AYAD ALLAWI RUMORED TO RETURN, MANY IN IRAQIYYA

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001942 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (REFERENCE A) E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017 TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL SUBJECT: AYAD ALLAWI RUMORED TO RETURN, MANY IN IRAQIYYA UNHAPPY WITH HIS LEADERSHIP REF: A. BAGHDAD 1889 ¶B. BAGHDAD 1987 ¶C. BAGHDAD 1859 Classified By: DCM Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary. Ayad Allawi, former Prime Minister and chief of the Iraqiyya bloc, is expected to return to Baghdad in the next week following several months traveling in European and Arab Capitals to drum up international support for a secular, cross-sectarian front as an alternative to the Maliki government; he threatened in March and then again in May to withdraw from the GOI in protest of its sectarian nature and failure to achieve progress on reconciliation. Revelation of the April 29 "Cairo Declaration," Allawi's most recent attempt to create an alternative bloc to the Maliki government with a group of mostly Sunni politicians, has placed him at the center of controversy and provoked political attacks from Shia and, in particular, Kurds. Although many parties agree with Allawi's secular, cross-sectarian political agenda, his numerous attempts to form an opposition bloc have failed, primarily due to the reluctance of others to work outside the GOI, and Allawi's insistence on his own leadership of a new front. Iraqiyya members outside of Allawi's inner circle are increasingly disappointed with his leadership and some are considering withdrawal from the bloc. Despite U.S. pressure to use his position as a national secular figure to help the GOI reach consensus on key benchmarks, Allawi has so far proven unwilling to put reconciliation goals before his own ambitions to regain the premiership. End summary. -------------- GOI Outrage over Defunct Cairo Declaration -------------- ¶2. (S) The so-called "Cairo Declaration," revealed publicly June 4, was produced by a group of mostly Sunni politicians and Allawi at a two day meeting in Cairo before the May 4 Neighbors Conference (ref B) It calls for the establishment a moderate bloc in opposition to the Maliki government. Its signatories include Allawi and Adnan Pachachi (Iraqiyya); Ayad al-Sumarrai (Iraqi Islamic Party, IIP); Dhafer al-Ani Tawafuq Salih Mutlaq and Amer al-Tamimi (Hewar); Hachim al-Hassani (Sunni moderate Iraqiyya member but signed under his former party the National Bloc); as well as several former Baathists and members of the Turcoman front. Public revelation of the document has produced public and private recriminations by Shia and Kurdish leaders, including PM Maliki. ¶3. (S) According to several Iraqiyya members, the new front was to be announced May 20 but never transpired because Sunni Tawafuq members pulled out shortly after the meeting. What is certain, is that by the time the declaration was revealed publicly (most likely by the GOI),it was already known to be defunct, leading Sunnis and Iraqiyya to accused the Shia and Kurds of using it for the purpose of political attacks. (Comment: Since his brief return in February, Allawi has been open about his attempts to convince other parties to join an opposition bloc; many parties including Hewar, IIP, Shia Fadhila, and the Kurdish PUK and KDP have negotiated with him at some point, though not all of them with the intention of withdrawing from the government. That the GOI was unaware of the defunct status of the Cairo Front when it released its contents is unlikely. End comment). -------------- Ayad Strikes Back -------------- ¶4. (U) In his first public statement in some time, Allawi was interviewed in London-based Arabic daily al-Sharq al-Awsat ON June 7. In reaction to the uproar over the Cairo Declaration, Allawi said that no political front was ever announced, and that the meeting was not held in secret. He criticized the GOI for accusing him of conspiring with Arab intelligence services, retorting that the GOI itself is infiltrated with Iranian intelligence. His repeated his common criticisms of the Maliki government -- that it had failed to fulfill its promises of reconciliation because it is sectarian in nature. Allawi claimed the U.S. was "incapable of finding real solution for Iraqi" and therefore "we must turn to international and regional forces" including the United Nations, Organization of Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and Iraqi neighbors; "these parties should be encouraged to intervene to help the United States." -------------- -------------- Allawi Postpones Withdrawal due to External Pressure -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) When Iraqiyya members met in Amman in mid-May, discussions centered on whether to withdraw from the GOI. According to Adnan Pachachi the decision was made to withdraw. Other Iraqiyya members outside of Allawi's own Wifaq party, however, say the rejected this approach. Hammeed Majid Musa, a Communist MP in the Iraqiyya bloc told us that he had objected to withdrawal at the Amman meeting. Musa said that others shared his view that such a move would serve only to isolate the Iraqiyya MPs from the government and their constituents. "We see Ayad as outside the Iraqiyya program," said Musa, referring to his efforts to ally with Sunnis parties against United Iraqi Alliance. Musa also criticized Allawi for encouraging Gulf countries to play a negative role. Several days later the Iraqi press reported that Iraqiyya list ministers had decided to continue in their posts should Allawi pulls out of the government. This conflicts with Allawi's claim in his London interview that "there was a complete opinion in the Iraqiyya list to with draw from the government." (Comment: most likely Allawi was aware that some Iraqiyya figures outside in