Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1755
2007-05-27 14:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

FORMER PRIME MINISTER JA'FARI LAMENTS LACK OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7778
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1755 1471406
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271406Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1394
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001755 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER JA'FARI LAMENTS LACK OF
TECHNOCRATS IN CABINET

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001755 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER JA'FARI LAMENTS LACK OF TECHNOCRATS IN CABINET Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) In a May 23 meeting, former Prime Minister and current Council of Representatives member (Shi'a Coalition, Dawa) Ibrahim al-Ja'fari hailed President Bush's decision to topple Saddam Hussein as a historic and strategic decision that Iraqis will view as "an Iraqi national decision." He listed the accomplishments of the new Iraq but warned that the government was suffering from a lack of technocratic ministers. "The ministers need to be connected to the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, not allocated by sect or to the political parties." On the positive side, he observed a greater convergence between Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish views. Ja'fari said that he was hosting a weekly meeting for CoR members to promote this convergence and develop greater support for the Prime Minister. (Comment: We do not believe Ja'fari has attended the CoR once since March, leading us to wonder if his efforts would not be better placed at the CoR itself. End comment.) ¶2. (C) Ja'fari commented that there could be no reconciliation with al-Qaeda but that there needed to be greater clarity on what reconciliation meant for "resistance" groups, both in terms of what they would give and what they would get. Acknowledging that deBaathification reform would play a role in reconciliation, he argued that there needed to be a transition from "purging Baathists" to "purging criminals." He criticized the GOI for being "reactive" on regional issues, noting that the GOI needed to follow-up with its neighbors after the Sharm conference. Ja'fari said that the most important things the US could do to support Iraq were to continue to insist on Iraq's democratic institutions, convince neighboring Arab countries to support Iraq, and support reconstruction efforts as permitted by the security situation. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador assured Ja'fari of President Bush's continued commitment to Iraq's democracy. He noted that the Baghdad Security Plan, although only half-implemented to date, had shown promising signs in reducing sectarian killings and in increased participation from Iraqi security forces. Political steps were necessary as well, the Ambassador said: "People in the US want to see clear indications of progress; that is our message to Iraqi leaders." The Ambassador told Ja'fari that progress in the next three months on the hydrocarbons law, deBaathification reform, and constitutional review was critical to supporting President Bush's commitment to Iraq. He noted to Ja'fari that the purpose of Vice President Cheney's recent visit to the region was to convince Iraq's Arab neighbors to do more to support Iraq. The positions of Iran and Syria, the Ambassador observed, did not make sense: by taking actions to destabilize Iraq and support al-Qaeda and militia activity inside Iraq, Iran and Syria risked a disaster on their borders. CROCKER

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -