VP MEETS VP ABDEL MEHDI ON THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000145 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2017 TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL SUBJECT: VP MEETS VP ABDEL MEHDI ON THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE FOR BAGHDAD SECURITY Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: PM Maliki and VP Abdel Mehdi met with the Ambassador January 12 to discuss the new Baghdad Security Plan, and the importance of GOI political support to ensuring the plan's success. Maliki asserted that ISF's heightened security operations would target anyone, Sunni or Shia, who was breaking the law. He added that for ISF to perform its duties with confidence, their efforts in Baghdad must have the backing of all parties. To this end, the PM asked VP Abdel Mehdi to take the lead on the political track, and tasked him with forming a committee of bloc leaders that would rally broad based public support - especially from the Sunnis - for the initiative. At the same time, however, Maliki insisted that in authorizing important operations he would no longer be deterred by other people's "sensitivities". End Summary. -------------- POLITICAL BUY-IN IS KEY... -------------- ¶2. (S) Maliki pointed with concern the focus by "certain Shia" on the Najaf marjayeeya's supposed complaints about the revamped Baghdad security plan, and media statements by Adnan Dulaimi condemning it as a concerted effort to target Sunnis. Maliki noted that the broad political support for the Baghdad security plan was "essential" to its success, and that he intended to meet with members from all parties to emphasize that no criminal group would have immunity from ISF operations. Maliki said he would call on all leaders to stand with him in the face of the violence. ¶3. (S) He said that personnel transfers and other logistical changes that resulted from the new Baghdad security plan should not be viewed from a sectarian perspective, but rather as an effort to improve the ISF. Maliki asked VP Abdel Mehdi to choose the members of a political committee that would keep abreast of developments with the Baghdad Security Plan, and subsequently rally their constituents' support for it. He asked Mehdi to ensure that there was sufficient Sunni representation. ¶4. (S) The Ambassador told the PM that VP Hashimi supported the security plan, and was willing to send Sunni IIP representatives that the PM could work with in the implementation phase, such as IIP Deputy Chair Ayad Sammraie. The Ambassador also highlighted Hashimi's keen interest in being kept in the loop on new developments with the plan, especially the timing of operations. While Maliki noted that he would take all points of view into account, he added that he would "no longer be deterred" by other groups' sensitivities when carrying out necessary security operations in Baghdad. ¶5. (S) VP Abdel Mehdi noted that moderate media statements were an important factor in improving the security situation, complaining that Iraqi politics, and in many cases security, "had become a hostage" to the media. In recognition of this, PM Maliki said, he had charged his own media advisor to form a committee that would look at the plan from a media aspect. While hardliners such as Harith Al Dari would continue to make inflammatory statements to the media, Maliki said, Iraq's political leaders should be circumspect in this regard, given the impact they have on the Iraqi street. -------------- GOI'S CHANCE TO PROVE ITSELF -------------- ¶6. (S) With Saddam's execution over with, Maliki argued, the GOI had firmly established its authority. Under the new security plan, the GOI had a real opportunity to take the lead in security provision in Baghdad for the first time. If the plan succeeded in bringing Baghdad's security under control, Maliki said, the political process, economic development and service provision could go forward. ¶7. (S) Both Maliki and Abdel Mehdi expressed frustration with the CoR, calling it a "paralyzed" institution. The numerous key laws, deputy ministerial appointments and ambassadorships that were being held up at the CoR were seriously impeding the functioning of the GOI. The Ambassador told Abdel Mehdi and Maliki that bloc leaders should be doing more to ensure that their fellow party members were attending sessions. Maliki pointed out that an improved security situation would remove the major BAGHDAD 00000145 002 OF 002 obstacle keeping CoR members from coming to work. KHALILZAD