KURDISH LEADERS DISCUSS POLITICAL PROGRESS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001700 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ SUBJECT: KURDISH LEADERS DISCUSS POLITICAL PROGRESS, SETTING STAGE FOR OIL NEGOTIATIONS Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 21 meeting with the Ambassador, DCM and Econ Counselor, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani, and former DPM Rowsch Shaways discussed the mood in Washington and the need for political progress in Iraq. The meeting was also attended by several KRG ministers. Saleh said Maliki agreed to form a kitchen cabinet and the Ambassador discussed the importance of President Talabani's initiatives on the "Council of Four" and the Political Council for National Security (PCNS). Separately, the DCM heard that the meetings between the KRG delegation and the Prime Minister have set the stage for the real hydrocarbon negotiations to begin. Participants also discussed Maliki's relations with Iran and the Arab states, the PKK, and Baghdad security. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and Barham Saleh agreed that the American people needed to see meaningful progress toward political reconciliation. This is why progress on hydrocarbon legislation is so important. The Ambassador told Nechirvan that unless the US saw progress before September our current policy would be unsustainable. The Kurds should be under no illusion: there is no Plan B. We will not be maintaining a military presence only to protect the north. He emphasized that the US would not simply shift its forces or their posture in Iraq; they would leave. Nechirvan responded nonchalantly, perhaps not believing what he was hearing. Saleh emphasized to him that this was the reality he had seen while in Washington the past two weeks. He tried to make this clear to Nechirvan as he had made it clear to Prime Minister Maliki earlier. ¶3. (C) Saleh said he recounted his trip to Washington to PM Maliki, explaining how serious the mood was in Congress. He thought the PM recognized the need for significant progress to change US attitudes. Saleh pressed him on power sharing as well, securing Maliki's agreement to form a kitchen cabinet. Originally he intended to include 10 people but Saleh talked him down to 5-6. Saleh did not discuss who would be in the kitchen cabinet, but he did discuss ministerial changes. He told the PM he should choose a diverse group of technocrats - a Christian, a Turkoman, etc. The PM replied that this was a political impossibility, but admitted that Sami al-Askari would be withdrawn as the candidate for transportation minister. -------------- PCNS and Power Sharing -------------- ¶4. (C) Shaways told the Ambassador the next Political Council for National Security (PCNS) meeting would be on May 24. He said they had decided to keep the PCNS and advisory body for now. He later stated frankly that as a purely advisory body the PCNS did "nothing." The Ambassador emphasized to all attending that the Embassy supported President Talabani's initiatives to strengthen the PCNS and establish the "Council of Four," including the Presidency and the Prime Minister. He said power sharing and hydrocarbons legislation are key components of national reconciliation. In Shaways' view, all of the political players are trying to strengthen their own position. The Ambassador said this is exactly what they need to work on fixing. -------------- Meetings Set Stage for Oil Negotiations -------------- ¶5. (C) The DCM, in a separate meeting with Maliki's chief of staff, Dr. Tarik Abdullah, was told that the initial meetings between Nechirvan and the PM were purely protocol - they would set the stage for real negotiations to begin later. The PM and Nechirvan also agreed that, instead of KRG Oil Minister Ashti Hawrami and GOI Oil Minister Hussayn al-Sharistani going at it, Vice President Abdel Mehdi, Finance Minister Bayan Jabr, and Nechirvan would meet in a small group to negotiate the principles before the technical and legal teams came in to work out the details. Dr. Tarik also told the DCM that he was pleased Nechirvan had committed to staying in Baghdad until they finished the law, though he said their next meeting was not yet set. ¶6. (C) EconCouns heard from Hawrami and others that the mechanisms contained in the USG proposed draft revenue management law were something they could live with, and that using the USG draft would be a good starting point for negotiations. -------------- Maliki's Relations with the Neighbors BAGHDAD 00001700 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶7. (C) Nechirvan noted that Maliki was clearly upset with the Iranians over their continued funneling of money to terrorists and continued support for violence and attacks. Still, he is focused on the hostility he faces from the Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. Saleh advised the PM to reach out to Arab states in spite of his frustration, and to focus on the Iraqi internal situation. Nechirvan discussed the need to support the PM and noted that the real reason the Arabs hate Maliki is because he is a true Shia believer. -------------- Nechirvan Dismisses PKK Issue -------------- ¶8. (C) Nechirvan told the Ambassador he thought the PKK would hold their ceasefire. He thought Turkey would conduct limited cross-border operations but was dismissive of the suggestion of a wider conflict. -------------- Baghdad Security: Some Progress -------------- ¶9. (C) Asked about the Baghdad Security Plan, Shaways said that he had seen some progress, but many people were afraid that as soon as the forces pull back the trouble will begin again, the terrorists will return. He said the Shia are afraid the Sunnis will use this as an opportunity to move in and regain some of their power. Shaways said it is no longer party against party; it has turned into Sunni against Shia. He said the decrease in sectarian violence in Baghdad has also led to an increase in insurgent activity in other provinces, in particular Mosul and Kirkuk. But he said generally in Baghdad it is better. CROCKER