VP MEETS VP ABDEL MEHDI ON THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000145

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: VP MEETS VP ABDEL MEHDI ON THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
FOR BAGHDAD SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: PM Maliki and VP Abdel Mehdi met with the
Ambassador January 12 to discuss the new Baghdad Security
Plan, and the importance of GOI political support to
ensuring the plan's success. Maliki asserted that ISF's
heightened security operations would target anyone, Sunni
or Shia, who was breaking the law. He added that for ISF to
perform its duties with confidence, their efforts in
Baghdad must have the backing of all parties. To this end,
the PM asked VP Abdel Mehdi to take the lead on the
political track, and tasked him with forming a committee of
bloc leaders that would rally broad based public support -
especially from the Sunnis - for the initiative. At the
same time, however, Maliki insisted that in authorizing
important operations he would no longer be deterred by
other people's "sensitivities". End Summary.

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POLITICAL BUY-IN IS KEY...
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2. (S) Maliki pointed with concern the focus by "certain
Shia" on the Najaf marjayeeya's supposed complaints about the
revamped Baghdad security plan, and media statements by
Adnan Dulaimi condemning it as a concerted effort to target
Sunnis. Maliki noted that the broad political support for
the Baghdad security plan was "essential" to its success,
and that he intended to meet with members from all parties
to emphasize that no criminal group would have immunity
from ISF operations. Maliki said he would call on all
leaders to stand with him in the face of the violence.


3. (S) He said that personnel transfers and other
logistical changes that resulted from the new Baghdad
security plan should not be viewed from a sectarian
perspective, but rather as an effort to improve the ISF.
Maliki asked VP Abdel Mehdi to choose the members of a
political committee that would keep abreast of developments
with the Baghdad Security Plan, and subsequently rally
their constituents' support for it. He asked Mehdi to
ensure that there was sufficient Sunni representation.


4. (S) The Ambassador told the PM that VP Hashimi supported
the
security plan, and was willing to send Sunni IIP
representatives that the PM could work with in the
implementation phase, such as IIP Deputy Chair Ayad
Sammraie. The Ambassador also highlighted Hashimi's keen
interest in being kept in the loop on new developments with
the plan, especially the timing of operations. While
Maliki noted that he would take all points of view into
account, he added that he would "no longer be deterred"
by other groups' sensitivities when carrying out necessary
security operations in Baghdad.


5. (S) VP Abdel Mehdi noted that moderate media statements
were an important factor in improving the security
situation, complaining that Iraqi politics, and in many
cases security, "had become a hostage" to the media. In
recognition of this, PM Maliki said, he had charged his own
media advisor to form a committee that would look at
the plan from a media aspect. While hardliners such as
Harith Al Dari would continue to make inflammatory
statements to the media, Maliki said, Iraq's political
leaders should be circumspect in this regard, given the
impact they have on the Iraqi street.


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GOI'S CHANCE TO PROVE ITSELF
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6. (S) With Saddam's execution over with, Maliki argued,
the GOI had firmly established its authority. Under the new
security plan, the GOI had a real opportunity to take the
lead in security provision in Baghdad for the first time.
If the plan succeeded in bringing Baghdad's security under
control, Maliki said, the political process, economic
development and service provision could go forward.


7. (S) Both Maliki and Abdel Mehdi expressed frustration
with the CoR, calling it a "paralyzed" institution. The
numerous key laws, deputy ministerial appointments and
ambassadorships that were being held up at the CoR were
seriously impeding the functioning of the GOI. The
Ambassador told Abdel Mehdi and Maliki that bloc leaders
should be doing more to ensure that their fellow party
members were attending sessions. Maliki pointed out that
an improved security situation would remove the major

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obstacle keeping CoR members from coming to work.
KHALILZAD