AMBASSADOR'S MAY 27 MEETING WITH TURKISH IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001793 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV ENRG TU SY IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MAY 27 MEETING WITH TURKISH IRAQ ENVOY CELIKKOL Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 27 meeting with the Ambassador, Turkish MFA Iraq Envoy Oguz Celikkol said Turkey will propose that the Neighbors Conference energy working group meet June 14-15 in Istanbul. Celikkol and the Ambassador discussed ways to keep participation in the working group from becoming unwieldy. Celikkol strongly and repeatedly stressed that the GOI and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had to take steps to counter the PKK in northern Iraq. However, Celikkol demurred when the Ambassador suggested he consider speaking to KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani, currently in Baghdad for talks on hydrocarbons legislation. The Ambassador and Celikkol agreed that UNAMI could play a useful role in resolving the question of the Kirkuk referendum. MNF-I Operations Chief MG Fastabend previewed a May 28 MNF-I briefing to the GOT about Syrian involvement in allowing foreign fighters into Iraq intended to prepare the GOT to again urge Syria to take steps to stop them. The Ambassador updated Celikkol on the progress of hydrocarbons legislation and upcoming US-Iran talks. Celikkol said the GOT is considering opening a consulate in Basra. End Summary. Neighbors Conference Working Groups -------------- ¶2. (C) Celikkol said he would talk to the Iraqi MFA about next steps on the working groups formalized after the May Sharm el-Sheikh Iraq Neighbors Conference. Turkey would propose that the energy working group meet June 14-15 in Istanbul. Celikkol worried that participation could get so large as to be unwieldy; restricted participation would be better. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador said U.S. participation in the energy group would make sense but would open the door to requests from many other countries. He suggested Celikkol ask the GOI its views. One idea could be to limit the working groups to politically essential representation and then have working sessions with even more restricted participation. ¶4. (C) Celikkol said Turkey is open to U.S. suggestions. On energy, Celikkol said the GOT is interested in a separate trilateral US/Turkey/Iraq energy working group, perhaps to meet in parallel with Neighbors energy working group, to discuss trilateral energy cooperation. The Ambassador welcomed the idea. Celikkol said the GOT would work the idea with the US and Iraqi embassies in Ankara. PKK --- ¶5. (C) Celikkol gave the Ambassador a copy of a letter from PM Erdogan to PM Maliki expressing support for the GOI and willingness to cooperate on energy and training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Celikkol said he wanted to draw Maliki's attention to the PKK issue. The most recent GOI diplomatic note on the PKK was "positive" but did not label the PKK a terrorist organization. Explosives used in the May 22 bombing in Ankara had come from Iraq. The GOI and "authorities in the north" need to take steps to stop this. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador reiterated deep USG concern about PKK activity emanating from northern Iraq. He reviewed his recent discussions with President Talabani and KRG President Masoud Barzani on the issues of PKK threats to break its ceasefire and Barzani's public statements. The Ambassador told Celikkol he had even more recently discussed the PKK with KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani, who was currently in Baghdad for discussions on hydrocarbons legislation, and found him to be relatively forthcoming on the PKK. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador suggested Nechirvan's presence in Baghdad might be an opportunity for Celikkol to meet with him. Celikkol demurred, saying he would have to consult with Ankara on the matter. Masoud Barzani's February media statements had made such meetings "impossible." Celikkol conceded that Nechirvan may be more flexible that Masoud Barzani, but "people" in Turkey now believe the "authorities in the north" are actively supporting the PKK. Celikkol's deputy Murat Ozcelik said that at this point, anyone who talks to Nechirvan would be considered a "traitor" in Turkey. Celikkol said he plans to meet with Kurdish DPM Barham Saleh. ¶8. (C) Celikkol told the Ambassador several times that "any action" by KRG authorities, such as an arrest of a PKK figure or restrictions on PKK movement, would have a positive impact in Turkey. Ozcelik said the MFA would work hard to use any step by KRG authorities to "put things on the right track." Kirkuk BAGHDAD 00001793 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶9. (C) Celikkol told the Ambassador that members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) Sunni Tawafuq bloc, and even Kurdish CoR members and President Talabani, are telling Turkish officials that postponement of the Kirkuk referendum is "necessary." However, KRG President Masoud Barzani refuses to accept this. ¶10. (C) Celikkol said the GOT believes that the UN could play a useful role in resolving Kirkuk by coming up with what Celikkol characterized as a face saving way for Barzani to agree to postponement. However, the GOT would oppose any UN attempt to "give legitimacy to the referendum." The Ambassador told Celikkol that UNAMI SRSG Qazi and his deputy Schulenberg appear to understand the complexities surrounding the Kirkuk issue. The USG has urged UNAMI to take a more active role on Kirkuk. The UN could find a way "not forward" on a referendum in 2007, but needs to be pushed to get adequate staffing and resources into Iraq in order to deal with the issue successfully. Turkish Engagement with Syria on Foreign Fighters -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) The Ambassador introduced MNF-I Operations Chief MG Fastabend, who told Celikkol that Commanding General Petraeus is sending a team to Turkey on May 28 to brief the GOT on intelligence about Syrian involvement in allowing foreign fighters into Iraq. MNF-I hopes the GOT would use the briefing to approach Syria and urge it to suppress the flow of fighters into Iraq. ¶12. (C) Celikkol noted that the GOT has spoken to Syria about foreign fighters in the past, including a trip by FM Gul to Damascus. Syria had thereafter tightened security at the Damascus Airport. ¶13. (C) Celikkol asked whether the GOI and Syria had followed up on their joint security working group. The Ambassador said that Syria has been vague on what it expects from the working group, and FM Zebari's frequent travels abroad made progress difficult. Hydrocarbons Legislation and Iran Talks -------------- ¶14. (C) Celikkol asked the Ambassador for an update on progress on hydrocarbons legislation and the upcoming U.S.-Iraq talks. The Ambassador explained that discussion is currently centered on the hydrocarbons financial management legislation. There is broad agreement that revenues will go into a central account; Kurds are focused on assuring the central government would not be able to block distribution of revenues to the regions. ¶15. (C) The Ambassador noted that there was some confusion on the Iranian side about who would head their delegation. PM Maliki is hosting the talks; this would be a positive signal that Iraq is included. Turkey Considering Basra Consulate -------------- ¶16. (C) Celikkol said that the GOT is considering opening a consulate in Basra by the end of 2007. VP Mehdi had told the GOT that Iraqi Shia want increased engagement with Turkey. The Ambassador noted that the U.S. Regional Embassy Office (REO) in Basra is experiencing almost daily rocket and mortar attacks, and that militias in Basra are not under control. ¶17. (C) Turkish Ambassador to Iraq Kanbay asked about media reports of a new U.S. Iraq campaign plan, benchmarks for the GOI, and U.S. support for PM Maliki. The Ambassador replied that the Joint Campaign Plan is a standard document that he and General Petraeus agreed needed to be reviewed, and is still in the drafting process. Leaks to the press about the report had not been helpful. ¶18. (C) The Ambassador stressed that PM Maliki has full U.S. support; any change of government at this point would lead to prolonged wrangling over a new government. On benchmarks, President Bush had been clear about what needed to be done in Iraq for the good of the country and to help manage the debate inside the US. CROCKER