INTERMEDIATE RECONCILIATION MEASURES FOR PM MALIKI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001499

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: INTERMEDIATE RECONCILIATION MEASURES FOR PM MALIKI

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: As intermediate reconciliation measures, PM
Maliki could follow up on his March visit to Anbar with
further outreach to Sunni areas; take steps to mitigate the
effects of de-Ba'athification; appoint a senior Sunni
adviser; make a targeted political push for a consensus
candidate for Minister of Health; and take steps to ensure
impartiality in humanitarian assistance. End Summary.


2. (C) To keep momentum for reconciliation, Embassy Baghdad
has identified a number of interim reconciliation measures
for PM Maliki. Reconciliation remains a tough slog: easy
measures tend to be mostly symbolic; effective measures are
politically controversial and tough to implement. The
measures we suggest below are not free of political problems,
nor will they resolve the substance of Iraq's reconciliation
issues. However, they are feasible and could serve as
springboards for more effective measures.

Outreach to Sunnis
--------------


3. (C) The PM's March visit to Anbar province was
well-received. The PM could follow up with a series of other
outreach initiatives to Sunni areas.

-- The PM could visit another heavily-Sunni area, such as
Tikrit, or could officially re-open the Al-Qa'im border
crossing in Anbar province.

-- The PM could invite Anbar and Salah ad Din provincial
councils to Baghdad for a series of meetings with him and key
ministers.

-- The PM could urge key ministers, especially those in
charge of services, to visit heavily-Sunni provinces with an
eye toward identifying priority projects for the GOI in each
province.

-- In Baghdad, where Sunnis are not represented on the
provincial council, the PM could meet with Baghdad Sunni
leaders and ask them to identify priority projects in
Baghdad's Sunni neighborhoods.

-- Along the same lines, the PM could direct Sunni DPM
Zawbai, who heads the Fardh al-Qanoon Executive Steering
Committee's services committee, to produce a list of priority
services projects in Baghdad's Sunni neighborhoods.

Mitigate de-Ba'athification
--------------


4. (C) Final passage of meaningful de-Ba'athification reform
faces a difficult path. However, there are a number of
intermediate steps that would be less difficult and could
mitigate de-Ba'athification's effects.

-- The PM could start by sending to the Council of
Representatives the "compromise draft" de-Ba'athification
reform law signed by the PM and President Talabani in late
March.

-- The PM could direct the Council of Ministers to suspend
implementation of de-Ba'athification orders issued by the
Higher National de-Ba'athification Commission (HNDBC) pending
passage of de-Ba'athification reform legislation.

-- A more modest approach would be for the PM to grant
case-by-case exemptions to individual de-Ba'athification
orders and reinstate individual government employees and
their pensions.

-- In particular, the PM could make certain his effort to
reinstate former army officers continues.

A Senior Sunni PM Adviser
--------------


5. (C) -- With relations between the PM and Sunni VP
al-Hashimi badly strained, the PM could name a senior Sunni
politician as an adviser.

A Targeted Political Push for a New Health Minister
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Sectarian provision of health services, especially in
Baghdad, remains a sore point with Sunnis and a potent symbol
of sectarian strife. Broad cabinet changes are hindered by
the need for political consensus on a number of points,
including the sensitive post of Defense Minister.

-- The PM could publicly proclaim the Health Ministry as an
area off-limits to sectarianism, appoint a cross-sectarian
commission of Shia, Sunnis and Kurds to identify and name a
candidate to be the new Health Minister, and take that
nomination to the Council of Representatives on a priority
basis.

Guarantee Impartiality of Humanitarian Assistance
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The Ministry of Displacement and Migration is headed
by a Shia Kurd minister who has largely focused on the return
of Shia Kurds (aka Faili Kurds) from Iran, and has promoted
Shia and Faili Kurd employees at the Ministry. More
attention should be paid to the plight of refugees in Jordan
and Syria, and to the needs of internally displaced persons
(Sunni, Shia and Christians).

-- The PM could order the minister of Displacement and
Migration to promote qualified Sunni civil servants to
positions of responsibility.

-- The Ministry of Displacement and Migration could open a
second branch office in Baghdad, to better serve internally
displaced Sunnis.

-- The Ministry could strengthen its branch office in Anbar
province, where there are many internally displaced Sunnis.

-- The GOI could engage the Government of Jordan and the
Government of Syria and convince them (and compensate them if
necessary) to extend education to all Iraqi children in these
two countries.

-- The PM could consider replacing the current Minister of
Displacement and Migration with a Minister that is more
assertive and active in helping the close to one million new
internally displaced persons and the most vulnerable Iraqis
among the up to two million Iraqis out of the country.


SPECKHARD