Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD15
2007-01-03 10:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT TIKRIT: LOCAL POLITICIANS "REJECT IDEA" OF A

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7761
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0015/01 0031017
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031017Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8901
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000015 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: LOCAL POLITICIANS "REJECT IDEA" OF A
NATIONAL MODERATE FRONT

REF: BAGHDAD 4651

Classified By: Stephanie Miley, PRT Team Leader, for reasons 1.5 (b) an
d (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000015

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: LOCAL POLITICIANS "REJECT IDEA" OF A
NATIONAL MODERATE FRONT

REF: BAGHDAD 4651

Classified By: Stephanie Miley, PRT Team Leader, for reasons 1.5 (b) an
d (d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. At a December 26 political
roundtable, keyed-in Salah ad Din (SaD)
politicians (all Sunni Arabs) "rejected the
idea" that a national moderate front -
potentially comprising SCIRI, Dawa, KDP, PUK,
and IIP - could effectively work together and
govern the country. Saying they had heard
nothing through official party channels and had
learned of the potential moderate political
party grouping through the media, the group of
Provincial Council members and local
politicians termed the idea "another Coalition
Forces-inspired attempt to fix a broken
process." They asserted that the grouping of
parties could not work together because their
specific interests were too different and that
if a moderate front did emerge, it would not
last long because "the parties have not been
communicating their true interests to one
another." They also expressed the veiw that a
moderate front could be very damaging to the
political process by pushing Iraq into a
"Lebanese-style, sectarian-based democracy."
Conceding that Iraq's political parties were
too weak to handle the current sectarian
environment, they suggested a strong, secular
leader (like former PM Ayad Allawi) backed by a
nonpartisan "salvation" government was the way
forward for Iraq's democracy. If a moderate
front does emerge, it is clear that it will
have little backing among local politicians in
Salad ad Din without serious lobbying by the
respective parties' national leaders at the
provincial level. END SUMMARY.

--------------
At the Roundtable
--------------

3. (C) On December 26 at a PRT-initiated
political roundtable, Provincial Council (PC)
members Jassim Shaki Abdullah and Dhamin Ulaiwi
Mutlag, Political Action Committee Secretary
Dr. Nuri Mohammad Dhahir, SaD IIP
representative Hashem Jihad, and local
politician Johar Hamad Haham (all Sunni Arabs)
met to discuss the possibility of a national

moderate front, potentially comprising SCIRI,
Dawa, KDP, PUK, and IIP. All, including those
affiliated with parties that may join the
moderate front, said they had heard nothing
official from their respective parties about
the potential political grouping and had
learned of the possibility through the media.

--------------
Rejecting the Idea of a Moderate Political
Front
--------------


4. (C) The roundtable participants "rejected
the idea" that the grouping of political
parties could work together and govern the
country, terming it "another Coalition Forces-
inspired attempt to fix a broken process."
They said the current disarray in the national
political scene was a result of the Bremer
Administration's "poor planning" which has led
to "poor achievements."


5. (C) In the view of the keyed-in politicians,
the moderate front could not function with the
potential composition of political parties
because the party's interests were too
different. If the parties were able to form an
alliance, they surmised, it would be short-
lived and resulting from a lack of the parties
"communicating their true interests to one
another." They questioned "who the leaders on
the ground" would be.

-------------- --
Moderate Front Seen as a Step toward a
"Lebanese-Style Democracy"

BAGHDAD 00000015 002 OF 002


-------------- --


6. (C) They also asserted that formation of
such a moderate front, based on sectarian
parties, could be damaging to the political
process. They assessed that it would push Iraq
into a Lebanese-style, sectarian-based
democracy that would not be able to function as
a national government. They conceded that
Iraq's national political parties are weak and
suggested that was a potential source of the
nation's current sectarian dilemma.


7. (C) They said that if the U.S. was serious
about fixing Iraq's "broken political process"
it would support a strong, secular leader,
"like Ayad Allawi who is Shia but secular," and
would repeal all of the Bremer Administration
legislation. They recommended that a
"salvation" government, with no political
affiliations be elected to the nation's
leadership. As Iraq's democracy strengthened,
possibly after two years, they suggested,
political parties could be introduced.

--------------
Frustrated by Lack of Clear U.S. Policy
--------------


8. (C) They also expressed frustration with
what they perceive as the U.S.'s lack of a
clear policy on Iraq. They recognized that the
Bush Administration was undergoing a policy
review and would set forth its agenda on Iraq
in early 2007. They welcomed re-convening a
similar political roundtable at that time to
discuss the new policy.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) The individuals at the roundtable were
among Salah ad Din's most active politicians
and keyed-in individuals. Their views are
generally representative of those in the
province involved in the political process, and
their forthright rejection of a potential
moderate front was strong. If a national
moderate front does emerge, it is clear that it
will have little backing among local
politicians in Salah ad Din without serious
lobbying by the respective parties' national
leaders at the provincial level. END COMMENT.


10. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit,
Salah ad Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit.
SCOBEY