NINEWA'S GOVERNOR FADING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001711 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 TAGS: PINR PGOV PBTS IZ SUBJECT: NINEWA'S GOVERNOR FADING Classified By: Ninewa PRT Leader James Knight: 1.4 (B) and (D) This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Ninewa's Governor Duraid Kashmoula has shown progressively greater mental and physical impairment over the last several weeks. His behavior has become unpredictable and counterproductive; his effectiveness as Governor and PRT and Coalition interlocutor is now questionable. However, his continued service as Governor of Ninewa is considered critical by Ninewa's Kurdish Alliance; the Alliance is unlikely to permit him to resign until the Article 140 process for resolution of areas disputed in Ninewa has concluded. ¶2. (S/NF) After his unfortunate performance at the MND-N Governors' Conference 16 May (detailed below para 6),MNC-I and MND-N offered to facilitate a medical workup at Coalition facilities in Baghdad in the hope Kashmoula's increasingly erratic behavior has a treatable medical cause. He has declined this offer. End summary. -------------- Always somewhat difficult . . . -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Governor Kashmoula is famously petulant and known for odd priorities not clearly significant for Ninewa. A regular example has been regular last-minute boycotts of PRT and Coalition- facilitated events outside Mosul. This proclivity has been especially evident for Tal'Afar. Kashmoula has also shown progressively poorer judgment in public statements. For example, on camera he has recommended Iraqi security forces simply kill captured insurgents rather than rely on the judicial process, and -- noting that the GOI in Baghdad has no interest in Ninewa's problems -- proposed independence for the province. Both remarks were tactfully edited from coverage later broadcast in Mosul by the Iraqi Media Network. -------------- . . . but facing rising stress . . . -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Governor Kashmoula's erratic behavior has exacerbated since Article 140-related security incidents in Ninewa leapt in April 2007. Following a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) that barely missed Ninewa Vice Governor (and provincial Kurdistan Democratic Party chief) Khasro Goran at Tal Usquf on 23 April, Kashmoula urgently insisted he would resign within the week. In presenting his resignation decision to the PRT Team Leader 24 April, he was extraordinarily relaxed and cheerful, in stark contrast to his unkempt, frantic appearance the day before. He removed personal items from rooms in his official residence in Mosul in preparation for his imminent departure. ¶5. (S/NF) However, when our PRT Team Leader met Vice Governor Khasro 29 April to discuss Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) views on Kashmoula's successor, Khasro insisted that quote we (the KDP) cannot permit Kashmoula to resign unquote. In the same conversation Khasro also pointed out that the Kurdish Alliance opposes provincial elections in Ninewa since quote we do not want a government hostile to the Article 140 process in place before the process concludes unquote. Khasro clearly believes Kashmoula as Governor -- and the most reliable Sunni Arab in the Kurdish Alliance -- cannot be spared. At the Team Leader's next meeting with Kashmoula, Kashmoula said he had changed his mind, and he will remain in office. -------------- . . .and now an embarrassment -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Since retracting his resignation decision, Kashmoula has been progressively less predictable: BAGHDAD 00001711 002 OF 004 -- At the Ninewa Business Forum held in Baghdad 28 April, he focused his unscripted remarks entirely on increasing security risks and (unverified) massive al-Qaeda presence in Ninewa as the major economic issue, thus aborting the Forum's focus on capital improvement and investment in Ninewa. -- At the April Ninewa Provincial Security Transition Assessment meeting (actually held 3 May owing to Kashmoula's participation in the Forum) Kashmoula insisted that 6500 al-Qaeda operatives are now conducting operations in Ninewa. He broke down this number by job descriptions. None of the other participants at the meeting, including Coalition maneuver commanders, had any information corroborating this assertion at any level. Ninewa PDOP MG Wathiq, also in attendance, quickly changed the subject and brought the brief back to its normal topics. At a meeting with the PRT Team Leader two days later, Kashmoula indicated he had received this information in an e-mail from a source he could not further identify. -- Kashmoula attended the MND-N Governors' Conference at COB Speicher 16 May unshaven and disheveled. His skin tone was grey, and he had black circles around his eyes. His