IRAQI PM OUTLINES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000148 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI PM OUTLINES BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On January 13, the PM briefed the Ambassador on his plans for implementing the new Baghdad security plan, in the presence of the team he has assembled: Shiite VP Mehdi, who will coordinate political support; Sunni DPM Zawbai, in charge of bringing services to cleared areas; Kurdish DPM Saleh, in charge of economic support; and Shiite PM spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh, in charge of media aspects. The PM previewed some of the plan's security aspects and promised the group a more in-depth briefing. End Summary. -------------- -------------- PM: Important that GOI and USG Not Disagree Publicly -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The PM emphasized that the GOI and USG not disagree publicly as the Baghdad security plan moves forward. He expressed concern that USG public statements about deadlines and timetables were inconsistent with Iraqi sovereignty. -------------- Four Support Committees -------------- ¶3. (C) The PM said committees focusing on politics, services, economics and the media will support the security plan. The service committee, headed by Sunni DPM Zawbai, will focus on bringing electricity, water and other municipal services "right away" to cleared areas. Shiite VP Abdul Mehdi heads the political committee, tasked with generating political support for the plan. Kurdish DPM Barham Saleh heads the economic committee, which will provide financing and other economic assistance needed for the plan to move forward. The media committee will be headed by PM spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh and Yassin Majid, also of the PM's office. The PM urged Zawbai, Mehdi, Saleh and al-Dabbagh to make sure their committees include members of all Iraq's ethnic groups. The final support for the plan, the PM added, is the USG. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Embassy had briefed DPMs Zawbai and Saleh on the types of support the USG could provide; our comparative advantage is speedy deployment of resources, the Ambassador added. The PM said Iraqi resources would come quickly as well; the Ambassador welcomed this and said the GOI would do well to speed up budget execution in support of the plan. -------------- Political Support for the Plan -------------- ¶5. (C) VP Mehdi emphasized the need for the committees to include well-known political figures from all ethnic groups. Part of the political effort will be directed at building public support in Iraq, the U.S. and regional countries. He asked to be informed about how long the security plan lasts, what it would entail, and when it would peak; the PM said military commanders would brief those details. -------------- Restoring Services -------------- ¶6. (C) DPM Zawbai said he had met with U.S. officials, Baghdad's governor, mayor and provincial council members, and officials in charge of electricity. Zawbai plans services operations centers on both sides of the Tigris river, one in Baghdad's Karkh district, the other in Rusafa. Zawbai said he had also discussed with the Electricity Minister the importance of having electricity at night, to help work crews and help authorities enforce curfews. Zawbai added that he had met with Embassy DCM and would be forming joint teams with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO). Services go hand in hand with security, Zawbai said, and he would coordinate with military officials to protect personnel working to restore services. The Ambassador suggested Zawbai also consider some measures to restore banking services. -------------- A Realistic Expectation: Changed Trends -------------- ¶7. (C) DPM Saleh acknowledged the plan would not work overnight; "changed trends" are a more realistic expectation. Saleh proposed the group meet weekly. Echoing the PM, he stressed that the plan's "political faces" must come from ll BAGHDAD 00000148 002 OF 002 sects, especially Sunni. Saleh urged the PM to direct ministries on the specific steps needed to implement the PM's plan, especially the Construction and Health Ministries; he asked the PM to help with the Health Ministry. Saleh said he would focus on budget execution, particularly on services. ¶8. (C) On hydrocarbons, Saleh told the Ambassador the draft law would be finalized "today" and the agreed draft law would be presented to the Council of Ministers January 18. This would send a strong positive message to Iraqis and to the world. Saleh said it would be important to brief the plan to donor country ambassadors and to the EU. -------------- --- The Importance of One Voice and No Public Splits -------------- --- ¶9. (C) Al-Dabbagh also asked to be briefed on the plan in order to be able to put together a media plan; he called for there to be a single GOI source authorized to make public statements. VP Mehdi stressed that the GOI must not split publicly about the security plan, even if internal differences arose. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador told the group that, as in the security sphere, the USG would follow the GOI's lead on the plan's service and economic aspects. He also suggested that VP Mehdi's political committee help push key legislation through the Council of Representatives (CoR). -------------- PM Previews Security Measures -------------- ¶11. (C) The PM said the group would meet again before the plan was officially launched. Security is the basis for political progress, the PM said, and President Bush seemed to be thinking in the same way. The PM stressed that there would be no political interference in the plan's military operations and no sanctuary for terrorists. He said he had contemplated starting operations January 15 but more preparation is needed. He noted that some trenches have been dug around Baghdad, there have already been some detentions, and force deployments have begun. The PM told the group there would be 28 fortified checkpoints around Baghdad with over 30 people manning each, including Coalition Forces (CF). ¶12. (C) DPM Zawbai pointed out that, in the past, official Iraqi government vehicles had violated curfews and this had caused problems. The PM replied that official vehicles would not be allowed to depart government offices after working hours. The Ambassador urged the PM to also think about routing of cars and parking restrictions that should be enforced. KHALILZAD