his Wifaq inner circle disagreed with withdraw, but discounted them. End comment.) ¶6. (S) Following the Amman meeting, Allawi dispatched Adnan Pachachi to Baghdad to discuss the matter with Ambassador, among others (Ref C). On May 22, Ambassador strongly urged Pachachi against Iraqiyya's withdrawal from the GOI, saying that it would be a disastrous move at this time. Given the domestic pressure for quick GOI political progress, Ambassador made clear that in the USG view all political efforts should be directed at helping the Iraqi government make progress on reconciliation benchmarks. Pachachi met with Iraqiyya members that week and reportedly told them that due to U.S. and Group of Six pressure, Allawi had decided not to withdraw from the Maliki government before September. This was confirmed by Allawi in his London interview, "we received a torrent of contacts from the U.S. administration and leaders of Arab and Islamic countries who we respect asking us to wait and not withdraw because it would be damaging to the security and political situation. They asked us to give the Iraqi government another chance." ¶7. (S) A group of Iraqiyya members including Pachachi met with PM Maliki in a conciliatory meeting May 24. In statements following the meeting, Maliki said that "the blocs have the right to move to form fronts, but it is wrong to open the door to foreign interference." Pachachi stated that Iraqiyya supports the national unity government and that the Iraqi List ministers will continue to carry out their duties. "We want to help the security plan currently carried out by the government succeed. Therefore, we decided not to withdraw from the government at present," he stated. -------------- Some Reject Allawi's Leadership -------------- ¶8. (S) Although Allawi postponed withdrawal, many both within and outside his inner circle express frustration with his leadership. MP Safia al-Sohail, an Allawi insider, told PolOff that she was "disgusted" with Allawi's attempts to overthrow the elected GOI leadership outside of the democratic process. Others make the same complaint, pointing out that his behavior undermines Iraqiyya's democratic values. Those outside the Allawi camp complain that the former PM runs the bloc as a dictator, without consultation or transparency, and is motivated solely by his ambition to be Prime Minister again. Bloc members who remain in Baghdad and regularly attend Council of Representative (CoR) session, complain that Allawi's outside efforts work against their own to achieve progress on reconciliation benchmarks from within the system. ¶9. (S) Bloc member Mehdi al-Hafez was frustrated to the point that on May 29 he publicly announced his withdrawal from Iraqiyya, saying that as an independent he will "stick to the Iraqi lists' political program focused on fighting sectarianism, realizing peace and security in Iraq, and practicing democracy." Hafez explained to PolOff the factors that led to his decision to pull out of Iraqiyya: Allawi's efforts to form an opposition front are "polarizing," playing into sectarian feelings and harmful to reconciliation efforts; Allawi's decision-making is non-transparent and without consultation (the five Iraqiyya ministers did not know if his plans to withdraw from the GOI); and, that Allawi's efforts to illicit Arab government support for himself and against Maliki are unhelpful. -------------- Can Allawi and Iraqiyya Help with Benchmarks? -------------- ¶10. (C) Iraqiyya members complain often that although their secular, non-sectarian democratic program is closest to our own American political values, the U.S. has failed to support the party's efforts. Dr. Pachachi and MP Maysoon al-Dumluji regularly press the Embassy to arrange a Washington visit to meet with senior U.S. officials for the purpose of demonstrating U.S. support for their moderate, secular agenda. PolOff suggested to Maysoon that Iraqiyya focus instead on playing a positive role consensus building in the CoR for benchmark passage. Dumluji said June 5 that she has raised this idea with Allawi who promised to examine it. Former Iraqiyya CoR member Mehdi Hafez sits on the oil committee and professes a willingness to help reach consensus on hydrocarbon legislation. Iraqiyya CoR member Hameed Majid Musa has similarly offered his help on the Constitutional Review Committee. ¶12. (C) Iraqiyya support for provincial elections is less clear. Allawi enjoys a degree of popular support, particularly as the Iraqi population grows weary of sectarian violence and the Maliki government's inability to deliver services. However, if elections were held today Iraqiyya MPs believe they would lose many if not most of their 25 seats in Parliament; they will not support an elections law that allows for closed lists. Allawi himself is a strong proponent of de-Baathification reform, but unlikely to support anything but a very liberal de-Baathification draft allowing for maximum reintegration of former Baath party members and amnesty for all those who cannot be prosecuted. ¶13. (S) Comment. With Allawi likely to return to Baghdad shortly, what role can we expect him to play at this crucial time in the U.S and Iraqi political process? His failure to form a new front with outside support may have convinced him of the need to take some positive action to regain local credibility. His statements in London demonstrate he has not changed his view that the Maliki government has already failed. He may plan to wait in the wings until September, hoping he will be called in to save the day. An old school Arab nationalist, the Allawi we know is strong on vision but unwilling to mobilize his bloc or get his hands dirty in Parliament conducting difficult negotiations on reconciliation benchmarks. We will press him to use his secular nationalist credentials to work within the GOI to achieve key political benchmarks. CROCKER