PART 3 OF 3: WHOEVER RULES SADR CITY, RULES BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001538 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS IZ SUBJECT: PART 3 OF 3: WHOEVER RULES SADR CITY, RULES BAGHDAD Classified By: Classified by Deputy PolCouns Charles O. Blaha, for reas ons 1.4(B) and (D) ¶1. (C) This is the third of three cables on the relationship between the Sadr City District Advisory Council (DAC) and the Sadrists located in the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS). On May 4, poloff conducted a protracted interview with Heyder S. Zedan and Suaad A. Allami, two leading moderates on the Sadr City DAC, following their meeting with the Adhamiya-Sadr City EPRT. Septels described the Sadrist take over of the Sadr City DAC between 2003 and 2006, and the moderates' recent "push back" against the Sadrists. This cable provides detailed information about contemporary life in Sadr City, including a Sadrist extortion racket and available healthcare facilities. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Sadr City DAC Members Heyder S. Zedan and Suaad A. Allami told poloff May 4 that control of Sadr City has been tantamount to control of greater Baghdad since the district's creation in 1959. They also claimed that some Sunnis still live in Sadr City, despite the forced expulsions along sectarian lines that have occurred in the district and throughout Baghdad since March 2006. In addition, they described the organized extortion system through which Sadrists regularly collect money from Sadr City businesses. Finally, they detailed the healthcare facilities available to residents of Sadr City, and requested USG help with training, buildings, and medical supplies. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- "HE WHO CONTROLS SADR CITY, CONTROLS BAGHDAD" -------------- ¶3. (C) Ranging back to the origins of Sadr City in 1959, Zedan explained that the military government of Abd Al-Karim Qasem created the district of "Revolution City" to provide free housing for poor and homeless people who had ventured into Baghdad from rural areas -- primarily Shia from the south of Iraq. Each family received a home of 144 square meters, which tenants eventually sub-divided among several families. As the population grew extremely rapidly, residents clung to the family members and groups with whom they had first arrived in the district. Zedan explained that Sadr City has long provided residents a largely self-contained economy. Internal markets offer the most affordable food and housing in Baghdad. It comprises 104 square blocks, or sectors, plus three other neighborhoods outside the central sector system. ¶4. (C) Saddam realized, Zedan said, that "He who controls Sadr City, controls Baghdad." To assert his claim over densely populated Sadr City, Saddam renamed it after himself, "Saddam City." The district only became known as "Sadr City" after the regime fell in April, 2003. -------------- SUNNIS STILL LIVE IN SADR CITY -------------- ¶5. (C) For the first time in its history, Shia residents of Sadr City govern their own district. Sunnis, however, still live in Sadr City, Zedan and Allami asserted. Some families have lived there since Qasem established the district in ¶1959. Sunnis do not live there together in large groups, Zedan and Allami explained, and they live in fear and insecurity, but numerous families remain. Zedan told a story illustrative of the challenge Sunnis in Sadr City face meeting basic needs: when the child of an old Sunni friend of his in Sadr City needed medical care, the friend could not safely travel with his child to Zedan's medical clinic. Zedan had to visit him in his home. -------------- THE SADRIST EXTORTION SYSTEM -------------- ¶6. (C) The first Shia experiment with self-government in Sadr City centers on the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) in Sector 14. Zedan and Allami described the main OMS "hadquarters" in Sector 14 as a "huge office" by Sadr City standards, comprising at least 1,000 square feet. The OMS has organized itself into various departments and sections throughout the district. ¶7. (C) Zedan and Allami detailed an organized extortion racket that resembles the taxation structure of a normal city government and affects the daily lives of all of Sadr City's inhabitants. Every day, for example, the OMS collects six percent of the daily revenue of each of the district's five large gas stations. Zedan and Allami emphasized that other businesses pay comparable rates through a comparable system. Zedan and Allami implied that refusal to pay could prove BAGHDAD 00001538 002 OF 002 fatal. OMS earns high profits from this system, they explained. ¶8. (C) Zedan and Allami added that the citywide services institution (the Amanat) ties into the Sadrist system of corruption, wherein both Amanat managers and the OMS office profit from the provision of services to Sadr City. They provided the example of Musa Dishar, General Manager for the Environment in the Amanat, whom Zedan and Allami claim has recently purchased a house of 600 square meters and now drives a BMW. They reported that many OMS and Amanat officials in Sadr City flaunt their new wealth through conspicuous consumption. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: While the threat of violence against those who fail to pay "taxes" to OMS comes as no surprise, the low, seemingly sustainable rate of taxation (six percent) may once again reflect Sadrist pragmatism. END COMMENT. -------------- HEALTHCARE FACILITIES AND NEEDS IN SADR CITY -------------- ¶10. (C) During their May 4 meeting with EPRT Team Leader, Zedan and Allami reported that Sadr City has five hospitals, including two general hospitals (Al Akadissiya and Al Imam Ali) and three specialized hospitals (two for gynecology and pediatrics (Admin Balady and Mihabiba),and one psychiatric hospital (name unknown)). In addition, Sadr City has 19 health clinics for primary care. ¶11. (C) Zedan explained that Sadr City's health professionals have traditionally purchased medical equipment, supplies and medicine from one large depot in Al Hadr, which they described as a 'hot' Sunni area. Most of the workers at Sadr City's hospitals and clinics no longer feel safe traveling to Al Hadr to make necessary purchases. ¶12. (C) Zedan requested USG help in building a warehouse for medical supplies in Sadr City, and also in building a central pharmacy to make drugs available for cancer and other chronic illnesses. Most small pharmacies do not stock these drugs, he said. In addition, Allami mentioned that one of her relatives serves as director of one of Sadr City's general hospitals; all of the hospitals, she reported, need emergency units. ¶13. (C) Most importantly, Zedan said, Sadr City needs training for doctors, nurses and technicians. He said that training could prove more useful than equipment or money. "Training enters the head," he explained, "not the pocket," alluding to the possible theft of material donations. EPRT Team Leader noted that it might be possible for Brigade Combat Team staff to assist with trauma training. Zedan offered to credit the USG for building any new health-related structures; EPRT Team members insisted that the people of Sadr City would be better served if Iraqi government entities take credit. CROCKER