Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1605
2007-05-16 15:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMITTEE: PREPARING FINAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM IZ 
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VZCZCXRO7263
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1605/01 1361531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161531Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1191
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001605 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMITTEE: PREPARING FINAL
REPORT, SEEKING FINAL COMPROMISES

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001605 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMITTEE: PREPARING FINAL REPORT, SEEKING FINAL COMPROMISES Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The Constitutional Review Committee's (CRC) May 15 deadline to submit its recommendations to the Council of Representatives (CoR) passed with measurable progress on key issues but without final consensus on issues such as resource distribution and power-sharing. The most comprehensive proposals to date focus on judicial reform, independent institutions and the federation council. While the CRC has functioned well in the past few weeks, CRC Chair Humam Hammoudi (SCIRI) and Deputy Chairs Ayad Sammarai (IIP) and Fouad Massoum (PUK) admit their respective political leaders are unaware of the impact and scope of the CRC's recommendations. They agree that support from Iraq's political leadership is essential before any of the changes can be accepted. Privately, United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) officers, Sunnis, and Shia CRC members express concern that Kurdish leaders will refuse to endorse any amendments which change regional autonomy, resource distribution or the process for determining Kirkuk's final status. ¶2. (C) Summary cont. The CRC intends to address outstanding issues ) including power sharing between the central and regional/provincial governments; resource distribution; and the authorities of Iraq's Presidency Council ) over the next few days with a goal of completing their report by May 21, the day before CoR reconvenes. The CRC leadership is unconcerned that the report is incomplete by the May 15 deadline, citing a letter sent by Hammoudi to CoR Speaker Mashadani outlining the CRC's progress and outstanding issues as sufficient. The CRC is prepared to continue working together until consensus is reached, even if a partial list of recommendations must be submitted to CoR. Both Hammoudi and Sammarai recommended that U.S. efforts, particularly with Kurdish leadership, was now in order to encourage their support of the CRC's recommendations. End Summary. -------------- Progress Made: Judiciary; Institutions; Federation Council -------------- 3.(C) The CRC has adopted recommendations on judicial reform based on suggestions submitted by UNAMI and recommendations from Iraq's Chief Justice. Some of the proposed judiciary changes include renaming the "F
ederal Supreme Court" to the "Federal Constitutional Court" and granting authority to that court to review the constitutionality of regional Constitutions, laws, and regulations. Furthermore, the CRC, using suggestions again provided by UNAMI, examined the role of Iraq's independent institutions, clarifying that the commissions are independent financially and administratively. They have also proposed an Independent Commission for Promoting the Constitution. This new commission would be responsible for informing people about their constitutional rights, reporting on ministry violation of those rights, and challenging laws in the Federal Constitutional Court that appear to violate the Constitution. Finally, the CRC has also reached consensus on specifying the role of the Federation Council (FC),the second legislative chamber, in the constitution. The CRC proposal grants the FC the authority to draft and consider laws affecting the regions and governorates. The proposal would also establish how members are elected to the FC and the number of representatives per region or governorate. ¶4. (C) In a May 15 meeting with Legal Advisor and Poloff, UNAMI representatives stated that further recommendations relating to Iraq's security forces may be forthcoming. The CRC is reviewing, UNAMI said, a provision that would allow the national army to respond to an act of aggression against a province or a natural disaster within a province without seeking permission from the local government. UNAMI further stated that the CRC is debating whether the regional guards permitted in the constitution would be considered as part of Iraq's national security forces. Finally, the CRC appears to have reached consensus on a number of minor changes to the constitution affecting inheritance and reaffirming a commitment to hiring public servants on a merit-based system. -------------- -------------- What's Left to Decide: Power and Resource Sharing -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Sammarai and Hammoudi each told PolCouns that consensus on Articles 110 through 115, the constitutional articles relating to resource distribution and power sharing between the central and regional governments, has almost been reached. It appears that the CRC will recommend that customs policy and administration of waterways will become the BAGHDAD 00001605 002 OF 003 exclusive domain of the federal government. Furthermore, according to Sammarai, the CRC's final report will contain a recommendation that the central government have the authority to tax and regulate air-traffic control. The CRC, at least Sammarai and Hammoudi, is further pushing for central government authority to regulate the distribution of oil revenue. While the CRC's Kurdish representatives, including Fouad Masoum, appear to support the principle of this recommendation, this recommendation does not necessarily have the support of Kurdish leadership, especially among KDP leaders. -------------- Increasing Presidential Powers, Decreasing the PM's Role -------------- ¶6. (C) Sunni demands that the Presidency be strengthened in comparison with the