FADHILA LEADERS GIVE AMBASSADOR OVERVIEW OF PARTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001773 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: FADHILA LEADERS GIVE AMBASSADOR OVERVIEW OF PARTY GOALS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 24 meeting with the Ambassador, Fadhila leaders Hassan al-Shammari, Basim al-Sherif, and Karim al-Yacoubi laid out to the Ambassador Fadhila's position on key legislative issues. They said there was political pressure on the Prime Minister to "certify" a vote of no confidence of dubious legality against the Basrah Governor. They characterized several currents within the Sadrists, and al-Yacoubi opined that the Sadrists would pick up seats in provincial elections. End summary. -------------- Fadhila's Position on Key Legislation -------------- ¶2. (C) Al-Shammari opened with a summary of Fadhila's position on topical issues. He said that Fadhila supported a schedule for withdrawal of coalition forces, but that should a withdrawal happen at this point "it would be a disaster." He pointed to the lack of preparedness of Iraqi security forces and argued that their loyalties "were not yet fully with Iraq." On deBaathification, he stated Fadhila's position that individuals should be judged in courts on the basis of criminal behavior, not "deBaathified" based on their level in the Baath party. With the exception of groups such as the Fedayeen Saddam, al-Shammari said that the new Iraq should be able to benefit from the experience of people who worked even in security forces of the former regime after they had been re-educated. Al-Yacoubi added that law should also treat the victims of Saddam's regime with justice. ¶3. (C) On the hydrocarbons law, al-Shammari said that Fadhila supported investment and participation by U.S. companies possessing advanced technology. Al-Yacoubi added that provinces, like regions, should have the ability to sign contracts in the oil and gas sector subject to approval by the federal government. On the elections system, al-Yacoubi noted Fadhila's support for district-based elections of individuals rather than a province-wide, closed list system. "The current system is based too much on the parties; people need to feel that they know their representatives, that they voted for them, that they are qualified." Al-Shammari and al-Sherif concluded their presentation of Fadhila's position on key legislation by characterizing the party as an Iraqi nationalist party that, unlike several of its rivals, eschewed militias. -------------- Politics and Security in Basrah -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about the situation in Basrah, al-Shammari said that the pressure on the governor to step down resulted not from lack of services but from Fadhila's withdrawal from the Shi'a coalition. Although the Prime Minister might want to certify the vote of no confidence in the governor, al-Shammari continued, the vote was illegal and regardless the Prime Minister did not have the authority to certify it. Asked by the Ambassador why Basrah was so violent given that there was no sectarian violence or al-Qaeda presence, al-Shammari noted the presence of militias tied to political parties, many with links to Iran. He gave the example of Abu Qadir, JAM leader in Basrah. While the security committee established by the central government could choose to execute a warrant to arrest him, al-Shammari continued, it chose not to do so because of Abu Qadir's ties to the Shi'a coalition (presumably the Sadrists). (Note: Media reports indicate that British troops killed Abu Qadir on May 25. End note.) Al-Sherif said that the Governor of Basrah had asked the Prime Minister for his help in appointing a new, independent police chief. According to al-Sherif, the Prime Minister rejected the person proposed by the Governor (someone from Kut; no name given) despite prior buy-in from the MOI. -------------- The Sadrists: Different Currents -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked what the Sadrists wanted and how best to deal with them. Al-Shammari said that they wanted a law that set a timetable for withdrawal, even if the timetable specified a time several years away for the withdrawal. He noted the presence of several currents within the Sadrists: "Some will take weapons even from the outside (i.e., Iran),and others support the political process but fear the first group." Al-Shammari put Salah al-Obeidi and Ahmed al-Sheibani in the latter group. It was impossible to tell who beyond Muqtada was influential in the Sadrist camp, he continued, because its political leaders seemed to change BAGHDAD 00001773 002 OF 002 frequently and no one except Muqtada had decision-making authority. Al-Shammari and al-Yacoubi debated among themselves the pluses and minuses of what they expected would be Sadrist gains in provincial elections, when they took place. Al-Shammari forsaw problems but al-Yacoubi thought that as long as district-based elections for individuals took place, the Sadrist candidates that prevailed would be good ones. -------------- Iran, Syria, and Failure in Iraq -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to relations with neighboring countries, al-Shammari noted that Iran and Syria wanted to see the failure of U.S. policy in Iraq and asked why the US dealt with groups related to Iran (e.g., ISCI). The Ambassador responded that four years after Saddam's fall it was not up to the US to pick who ruled in Iraq. Iran and Syria, he continued, have to understand that U.S. failure in Iraq will mean the failure of the new Iraq, which in turn would have very severe consequences for them. Al-Sherif said that he thought the Iranians understood this point, as he heard it from several Iranian officials when he visited Tehran as part of President Talabani's delegation. CROCKER