appearance was startling to many individuals in attendance who know him well -- most assumed he was ill. He behaved oddly throughout the conference. He cradled his head on his table and slept at intervals during remarks, but woke up to engage in an inflammatory exchange with Vice Prime Minister (VPM) al-Zawba'i over the situation in Tal'Afar. At the conference's reconciliation luncheon -- attended only by the Governors, senior commanders, Ambassador Crocker, and other senior Embassy staff -- Kashmoula provoked a strident exchange with al-Zawba'i that shocked other participants. His contribution to the Article 140 discussion which closed the conference was a recitation from the Koran and a homily to the effect that God wants everyone to live in peace. -- Kashmoula's return to Mosul from the Governors' Conference was plagued by poor weather -- the entire Ninewa delegation remained at Speicher until late the following day. Kashmoula used shockingly offensive language to express his frustration at the ongoing delays. The evening of the 16th was marked by a series of SVBIEDs and complex attacks in Mosul -- by cell phone, Kashmoula ordered Iraqi forces responding to the attacks to kill all the insurgents involved (these orders were ignored). -- Kashmoula has reignited his vendetta against Provincial Council (PC) Chair Issa with a vengeance since withdrawing his intention to resign. The Governor's contention with the PC Chair has been a feature of Ninewa's political life since Kashmoula took office, but he has recently asserted that PC Chair Issa and PC Finance Committee Chair Francis Mansour are corrupt and involved in broad fraudulent expenditures associated with GOI provincial capital- improvement funds (Accelerated Reconstruction and Development Fund -- ARDF). He has pushed the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) office in Dahuk to target Issa, Mansour, and other Council members, in a way which threatens to block further progress on allocating 2007 and residual 2006 Provincial- controlled reconstruction funds. (Note: Irregularities do exist, but this crusade as being pursued by Kashmoula threatens what has heretofore been an exceptionally successful provincial capital- improvement budget execution process. End note.) -------------- Poor GOI response to Ninewa issues . . . -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Kashmoula indicates that his primary motivation for wishing to resign is the GOI's lack of interest in or response to Ninewa's pressing concerns. Only the Prime Minister is now responsive to him, and even the Prime Minister cannot elicit action for Ninewa from ministries. Kashmoula cites the ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Oil dealing with Ninewa's fuel crisis; meddling of the Minister of Interior in Ninewa police matters, including directed hiring of a by-name list of Shi'a recruits for Tal'Afar's police which may have triggered the 27 March SVBIED and reprisal killings there; Minister of Trade instructions regarding Public BAGHDAD 00001711 003 OF 004 Distribution System food deliveries that directed Minister of Trade employees in Ninewa to ignore the Governor. -------------- . . . declining influence . . . -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Governor Kashmoula has also been roughly handled by ministers in Baghdad. On 8 March, he and PDOP MG Wathiq hoped to discuss with MOI Bulani the directive to hire Shi'a police in Tal'Afar and the need for armored vehicles and heavy weapons needs for Mosul's police. Bulani refused to meet either, even as they waited outside his office while he remained at his desk without competing appointments. ¶9. (S/NF) Kashmoula met Minister of Defense Jasim and National Security Advisor al-Rubaie with Provincial Council Chair Issa 28 Mar, after the Ninewa Development Forum closed. Kashmoula had three agenda items: holding all Second and Third Iraqi Army Division units in Ninewa; retaining BG Mutaa as Commander of the Second Iraqi Army Division (he is currently Acting); and blocking efforts to enroll Sunni Arab tribes as independent anti-AQIZ forces, including providing tribal sheiks with arms and funds. All three were rudely dismissed. Jasim barked that the Second IA Division brigade now in Baghdad was formerly in Erbil, so its deployment does not affect Mosul. He insisted that BG Mutaa has never commanded a brigade, and is thus unqualified as a Division commander. Mutaa's only virtue is that he speaks English. Accordingly, the decision has been made to name another division commander, and that decision is final. NSA al- Rubaie said that the decision to arm Ninewa's Arab tribes along the 'Anbar model' has been made and is also final -- and cut Kashmoula off abruptly when he tried to object. Kashmoula visibly cringed when al- Rubaie silenced him. ¶10. (S/NF) At Speicher VPM al-Zawba'i was warm toward other MND-N governors, but