DEPUTY SECRETARY SHARES VIEWS ON LEGISLATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001993

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY SHARES VIEWS ON LEGISLATIVE
PRIORITIES, SECURITY, REGIONAL TIES WITH FORMER PM AL-JAFARI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Former Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim
al-Jafari told the Deputy Secretary June 13 that Baghdad
security had deteriorated, and al-Jafari worried about the
potential impact of that morning's Samarra bombings. He was
not convinced that the Neighbors' Conference in Egypt was
bearing fruit and cited GoI failings in integrating itself
more effectively into the Sunni-dominant Arab world. He
spoke of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's fatherly role in the
Iraqi politics and cited his own efforts to moderate Iranian
views of Iraq's national interest. He discussed legislative
benchmarks without committing to assist with their passage
through parliament this summer. End summary.


2. (C) Meeting at the former Prime Minister's request, on
June 13, al-Jafari told the Deputy Secretary that the
situation in Baghdad had deteriorated since the latter's
departure from Iraq two years previously. Al-Jafari
appreciated America's historical role in bringing Iraq out of
the Saddam Hussein era, while cautioning that some USG
decisions had led to unanticipated consequences. He recalled
President Eisenhower's provision of funding for the French to
fight in Indochina in the early 1950s as an alternative to
providing troops -- stressing that Americans were more likely
to accept taxes than casualties. Iraq, on the other hand,
does not need funding so much as it needs assistance on the
ground and "courageous political steps" from its US ally.


3. (C) The Deputy Secretary and former PM lamented the
morning's events in Samarra, in which a sensitive shrine was
hit by terror yet again; the Deputy Secretary noted that the
attack had all the markings of al-Qaeda. Al-Jafari recalled
the first Samarra bombing, after which he claims to have
called all Friday prayer leaders to calm the rhetoric, went
on the media quickly, wrote to political bloc leaders, and
held emergency meetings on national security. He said
terrorists in Iraq were getting encouragement and weapons
from others in the region, including Iran (al-Jafari had seen
evidence provided by the US).


4. (C) As part of a general critique of the current
government, Al-Jafari suggested that the Neighbors'
Conference in Sharm al-Sheikh was only a conference with no
subsequent progress. The Deputy cited debt relief as a topic
which came into a more hopeful focus in Sharm al-Sheikh and
continued to be a priority. Noting the important role of
regional countries, al-Jafari called for steps to end Iraq's
isolation in the Arab world. He noted that he had advocated
naming a Sunni president; Iraq, he said, is a minority in an
Arab world with Sunni leadership. Baghdad receives visits
from the US President, the British and Australian PM's, and
others, but "no single Arab president or foreign minister."
Iraq cannot allow its Shia character to isolate it from the
Arab world, he argued.


5. (C) Ayatollah Sistani's moderating (fatherly) role in the
Iraqi political arena has been helpful, agreed al-Jafari, but
should remain general in nature; religious authorities should
play a supporting (and not a policy-making) role. (Note:
al-Jafari claimed to be in regular contact with Sistani and
the marjariah and to have met with Sistani each time he
visited Najaf. End note.) Citing his March visit to Iran,
during which he met "all of the Ayatollahs," al-Jafari said
he had emphasized Iraq's new relationship with America and
that Baghdad wished to benefit from the US presence (which is
"not easy to say in Iran"). Iran's characterization of its
interests in Iraq has some similarity, at least rhetorically,
to US positions. Nonetheless, many in Iran recall the
dangerous time they had with Saddam Hussein and react
negatively when they see pressure on the Shia. For Iraq's
part, it gets water from both Iran and Turkey and has
interest in cordial relations. Iraq's "red line" is
intervention into its internal affairs.


6. (C) Asked if he attended sessions of the Council of
Representatives (CoR),of which he is a member, al-Jafari
said he preferred to gather CoR members at his residence for
bi-weekly discussions (claiming to assemble 50 members from
all sects). He felt the CoR was not functioning at the
proper level, and he limited his attendance to once every few
months. He claimed that his participation at the Political
Council for National Security (PCNS) was more useful.
Pressed to assist the movement of key benchmark legislation,
al-Jafari agreed the laws were important yet deflected the
conversation to the weakness of the CoR, now hit by a
"shameful" row over its speaker's behavior. The Deputy
reminded the former PM that legislation is a key symbol of
reconciliation -- emphasizing the potential sharing of
hydrocarbon resources by a nation often characterized for
internal fighting. Al-Jafari called for moving national
reconciliation from mere statements and conferences to

BAGHDAD 00001993 002 OF 002


practical steps.


7. (U) This cable was cleared by the Deputy Secretary's staff.

CROCKER