ABDEL MEHDI DISCUSSES STRATEGIC DIALOGUE,

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 001452

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IR IZ
SUBJECT: ABDEL MEHDI DISCUSSES STRATEGIC DIALOGUE,
POTENTIAL TRIP TO IRAN

REF: A. EMBASSY BAGHDAD CLASS 0/I 26APR07


B. 2006 BAGHDAD 4172

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Advancing the Strategic Dialogue
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1. (S) Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi discussed the course
of the U.S.-SCIRI strategic dialogue further with the
Ambassador in an April 27 meeting. Abdel Mehdi said that,
upon reading the papers provided by the U.S. side for the
security, economic, and political committees (ref A),he was
concerned that the papers seemed to "have requests for SCIRI"
rather than stand as the basis for a bilateral dialogue. The
Ambassador assured Abdel Mehdi that the papers were merely
illustrative, giving examples of the sort of issues the U.S.
side would want to discuss, in the same way that SCIRI's
papers gave examples of issues SCIRI wanted to discuss (ref
B). The Ambassador and Abdel Mehdi agreed that the
committees' work would provide an opportunity for both sides
to discuss a range of specific, short term issues as well as
a broader set of more strategic issues including the
long-term U.S.-Iraq relationship.


2. (S) The Ambassador gave the example of Basrah as a
critical issue where government institutions, saddled perhaps
by a lack of capacity, were having difficulty maintaining
order in the face of intense political and economic
competition. The Ambassador also suggested a discussion in
the political committee of how each side envisioned advancing
national unity in Iraq. Abdel Mehdi agreed, saying that
SCIRI had been thinking hard about this same issue and
showing the Ambassador a triangle with the Sunni, Shi'a, and
Kurdish communities at the points of the triangle and various
issues of overlap or disagreement written around the edges.
Abdel Mehdi speculated that the Iraqi army could play a
unifying role, but the Ambassador cautioned that the
political framework would have to be right for the army to be
successful in doing so. Abdel Mehdi said that he would
permanently chair the political committee and would chair the
security and economic committees when he isavailable;
otherwise, those committees would be chaired by Badr CoR
member Hadi al-Amri and Finance Minister Bayan Jabr
respectively, with the Mayor of Baghdad also participating in
the economic committee.

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Potential Trip to Tehran
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3. (S) Abdel Mehdi told the Ambassador that the Iranians
were asking either him or Prime Minister Maliki to visit
Tehran "to explain the Sharm conference and discuss other
issues." Abdel Mehdi said he did not think the Prime
Minister would go, but that he (Abdel Mehdi) might make an
unofficial visit to Tehran in the coming week. The
Ambassador told Abdel Mehdi that the U.S. hoped the Iranian
Foreign Minister would attend the Sharm conference, as it was
in Iraq's interests as well as Iran's. He expressed concern,
however, at the succession of senior GOI officials going to
Tehran, including an upcoming trip by Deputy Prime Minister
Barham Salih. The Ambassador suggested that these visits
might give the Iranians the wrong impression that Iraqi
leaders were at their beck and call. Abdel Mehdi assured the
Ambassador that, to the contrary, "We will put pressure on
them." He and Salih, he continued, "will tell them that
their behavior in Iraq is negative, in neither country's
interest." Abdel Mehdi argued that Iraqi leaders' visits to
Tehran achieved positive results, pointing to a visit during
which he convinced the Iranians to support the TAL. The
Ambassador said that it was important to point out the
implications of the Iranians' actions: for example, in the
south, Iran appeared not to be supporting the process of
extending the Iraqi government's control.
CROCKER