappear.
3. (C) Jafari said another problem was the Presidency was
not given to a Sunni Arab, and consequently, no Arab or
Muslim leader has made official visits to Iraq. He thought
Iraq should have friendly relationships with all its
neighbors, including Iran and Syria. Jafari said the
United States should have pressured the GOI to choose
stronger, more technocratic ministers. He said the GOI
failed to develop a political plan to contain the growth of
militias and instead allowed militias to integrate into the
Iraqi security forces (ISF). Jafari noted that allowing
Bayan Jabr to be the Minister of Interior was particularly
problematic. The Ambassador suggested that the Iraqi
political system, with its excessive diffusion of power,
might be
another problem. Jafari agreed and noted that over time,
the constitution is likely to change to address Iraq's
situation much like the U.S. constitution was amended.
--------------
And Gives His Advice for the Future
--------------
4. (C) Jafari characterized the Iraq Study Group report as
having many positives, a few negatives, and some gaps. He
said the U.S. Government should have asked Iraqi leaders for
help in filling in the gaps and then should have developed
an implementation plan. Jafari said the United States
should continue to focus on democracy in Iraq and should
not allow changes to the political structure that are
undemocratic, such as coups. He said leaders must stop
criticizing or weakening the government when they are part
of it. Jafari said national reconciliation should be
transformed from conferences with media statements to a
program that addresses difficult issues like detainees and
militias. He said the Prime Minister should have complete
control of the security forces and the Coalition should be
in supporting roles to the ISF. He added that the Ministry
of State for National Security should be made into a
full-fledged ministry.
--------------
Jafari Offers His Assistance
--------------
5. (C) Jafari opined that Washington needed to work out its
problems with Tehran. He said he might go to Iran in
February and offered his assistance on dealing with Iran.
Jafari said he had not seen Muqtada al-Sadr in some time
but offered to encourage Sadr to focus on constructive
politics if he travels to Najaf soon.
KHALILZAD