Prime Minister's authorities continue. While Sammarai conceded that it is unrealistic to change Iraq's commander-in-chief from the Prime Minister to the President, they remain committed, Sammarai said, to strengthening the Presidency,s powers. He suggested that the Sunnis would support increasing the President's authorities to include the ability to refer executive decisions and legislation to the judicial system if a question of constitutionality arose. UNAMI officers assess that in the coming days Sunni CRC members will continue endorsing recommendations aimed at shifting power away from the PM, although it is unlikely that the Shia or Kurdish CRC members would support any extensive changes in the division of powers. -------------- --- Article 140: The Spoiler in the Review Process? -------------- --- ¶7. (C) While CRC contacts have emphasized a desire to address Article 140, the provision which outlines how the final status of Kirkuk and the disputed territories will be determined since the Committee began meeting, it has been assumed that serious discussion would not occur due to Kurdish staunch opposition to any change. However, both Sammarai and Hammoudi told PolCouns that the CRC may propose a change to Article 140 which would delay the referendum currently scheduled to occur by December 31, 2007. The recommendation, put forward by CRC member Abbas al-Bayati (Shia Coalition, Turkomen),stipulates that Kirkuk would be considered its own region and would be prohibited from joining any other region for five years. During that period an international arbitrator would review boundary disputes and make recommendations for boundary changes, as allowed for under Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) 58. At the end of five years Kirkuk, with its newly defined boundaries, and any other disputed territories could move forward with a referendum. ¶8. (C) Sammarai told PolCouns that Tawafuq supports such a suggestion and in a May 15 meeting Hammoudi told PolCouns that this idea has gained momentum in the CRC. The Kurdish Alliance does not have the authority to negotiate changes to Article 140 so it is uncertain what action they will take should such a recommendation be put forward, although Kurdish leadership would be unlikely to support such a suggestion. -------------- -------------- Other Issues of Concern: Human Rights, Article 41 -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Several other issues remain which have not been fully addressed by the CRC, but are of significant importance to specific groups or communities. Hunain al-Qeddo, CRC member representing the Shabbak community, has tried to amend Article 125 to include the Shabbak and Yezidis in the list of named ethnic minorities whose "administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights" shall be guaranteed. The Kurds have opposed this change stating that the Shabbak and Yezidis are ethnic Kurds, a charge strongly resisted by the Shabbak and Yezidi communities. The Kurds' motivation, according to al-Qeddo, is to further their expansionist goals in northern Ninewa, which includes lands inhabited by the Yezidis and Shabbak. Sammarai told PolCouns that Tawafuq supports the Yezidis and Shabbak in their efforts, but intimated that if they are forced to compromise with the Kurds on resource sharing and distribution of wealth, they would yield on Article 125. ¶10. (C) Article 41, the personal status code, has also prompted heated discussions amongst women's rights groups who argue that this article should be deleted completely. They propose a return to Iraq's Personal Status Law from 1959. Both the Kurds and the Sunni groups, according to UNAMI, agree that Article 41 should be deleted. The Shia, however, BAGHDAD 00001605 003 OF 003 oppose deletion and while they may be open to modification it is unlikely an acceptable compromise can be found. -------------- Next Steps: Presenting to CoR, Engaging Party Leadership -------------- ¶11. (C) UNAMI has suggested that the CRC remain active to address any unresolved political and technical issues after the initial report has been submitted to COR. If the CRC submits an initial report that does not address all issues to COR, the Speaker may return the report to the CRC so that it can continue to work to achieve consensus on difficult issues among the party leadership. Once agreement is reached the CRC could amend its report and resubmit the amended report to COR. Debate on the CRC,s report could commence anytime after the CRC's amended report is submitted to COR. The constitution does not stipulate a timeframe for this debate, and CRC members as well as UNAMI expect that CoR members will debate the recommendations for some time. Following the debate, CoR will vote on the proposed recommendations. UNAMI has encouraged Deputy CoR Speaker Khalid al-Attiyah to prevent the CoR from voting on issues in a "line item" fashion and instead is suggesting that CoR vote on the entire package as a whole once political negotiations conclude. CRC member Abdullah Saleh confirmed to Poloff on May 15 that the amendments would be voted on as a bloc. The entire package of approved proposals then would be placed on a referendum for the public. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) After stalling following the April 12 CoR bombing, the CRC has increased momentum in the past couple of weeks, working diligently to strike compromise and present a comprehensive list of proposed changes which address Sunni concerns and make technical improvements to the constitution. While the compromises so far reached do not address critical issues such as resource distribution and power sharing, the process has demonstrated that the CRC is able to work together and find common ground. Transferring this to the political party leaders will be a challenge which could delay final resolution on the outstanding issues. Iraqi political leaders, ability to reach consensus in the coming weeks on these difficult political issues will demonstrate their level of commitment to using the constitutional review process as a tool for reconciliation. CROCKER

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