Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1964
2007-06-14 11:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR, CG MEET WITH PM FOLLOWING SAMARRA

Tags:  IZ PGOV PTER 
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VZCZCXRO5080
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1964/01 1651139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141139Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1690
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001964 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PTER
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR, CG MEET WITH PM FOLLOWING SAMARRA
SHRINE ATTACK: CURFEW IMPOSED, EXTRA SECURITY AROUND
RELIGIOUS SITES

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001964

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PTER
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR, CG MEET WITH PM FOLLOWING SAMARRA
SHRINE ATTACK: CURFEW IMPOSED, EXTRA SECURITY AROUND
RELIGIOUS SITES

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador and Commanding General (CG)
met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki June 13 within hours
of the attack on the al-Askari mosque in Samarra to discuss
immediate next steps. The PM imposed a curfew beginning at
1500 local time in Baghdad and called for extra security
around mosques and religious sites throughout Iraq, focusing
specifically on Sunni mosques in Baghdad. He said that he
would meet with the Presidency Council to project an image of
national solidarity. Political leaders, including Moqtada
al-Sadr and Adnan al-Duleimi, issued statements (septel)
denouncing the attacks and warning all Iraqis against
retaliatory actions. The Prime Minister expressed
frustration at the insufficient abilities of the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and the delay in transferring full
security authority to the Government of Iraq (GOI). The PM
did agree, however, on the need to "look forward" and work
together to defuse tensions. S/I Satterfield and Major
General Fastabend were also present.
End Summary.

-------------- -
NEXT STEPS: CURFEW, PROTECTING RELIGIOUS SITES
-------------- -

2. (C) The CG told the PM that Coalition Forces (CF) will fly
General Adnan Thabat, the appointed Samarra Brigade
Commander, to the site of the attack and will ensure the
expedited movement of additional security forces to the area.
The PM ordered a curfew in Baghdad to begin at 1500 local
time. Noting the difficulty in containing "extremist Shia
elements" determined to stage reprisal attacks, the PM
ordered extra security at holy sites throughout Iraq, citing
specifically two Sunni mosques in Baghdad: Abu Hanifa mosque,
the most important Sunni holy site in Baghdad located in the
Sunni-dominated Adhamiyah area, and Abdulqadir al-Jilani
mosque, named after the founder of the Qadriya Sufi order and
recently attacked May 28.


3. (C) The PM further demanded that ISF increase scrutiny at
checkpoints, especially on the canals and roadways adjacent
to Sadr City. The Ambassador suggested that the PM identify
those mosques and holy places which are most vulnerable,
cautioning that the GOI should not exclude the possibility
that al-Qaida will attack another Shia site. The PM
responded that he anticipates the likely reaction to be
against Sunni sites but agreed that as a precaution all holy
places should receive extra protection. The PM asked for
aerial support to protect the Ministry of Oil against mortars

and rockets; the CG agreed.


4. (C) On the political side, the PM said he had already
spoken with Moqtada al-Sadr who asked what he could do to
help. "Issue a statement," the PM said he told al-Sadr.
Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI) leader Abdulaziz
al-Hakim will issue a statement from Iran, the PM noted,
urging people to avoid retaliatory attacks. The PM had
spoken with Sunni and Shia religious leaders requesting that
they issue fatwas condemning the attack and prohibiting
violent reactions. (Note: Statements from Iraq's political
leaders and reactions in the aftermath of the attack will be
reported septel. End Note.) Finally, the PM said he will
meet later with the Presidency Council to further discuss the
situation.

--------------
PM CONCERNED ISF WERE COMPLICIT IN ATTACK
--------------

5. (C) The CG offered the PM the most recent details, noting
that information continues to be received and new details
emerge. MG Fastabend stated there were two explosions which
initial reports suggested might have been mortar or rocket
attacks. However, based on the damage to the two minarets
this appears unlikely. According to MNF-I information
approximately 40 Iraqi Police from the Tikrit Emergency
Support Unit (a SWAT-like unit as opposed to local police)
guarded the perimeter while approximately 10 Facilities
Protection Service (FPS) personnel from the Ministry of
Interior were inside the building. Additional reports
suggest that a small-arms firefight erupted at the time of
the explosion. MG Fastabend concluded that it appears, based
on the damage, that the explosives were previously placed.
This suggests the ISF protecting the shrine may have been
complicit in the attack, the PM stated, noting that "the
people of Samarra are intimidated by al-Qaida" and forced
into executing their orders.

--------------
PM FRUSTRATED BY ISF CAPABILITIES
--------------

6. (C) The PM noted his previous warnings that attacks on

BAGHDAD 00001964 002 OF 002


religious sites could spark a significant increase in
sectarian tension and expressed frustration that more
security forces were not in place to protect the al-Askari
Mosque. The PM further noted his dissatisfaction with the
progress of the development and fielding of the ISF and his
unhappiness that they continue to be blamed for not providing
security even though "the security file is in US hands."
Offering condolences to all Iraqis, the Ambassador urged the
PM to approach this crisis in the spirit of understanding and
cooperation and to reach out to all of Iraq's political
leaders. The CG urged the PM to look forward and resist
assigning blame, noting that MNF-I is only partially
responsible for delays in building the security forces,
gently reminding the PM of the inability of Iraq to field
leaders for their new units. The CG emphasized that MNF-I
takes its responsibility to build, train and support the ISF
very seriously and wants to "move forward" in the wake of
this latest attack to prevent subsequent violence.


7. (C) Comment: Maliki has said and done the right things
in the aftermath of the bombing: a curfew, clearly
identifying al-Qaida as the enemy targeting both Shia and
Sunnis, protection for Sunni shrines, outreach to the Sunni
leadership (Sunni VP al-Hashemi told the Ambassador after the
Presidency Council meeting that it had been very positive
with Maliki making clear that he was very focused on
preventing retaliation),and an MNF-facilitated visit to
Samarra. The coming days will determine whether these
efforts will be sufficient to prevent a new wave of sectarian
violence.

CROCKER

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