TWO DAWA LEADERS SAY DEBAATHIFICATION WILL BE HARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001463 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2017 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: TWO DAWA LEADERS SAY DEBAATHIFICATION WILL BE HARD SELL Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Small Signs of Political Reconciliation -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate conversations with PolCouns April 28 and 29, Dawa leaders and Council of Representatives (CoR) members Ali al-Adeeb and Haider al-Abadi mentioned small signs of Shi'a and Sunni politicians working together but indicated that deBaathification reform would be hard to achieve in the next two months. Al-Adeeb recounted his experience at a reconciliation conference he had attended the previous week in Beirut that included Salafis and Baathists. While he said that CoR member Abdulnasir al-Jinabi (National Dialogue Council) tried to torpedo the dialogue by insisting on dissolving the CoR and negating the consitition, he characterized several of the Sunnis in attendance, including Baathist Khalid al-Mai'ene and Association for Muslim Scholars member Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi, as "moderate." Al-Adeeb acknowledged that some of the requests of these moderate Sunnis could be countenanced, including a quick release of innocent detainees and, at some point, a pardon for lesser criminals or oppositionists. Al-Abadi offered his opinion that friction at the CoR between lawmakers of different sects had declined, partly through working together on projects like selecting the IHEC commissioners and partly because Sunnis were now seeing al-Qaeda as the greatest threat. "The Sunnis, and especially the IIP, are looking for allies; we are ready," al-Abadi said. -------------- deBaathification Reform a Hard Sell -------------- ¶2. (C) On deBaathification, however, al-Abadi argued that no one in the Shi'a coalition was ready champion the reform process because the Shi'a street perceived it as a process that would reward Baathists. PolCouns argued that if Shi'a coalition leaders themselves believed that reform was justified, they should correct misperceptions on the Shi'a street. She stressed how vital it was that Iraqi politicians show the Iraqi people that they were making progress on important national priorities. Both al-Adeeb and al-Abadi stressed that Baathists were one important source of violence in Iraq, noting that Shi'a would have a hard time supporting a law that might allow some Baathists to return to work or receive pensions when other (or perhaps even the same) Baathists were engineering car bombs that caused large Shi'a casualties. -------------- - Other Issues: Provincial Powers, Kirkuk, etc. -------------- - ¶3. (C) Al-Abadi expressed optimism that the CoR would pass the hydrocarbons law and the provincial powers law before it went on summer recess. The government was now considering the provincial powers law, he said, and was expected to provide extensive comments to the CoR. For its part, the Shi'a coalition, according to al-Abadi, had reassessed its position and would seek a law that was the least decentralized as possible given constitutional constraints. He suggested that SCIRI was seeking to take electoral provisions out of the provincial powers law (thus requiring a separate elections law) in order to delay elections. Turning to Kirkuk, al-Abadi said he did not think it could or should be solved in 2007. The Shi'a, he said, "did not want to facilitate Kurdish goals in Kirkuk or to be an obstacle." He opined that U.N. involvement would be a good idea, noting that the TAL, to which Article 140 refers, mentions this possibility. Al-Adeeb expressed concern that the Baghdad Security Plan was focusing on Shi'a neighborhoods, suggesting that biased intelligence from the INIS might be to blame. CROCKER