Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1647
2007-05-20 17:04:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

COMCENTCOM ADMIRAL FALLON AND IRAQI VP AL-HASHIMI

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS IZ 
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VZCZCXRO0719
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1647/01 1401704
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201704Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1249
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001647 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: COMCENTCOM ADMIRAL FALLON AND IRAQI VP AL-HASHIMI
DISCUSS POLITICAL PROCESS, DETAINEES

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001647

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: COMCENTCOM ADMIRAL FALLON AND IRAQI VP AL-HASHIMI
DISCUSS POLITICAL PROCESS, DETAINEES

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. Visiting COMCENTCOM Admiral William J.
Fallon, accompanied by Ambassador Crocker, met with Vice
President and Sunni bloc leader Tariq al-Hashimi May 12 to
press for progress on political benchmarks. Al-Hashimi
stated his genuine desire for progress on key reconciliation
issues including constitutional review and provincial
elections. The VP acknowledged that "the time is short" but
blamed a lack of mutual interest and mistrust among bloc
leaders, and ultimately the Prime Minister, for the current
impasse in the political process. Discussions centered on
security issues including the improving situation in Anbar
Province, MNF-I and GOI arrests and detentions of terror
suspects, and infiltration of Iraqi security forces by
sectarian militias. End summary.

--------------
Al Hashimi Understands Time Is Short
--------------


2. (C) In response to Admiral Fallon's request for his
assessment of the political situation, VP Al-Hashimi said, "I
am sure we are not moving in the right direction, or as fast
as you expect." The VP acknowledged the lack of action on
political benchmarks; he described the political process as
"stagnant," blaming mistrust and lack of mutual interest
among Iraqi leaders for blocking progress. Al-Hashimi
reported having several meetings with PM al-Maliki in the
past two days, saying only that the PM had made "promises on
what he would achieve and when." We have a genuine desire to
move forward, continued al-Hashimi, but the PM is "in the
driver's seat -- it is up to him to make the necessary
compromises -- we are in a wait-and-see mode."


3. (C) Admiral Fallon briefed al-Hashimi on his regional trip
and his message to Arab leaders that support for the elected
GOI is their best option for stabilizing Iraq. Admiral
Fallon briefly described several highlights from his meeting
with the Sultan of Oman as particularly encouraging, saying
the Sultan believes al-Maliki is sincere in wanting to do the
right thing for all Iraqis. Al-Hashimi replied that U.S.
pressure on al-Maliki to move forward on national
reconciliation was as least as important, particularly on the
constitutional review, which could allow Sunni parties to
share more substantially in decision-making.

--------------
Success against AQI in Anbar
--------------


4. (S) Admiral Fallon told the VP he had visited Anbar
Province recently and found the security situation much
improved. The VP agreed that there were signs of improvement

in Anbar, both in mentality and facts on the ground.
Engaging the tribes in Anbar against AQI has worked, the VP
acknowledged, but complained that the U.S. has a "guarded
approach" in dealing with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other
extremist elements. "You do not understand our fears or
allow us to contribute to your policy making on how best to
fight al-Qaida and terrorism," he said, and asked that MNF-I
reach out more to include Sunnis in the fight. Admiral
Fallon assured al-Hashimi that MNF-I understands that the
Sunnis must feel part of this effort, pointing out how
quickly the situation had turned around in Anbar despite the
many difficulties.

--------------
Al-Hashimi Wants MOre GOI Support
--------------


5. (S) The Sunni parties are contributing to the fight
against AQI and extremists behind the scenes, al-Hashimi told
Admiral Fallon, but said they lacked enough support from the
GOI to take a more public stance. The VP said he had been
trying to engage the GOI for many months and had submitted a
proposal for fighting AQI in Baghdad, but the GOI remained
hesitant to give full support to Sunni efforts to stop
violence. "We have a rigid discipline," the VP told Admiral
Fallon, we could employ a "watertight system to disarm
violent Sunni elements, but we cannot do it without the GOI
because they (extremist elements) are so heavily armed."

--------------
Detainees
--------------


6. (S) Admiral Fallon raised the sensitive issue of US-held
detainees, telling the VP that Speaker Mashhadani had raised
the matter with him several weeks ago and he responded that

BAGHDAD 00001647 002 OF 002


he was interested in looking into options to ameliorate the
problem. COMCENTCOM said MNF-I might consider a number of
low-risk options under tightly negotiated circumstances.
Thinking aloud, Admiral Fallon mentioned that one option
might be to explore how parole of some detainees to tribal
leaders might work. Al-Hashimi balked at this option,
stating that his personal image had been destroyed due to
broken promises to his constituency regarding detainee
releases. "Do not go directly to the tribes," the VP
implored, "come to us so I can restore my image and we can
prove that we can deliver." Al-Hashimi claimed that he could
monitor parolees through weekly checks at police stations.
The VP said he would pass along to MNF-I his own plan to
secure and rehabilitate released detainees by providing jobs
and encouraging 'normal life,' and suggested he work together
with MNF-I on a joint strategy.

--------------
Militia Infiltration of Security Force
--------------


7. (C) Al-Hashimi expressed concern about Congressional moves
to impose a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq.
He said he agreed with President Bush that setting a
timetable plays into AQI's hand. But, at the end of the day
U.S. troops will leave, he said. "I am afraid of a security
vacuum when your troops leave," and asked COMCENTCOM, "Who
will replace your troops, who will stop our country from
sliding into chaos?" The VP said he was afraid of the vacuum
that would be created by a U.S. withdrawal because of the
increasing infiltration of Iraqi security forces by militia.
This can only be solved, he said, by a competent and
patriotic Iraqi army. Fixing De-ba'athification is important
in preventing the polarization of security forces, he
continued, pointing to a tremendous reservoir of
cross-sectarian professions available. The VP suggested
calling up whole units or divisions of the ex-army, rather
than individuals, thereby including both Sunni and Shia.


8. (C) CoR member and Deputy Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) Chief,
Ayad Samarraie, also in attendance, raised the issue of GOI
Baghdad Security Plan (BSP)-related arrests. A large number
of individuals are arrested by Iraqi forces under the BSP
daily, said Samarraie, claiming that PM al-Maliki was
unresponsive to Sunni bloc human rights-related requests,
such as providing names of those arrested and charges against
them. "Unknown bodies are found everyday in the streets, who
are they?" asked Samarraie, suggesting that many may have
been killed and dumped by Iraqi forces. "We agreed to the
request to support the GOI in implementing the BSP," added
al-Hashimi, "now they are not respecting their obligations."

--------------
Sunni Support for Early Provincial Elections
--------------


9. (C) Pointing out that the Anbar Provincial Council (PC)
was back in Ramadi, the Ambassador suggested that the major
Sunni parties take advantage of this new dynamic to
strengthen their own moderates. The PC needs to develop a
budget, present it, and proceed with budget execution, said
the Ambassador, promising that the Embassy was ready to
provide technical advisors. Moving to the broader issue of
national provincial elections, Ambassador asked al-Hashimi
whether the IIP would support staggered elections, with early
elections in provinces where Sunnis are underrepresented.
The VP replied that he was very much in favor of early
provincial elections. As for earlier elections in select
provinces, he said the problem of voter participation for
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees would first
need to be addressed. Turning to Samarraie, the VP suggested
following-up with CoR members to discuss the complex details
of a potential plan for Iraqis seeking refuge outside their
provinces to participat
e in provincial elections.


10. (U) Admiral William J. Fallon has reviewed this message.
CROCKER

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