PRT TIRKRIT: SALAD AD DIN HAS NO CONFIDENCE IN PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001507 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PRT TIRKRIT: SALAD AD DIN HAS NO CONFIDENCE IN PM MALIKI ON RECONCILIATION REF: BAGHDAD 1437 Classified by PRT Leader Steven Buckler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. In recent meetings with Salah ad Din (SaD) provincial government leaders, politicians, tribal sheikhs, and local imams, all say that meaningful reconciliation is not possible under the al Maliki administration. With their identity based on their history of military and civic service to Iraq, SaD's Sunnis see many of the al Maliki administration officials and supporters as uncommitted to reconciliation and unfaithful to Iraq because of their historical and current associations with the country's enduring enemy, Iran. SaD Sunnis' universal preference for removing the list system of elections is based on their perception that the system is the reason so many expatriates, "unknown Iraqis," were elected to office. The January re-hiring of 200 de-baathified teachers and April commencement of monthly "emergency payments" for members of the former Iraqi Army have received private appreciation by the persons affected, but are seen as falling far short of what needs to be done for true reconciliation. Through reconciliation, SaD Sunnis are looking for debaathification reform that allows most former Baathists to return to their jobs, to participate in the political process, and/or to receive their pensions, and for the return to military positions or of pensions for the majority of former Iraqi Army members. Some also support finding a role for the Baath Party in the democratic political process. In short, they seek an active role in the political decision-making process. Meanwhile, de-baathification has become a symbol of what SaD Sunnis see as the central GOI's rejection of their participation in the political process. END SUMMARY. -------------- The View from the Provincial Government -------------- ¶3. (C) In a private conversation on April 29, SaD powerbroker Deputy Governor Abdullah Ajbarah rhetorically questioned "what the USG's next plan for Iraq" would be. He said that he met with former MNFI Commanding General (CG) Casey several months ago and asked what the current government's chances for success were. According to Ajbarah, the CG replied by saying the al Maliki administration had a 50 percent chance �00A;of success. Ajbarah said that the current trend looked like the "bad half" of those chances and said the USG needed to start planning another strategy for success in Iraq. -------------- What Local Politicians Think -------------- ¶4. (C) At an April 18 PRT-hosted political roundtable on how to support moderates in Iraq, several active local politicians concluded that for Iraq's continued democratic development, there must be "a change of government" and with it a change to the elections system. Roundtable participants, including Political Action Committee Secretary Dr. Nuri Mohammad Dhahir, SaD IIP representative Hashem Jihad, and local politicians Johar Hamad Haham, Jassim Salih, and Bedu Mohammed (all Sunni Arabs),said the current political parties are "too religious" and that the Constitution "creates a sectarian political situation." They advocated the USG discontinue its support for the al Maliki administration and begin working with Ayad Allawi to form a "salvation government" until the ratification of a new Constitution that upholds the unity of Iraq and establishes a government not based on "political Islam." They also strongly advocated for direct election of candidates rather than through a list system. -------------- Tribal Sheikhs Speak About Reconciliation -------------- ¶5. (C) At an April 24 Sheikhs' Council meeting, the more than 50 assembled sheikhs concluded that the USG "must establish a new secular government in Iraq" because the al Maliki administration "is killing the spirit of the Iraqi people." Many of them openly stated their support for the democratic system, including the head of the late Saddam Hussein's tribe, but strongly questioned al Maliki's intentions to work towards a stable, unified Iraq. They said that the al Maliki administration continues to allow Iran to negatively influence the political environment and security situation in Iraq. They also called for elections to occur as soon as possible, ones in which candidates are directly elected. (reftel) BAGHDAD 00001507 002 OF 003 -------------- Imams on Reconciliation -------------- ¶6. (C) At a May 1 meeting, SaD Religious Affairs Director and Sunni Endowment Representative Sheikh Yasin Mohammed Abdulfatah and University of Tikrit Islamic Studies Professor and well-respected imam Dr. Abdulmalek Abdulmajed said, "Reconciliation is not possible with the al Maliki administration" because it has not been honest about its commitment to secure Iraq and include all religious sects and ethnic groups in the political process. They too called for a "radical change in government" in the form of a "salvation government" under the leadership of Ayad Allawi or the United Nations with regional support from Arab nations. Denouncing the growing influence of Iran in Iraq's domestic affairs, they said the current government has "done more bad things in three years than Saddam's did in 30 years." (NOTE: Similar to many Sunni religious figures in SaD, Sheikhs Yasin and Abdulmalek are not pro-Baathist, merely referencing the previous regime as a comparator for their idea of poor governance. END NOTE.) -------------- Understanding the SaD Sunni Point of View -------------- ¶7. (C) With a large population of officials and military veterans from the former regime in Salah ad Din, proud of their military and civic service to Iraq, the SaD Sunni majority sees itself as faithful and loyal Iraqis who support a unified Iraq. They see many of the al Maliki administration's officials and supporters as Iraq deserters who did not support the country when it was at war with Iran and who are allowing Iran to gain too much influence to Iraq. They see Iran as Iraq's enduring enemy. Most people in the province support democracy ) or are not opposed to it. Some feel that the Baath Party should be included as one party in a multi-party political process. They are proud the province includes Sunni, Shia, Turcoman, and Kurdish elements, which interact relatively peacefully, and see it as a model for a unified Iraq. ¶8. (C) When it comes to elections, they adamantly argue for the direct election of individual candidates because they perceive the list system as the reason so many expatriates, "unknown Iraqis," were elected to office. In SaD these individuals, many of whom were in self-exile from the former regime, are seen as the ones pushing for the continuation of the current de-baathification policies and for the complete excommunication of the Baath Party. -------------- Reconciliation Efforts Get Little Traction -------------- ¶9. (C) In January approximately 200 de-baathified teachers were returned to their jobs, and in April former Iraqi Army members began receiving monthly "emergency payments" from the GOI. However, these reconciliation initiatives have been met with private appreciation by the persons affected and nothing else. Neither was reported in the media, and provincial government officials discuss them only when prompted. Most see these initiatives as good, but falling far short of what needs to be done for true reconciliation. -------------- What They Want Reconciliation to Look Like -------------- ¶10. (C) When SaD Sunnis speak about reconciliation they are looking for a de-baathification reform law that allows most of the former Baathist who are still around to return to their jobs, participate in the political process, and/or receive their pensions. They also want a majority of the former IA members still in the province returned to the military or allowed to receive their full military pensions. In their estimation, most of the former Baathists who still live in the province are not the "really bad" ones who committed crimes in the name of the former regime. Some also support finding a role for the Baath Party in the democratic political process, as one party among many. In short, they seek an active role in the political decision-making process. Many also advocate for compensation programs for those harmed by the former regime. ¶11. (C) De-baathification has become a symbol of what SaD Sunnis see as the central GOI's rejection of their participation in the political process. It is evident through their tone in meetings that most are politically downtrodden and feel as though they have no representation in BAGHDAD 00001507 003 OF 003 the national political decision-making process. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) The Sunnis of Salah ad Din are not against democracy or a multi-party political process. However, they have no faith in the al Maliki administration's ability to bring about meaningful reconciliation. They are unable or unwilling to understand deep-rooted skepticism about the intentions of former Baathists, which in turn compounds their political frustration and disdain for Iran and anyone perceived to associate with it. Nonetheless, they seek an active role in national political decision-making process. END COMMENT. ¶13. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit SPECKHARD