TALABANI DISCUSSES PRESIDENCY-PM MEETING, PCNS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001622 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: TALABANI DISCUSSES PRESIDENCY-PM MEETING, PCNS, OTHER ISSUES Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the Ambassador on May 17, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani said that a May 15 meeting between the Presidency and the Prime Minister (the so-called "Council of Four") had gone well and that Vice President Hashimi had seemed satisfied. He informed the Ambassador that the Political Council on National Security (PCNS) had met the previous night and agreed to draw up a "roadmap" for having regular meetings in the future. He said he had convinced former Prime Minister Allawi to return May 18 and participate in the GOI. He agreed to press Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani on the Hydrocarbons law as well as press the PKK to maintain their ceasefire and find out who the Iranians planned to present as an interlocutor for talks with the U.S. He claimed to have convinced the GOI to move outside the confines of the International Zone as part of an expansion of the secured area. He also said that many Diyala residents were ready to cooperate with the GOI and Coalition and asked for more weapons for Iraqi security forces. END SUMMARY. -------------- "Council of Four" Meeting Goes Well -------------- ¶2. (C) Talabani told the Ambassador that the "council of four," the Presidency and Prime Minister, had met two days ago and had a good meeting. The PM agreed that the four must meet regularly for discussions on all topics and share all their ideas for Iraq. He said Hashimi was satisfied by the meeting. Following the meeting of the four they all spoke to the press together, something they had not done previously. Afterward he said the PM and Hashimi held a private meeting he also described as positive. He said the PM invited Hashimi to attend security meetings that the PM holds regularly with U.S. and Iraqi generals and other officials. According to Talabani, Hashimi would not be able to attend the next meeting because he was traveling to Amman to attend an event hosted by King Abdullah that Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh was also attending, but the PM extended an open invitation. ¶3. (C) The PM asked the Presidency to send a representative to Council of Ministers (CoM) meetings, and the Presidency had chosen as the new chair of their "diwan" (essentially the new Chief of Staff of the Presidency) Nasir al-Ani, to be their representative. The PM also proposed that before the CoM approves a law it should send the draft to the Presidency for comment, and vice versa. -------------- PCNS Meeting -------------- ¶4. (C) Talabani said the PCNS met on May 16 and was attended by "everyone," including a representative of Fadilah and one from the Sadrists. He expressed optimism at the prospects for the PCNS as an institution and said that Hashimi, Vice President Abdel Mehdi and Dr. Rowsh Shaways, who represents Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani at PCNS meetings, had been charged with writing up the program, or "roadmap," of the PCNS, to include establishing regular meetings. He said they had agreed that meetings would still be held in Talabani's absence and would be chaired by the PM. Talabani took a message from British Prime Minister Blair to the PCNS, conveying that the groups need to work on cooperation and power sharing. They agreed. ¶5. (C) The PCNS also discussed securing the Council of Representatives (CoR) building. Talabani offered the Presidential (Republican) guard but the PM said that the Iraqi police were capable of doing it. -------------- Allawi Returning to Baghdad -------------- ¶6. (C) Talabani stated that he had met twice with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi when he was in the UK from May 10-13 and had convinced Allawi that his place is in Baghdad. He said Allawi would arrive on May 18. He called for Allawi to be given a position in the government, but did not yet have one in mind. Last year he had tried to get Allawi the position of secretary general of the PCNS, but the UIA had rejected it. Allawi agreed to return to work with the government and end his attempts to form a new front. Talabani claimed that the PM had agreed to meet with Allawi upon his return. -------------- -- BAGHDAD 00001622 002 OF 003 Talabani to press for Agreement on Hydrocarbons -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Talabani said that KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani would come on May 18 to discuss the package of hydrocarbons legislation. He said he had agreed with Nechirvan when they met in Iraqi Kurdistan recently that they must cooperate and successfully conclude the negotiations. He promised to talk to him again during Nechirvan's visit to Baghdad. -------------- PKK Ceasefire, Cambridge Trip -------------- ¶8. (C) Talabani agreed that the PKK needs to maintain their ceasefire. He said he was already working on this and promised to send an envoy the same day to press for continuing the ceasefire. Asked if KRG President Barzani could help, he said yes, and encouraged the Ambassador to call Barzani. ¶9. (C) Talabani told the Ambassador about his address to the Cambridge Students' Union in during his trip to the UK. In an example of the power of Talabani's personality he said that he received a letter afterward indicating that many of the students had reconsidered their opposition to the war after hearing Talabani's speech. -------------- U.S.-Iran Dialogue -------------- ¶10. (C) Talabani told the Ambassador that Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei had said Iran will remind the US of its responsibility to secure Iraq. Talabani took this as "green light" to the Iranian government to go ahead with U.S. talks. The Ambassador wondered who their chosen interlocutor would be. Talabani said he would see the Iranian Ambassador the next day and would ask. -------------- GOI to Move Outside IZ -------------- ¶11. (C) Talabani claimed he had convinced the entire government to move outside the International Zone (IZ) - the ministers, Prime Minister, and even the Council of Representatives. This would be part of an effort to expand the security sphere of the IZ by moving the Ministries with all of their security into previously unsecured areas. In this way they also could connect Baghdad's Karada district to the IZ. He asserted that Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council head Abdelaziz Hakim could help with this project. He also said he was trying to convince the ministers to visit the Mansour district of Baghdad. -------------- Diyala Ready for Liberation -------------- ¶12. (C) Talabani said there are 280 tribal and other leaders in Diyala ready to cooperate with U.S. forces against insurgents. He said the example of the tribal shayks in Anbar is spreading. On May 20 an anti-terror operation will commence in Diyala. He said representatives from 2000 Sunni Arabs from Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad, came to him to express their readiness to cooperate and protect their area. Talabani also claimed that U.S. and GOI forces could liberate the road from Baghdad to Khalis in Diyala and then on to Kirkuk. ¶13. (C) The Ambassador expressed reservations about the Shia leadership in Diyala. Talabani responded that the head of the Provincial Council is from the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party and the vice-chair is from his own Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party. -------------- Talabani Asks for Light Weapons -------------- ¶14. (C) Talabani told the Ambassador that the Iraqi Minister of Interior claimed a ratio of one Kalashnikov rifle per five people in the MOI security forces. Talabani, with the PM's agreement, asked the Chinese Ambassador for light weapons, who responded that in principle the Government of China supported this, but he would have to consult Beijing. Talabani said when he goes to China later in the summer after returning from the U.S. he will press them on this request. The Ambassador agreed to discuss with Generals Petraeus and Dempsey this request as well. BAGHDAD 00001622 003 OF 003 ¶15. (C) Talabani said they need to fill out their military units, they need 30,000 more recruits this year and need U.S. support to do it. The Ambassador replied that they will certainly look into it, but the Iraqi security forces are expanding very rapidly and at a certain point they run the risk of not being properly trained. Talabani said there are many former army members requiring little training that could join, but he admitted that the security forces need balance and need troops loyal to the government rather than a political party. CROCKER