Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD200
2007-01-18 16:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

LIFE IN DHI QAR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS IZ 
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VZCZCXRO1748
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0200/01 0181640
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181640Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9157
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000200 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: LIFE IN DHI QAR

REF: 2006 BAGHDAD 4766

Classified By: Dhi Qar PRT Deputy Team Leader Richard Riley for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000200 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: LIFE IN DHI QAR REF: 2006 BAGHDAD 4766 Classified By: Dhi Qar PRT Deputy Team Leader Richard Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Dhi Qar cable. ¶2. (U) Summary: Life for the average citizen of Dhi Qar is challenging, but is considered better than in most parts of Iraq. The provincial government has legitimacy in the minds of the average citizen, the rule of law, though nascent and troubled, does provide some sense of security even if that security is under significant pressure from militia groups. The average citizen still faces great economic challenges from unemployment and underemployment, high fuel prices, inflation and the ever present Mahdi Militia. Infrastructure of the educational system is deficient, but improving at the K-12 level, but post-secondary education opportunities are undermined by high unemployment in the province, which makes pursuit of a higher degree less tenable or attractive. End summary. DEMOCRACY ¶3. (C) There is a sense in Dhi Qar that the last provincial elections held in December 2005 were democratically valid and as a result, elected representatives are generally legitimate. However, the provincial government has not yet found the capacity to actively engage at the grass roots level with the citizenry. Our conversations in a variety of municipalities in the province indicate a very light footprint of the provincial government in its engagement at the municipal level. Certainly, in the rural areas outside of the major cities, the provincial government's engagement is virtually non-existent. ¶4. (C) There is also the conscious disenfranchisement of those supporters of the OMS/JAM element, from the existing government, given their decision to boycott the last elections held in December 2005. We are not certain how many supporters of OMS/JAM were part of the 33% of the electorate who chose not to participate in the last elections, but we surmise a significant portion were likely JAM supporters. Given this, there is also an ongoing disconnect between these supporters of OMS/JAM and the current government due to the antagonism between the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Party (the party of the provincial Governor) and the Office of the Martyr Al-Sadr (OMS). OMS and SCIRI are political, and potentially martial enemies. Since the OMS boycotted the December 2005 provinc
ial elections in Dhi Qar, they have no representation in the Provincial Council (PC). This does not stop them, however, from exerting political influence in the province through ongoing intimidation of the population via the JAM, and through their tacit alliance with friends in the Fadilah Party, which controls 11 of the 41 seats in the PC. Thus there is significant cleavage between the OMS supporters and the SCIRI backers, which exacerbates political tension in the province. Nevertheless, given the significant turnout in the last election with 67% of the electorate voting, the current government is generally viewed as both democratically elected and legitimate in the mind of the average citizen. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND RELIGION ¶5. (C) There is no broad freedom of expression or religion in Dhi Qar province. The province is very heavily Shia (95%), but there are small minorities of Baptists (Comment: The term "Baptists" refers to the population of followers of St. John the Baptist who still exist in the city of Suq Ash Shuyukh, not to the Christian denomination known by that name. End comment) While we do not have much information about Suq Ash Shuyukh, our sources indicate that this minority, and the Sunni minority in that city live in constant fear of attacks. Moreover, given the overall tense relations between the OMS and SCIRI and others, one is not free to express himself overtly against JAM or Badr Corps without some fear of retribution. ¶6. (S) Individuals in Dhi Qar daily have to face the difficulties of the ubiquitous Mahdi Militia. People fear that there will be a conflict between the security forces and the Mahdi Militia that will bring a great deal of suffering to this province. In addition, we have reports of JAM members intimidating shopkeepers by searching their shops and computers for pornographic material. People who work with the Coalition are in fear of their lives. They tell us that houses of people suspected of collaborating with the Coalition have been bombed and some have been kidnapped for profit, but were targeted primarily because they are thought to work with the Coalition. In this province, the JAM draws BAGHDAD 00000200 002 OF 003 its membership from young, unemployed and uneducated men. One of the effects of this is that the JAM is beginning to get the reputation in many circles as thugs rather than an army of devout Shi'ites protecting their sect from outside and contaminating influences. Thus, the pervasiveness of the Mahdi militia and the intimidation they direct at portions of the local population has a direct and chilling effect on freedom of expression in the province. RULE OF LAW ¶7. (S) The sense that rule of law prevails in Dhi Qar is growing, but it has a long way to go. Our sources indicate that it is still very common for people to go to their tribal leaders to settle a dispute rather that entrust