quite critical of Kashmoula at the morning session especially regarding the situation in Tal'Afar. At the closing session al-Zawba'i was hypocritically sympathetic, asking the other governors to help Kashmoula (this statement followed al-Zawba'i's altercation with Kashmoula at the reconciliation luncheon). -------------- -------------- . . . poor health and deteriorating behavior . . . -------------- -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Kashmoula suffers from diabetes which is monitored by the Combat Support Hospital on FOB Marez East -- the CSH also provides medication for Kashmoula's condition. However, he is careless in his diet. At the Speicher Governors' Conference he ate several ice cream cones, but no other food. He may be equally careless with his medication. We have frequently attributed his now-characteristic wild mood swings to these habits. He uses an inhaler frequently, and is a heavy smoker. ¶12. (S/NF) Kashmoula has become progressively more prone to inappropriate outbursts. His current pattern took shape in February when he walked out on a Provincial Council meeting screaming insults to an Iraqi Islamic Party member who had questioned a Kurdish Alliance effort to rig the composition of key Council committees. He reportedly had several equally strident encounters with Provincial Council Chair Issa and other Council members while he contemplated resignation, most revolving around his encouragement of heavy-handed CPI investigations of Council capital-improvement project processing. His verbal altercation with VPM al-Zawba'i at Speicher appears to have been of the same nature. ¶13. (S/NF) Kashmoula has also shown extraordinarily childish behavior in highly formal environments. His sleeping at his table at Speicher is one example. He has occasionally been extraordinarily disheveled at key meetings, despite the high standard of dress normal for officials of his stature in Ninewa. At one meeting with the Team Leader he was barefoot and unshaven, in a stained suit. ¶14. (S/NF) More generally, Kashmoula displays BAGHDAD 00001711 004 OF 004 progressively more consistent forgetfulness, paranoia, and obsessiveness. He often forgets the content of briefs and meetings, and readily forgets appointments -- even those he has stridently demanded. He focuses on matters of small significance to the exclusion of major issues -- at the Governors' conference at Speicher his major topic was a minor hiring issue with contractors engaged by a USAID implementing partner for Ninewa Woods cleanup. He has repeatedly threatened to withdraw support for the highly successful Mosul Major Crimes Court because of delays in reimbursement for food costs incurred by MCC trial judge panels. His behavior is uncomfortably reminiscent of early-onset Alzheimer's disease. -------------- . . . and no way out -------------- ¶15. (S/NF) Kashmoula is fully hostage to the KRG. His family resides in a KRG-provided house in Erbil. His family home in Mosul has been destroyed -- he has no refuge other than that provided by the KRG. A large number of immediate family members have been casualties of the insurgency, including a son -- he cannot risk loss of KRG protection. ¶16. (S/NF) Kashmoula has expressed interest in fleeing to the U.S. under the Special Benefit Parole program, and has provided the initial documentation necessary for processing. However, he will apparently remain in office until new Provincial elections following the completion of the Article 140 process and his family is in relative safety in Erbil. We have offered to pursue this parole when it is clear that he will in fact leave office; he appears unable to remember this expectation despite concurring many times. (Note: One of Kashmoula's sons is currently attending Drexel University in the U.S.; we presume he and other family members would wish to join his son there. End note.) ¶17. (S/NF) After the events at the Governors' Conference 16 May, MNC-I proposed facilitation of a medical visit by Governor Kashmoula to CF facilities in Baghdad. This offer was extended to Kashmoula by the PRT 21 May. Kashmoula -- again disheveled and preoccupied -- declined. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶18. (S/NF) Despite these increasing difficulties, our PRT and partner maneuver commanders continue to sustain good relations with Governor Kashmoula. However, his deteriorating behavior is generating new problems as he alienates his immediate staff and the Provincial Council. ¶19. (S/NF) Comment continued: The snowballing negative impact of the Article 140 process in Ninewa may be claiming a tragic victim with Governor Kashmoula. He is ready to leave and his recent behavior indicates he should -- but he is too critical to Kurdish control of Ninewa's government while the process goes forward for his resignation to be considered by the Kurdish Alliance. End comment. CROCKER