it to the civil authorities. On the other hand, the Iraqi Army in this province has proven capable of maintaining security in the province, and engaging militants when necessary. There are several confirmed reports in which the IP and IA have caught militiamen deploying rockets to be used against Coalition facilities in Dhi Qar. In each of these cases, the rockets were confiscated and the perpetrators arrested if possible (i.e. if caught). In most of those cases, the IP and IA acted on tips. There is no evidence of widespread harassment at police checkpoints ) shakedowns etc., but it is apparently easy to pay a bribe to get out of prison or out of trouble. There is also evidence of official corruption in obtaining Iraqi civil documentation. We have been told that one can procure an Iraqi ID with false name and other bio data for about $ 50 or a passport for about $ 200. ¶8. There are no reports of Shari'a courts, but the civil system is widely considered dysfunctional, and civil disputes are routinely handled through tribal elders. Our meetings with members of the Dhi Qar Judiciary recently indicate that the Judiciary is the weakest among the three branches of provincial government and provincial officials have actively sought the PRT's and Coalition's assistance in enhancing and improving the capacity of the courts and law enforcement in the province. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES ¶9. (U) Unemployment and underemployment are serious challenges in Dhi Qar. Estimates of the unemployment rate range from 40-60% . The unemployment situation in Dhi Qar is also potentially exacerbated by the inflow of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's). UNHCR estimates that approximately 12,000 IDP's have come to Dhi Qar since the bombing of the Samara mosque in February 2006. The relative safety, stability and homogeneity (Shia) of Dhi Qar has attracted this inflow of Shia IDP's, but also has the potential for making the unemployment situation that much worse. It is very difficult to find suitable work for those with college degrees. People who have college degrees are often either unemployed, or underemployed in trades or professions not in keeping with their level of education. ¶10. (U) Dhi Qar is a largely rural and agricultural province. The present low state of output in the agricultural sector due to many factors, including neglect of the agricultural infrastructure by the previous Sadaam regime and the inability of the current provincial government to support sufficiently the restoration of the agricultural base through subsidization of seed, fertilizer and equipment to farmers. Another factor is the insufficient level of electricity to power irrigation pumps which means that by some estimates only one fourth of the arable land in the province is tilled at this time. (See reftel) Entry-level workers unemployed by this situation, and others, can find work as day laborers. As in the United States, one who wishes employment as a day laborer will go to a designated place in Nassiriyah where day laborers congregate to meet employers early in the morning, and if they are fortunate, they will be hired for the day to do some manual job such as digging or another manual task. A day laborer can expect about 17,000 Dinars per day, and can expect to work perhaps twice a week if he is fortunate. Work days will be cancelled for either security reasons or for weather reducing the number of days when a day laborer can work. ¶11. (SBU) Inflation in Dhi Qar remains a significant issue. Among other causes, the high cost of fuel, and the difficulty in transporting goods to market due to security threats to convoys drive inflation in the province. Gasoline costs between 250 and 350 Dinars per liter depending on the grade. This is up from the pre-war price of about 20 Dinars per liter. People can also purchase gasoline on the black market for around 500 Dinars per liter. The high cost of fuel affects everything in Dhi Qar since, in addition to its use in automobiles, it is also used to fuel electrical BAGHDAD 00000200 003 OF 003 generators. That is significant with the present low level of electrical service in Dhi Qar ) three hours on, three hours off during the day, with about six hours of electricity during the night. ¶12. (SBU) The average cost of food is increasing to the point that it is difficult for a family to secure the food necessary to feed itself. The staple food, white rice, costs about 500 Dinars per kilogram. A kilogram of tomatoes costs about 1,500 Dinars now, and a kilogram of meat can cost as much as 8,000 Dinars. The practical effect of this is that many families will eat meat only once a week. EDUCATION ¶13. (SBU) The educational system in Dhi Qar is rudimentary, but improving. In general, the opportunity for children to attend primary school is good and improving due to Coalition efforts to rebuild and refurbish schools, but the motivation to obtain a higher education is undermined by the perceived lack of opportunity, and by the fact that the Sadaam era military service deferment is no longer in effect. The greatest concern is the fact that a person who would have otherwise gone on to college, will not do so now because of familial financial obligations, and because they don't see any improved opportunity for them if they do when you have people with college degrees underemployed as cab drivers and manual laborers. ¶14. (U) On a more positive note, in Dhi Qar at least, citizens are beginning to have a more positive view of the ability of the government to deliver essential services. Even though the ability of the local and provincial governments to deliver these services is still low, citizens are able to see progress around them in the form of streets being built, water treatment plants coming on line, etc. At present, this is probably only true in the cities, but it is a start, and people see it and can mark the progress, though there is still much room for improvement. KHALILZAD

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