AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES U.S. CONCERN ABOUT UNAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001439 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UN IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES U.S. CONCERN ABOUT UNAMI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT WITH SRSG QAZI Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador expressed strong concern with UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) SRSG Qazi about content of UNAMI's human rights report released August 25. The report mischaracterized conditions for U.S.-held security detainees, failed to note Iraqi progress in some sectors, and unduly accused the GOI of withholding casualty figures. The Ambassador expressed further concern about a general failure by UNAMI to consult MNF-I in advance of the report. Qazi said he took full responsibility for the content of report, and welcomed U.S. feedback to incorporate in subsequent reports. The Ambassador and Qazi also discussed preparations for the upcoming Neighbor's Conference in Sharm al-Sheikh, a possible role for the UN in facilitating a resolution on the status of Kirkuk, and provincial council elections. End Summary. -------------- -------------- UNAMI Report: Misrepresentations, Poor Consultation -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador began his conversation with SRSG Qazi by noting U.S. surprise and concern with the content and tone in of some parts of UNAMI's Human Rights report on Iraq, released August 25. The Ambassador acknowledged that in their telephone conversation the previous day, Qazi had agreed to remove prior to release two objectionable sentences which mischaracterized Coalition treatment of security detainees. However, there remained a number of objectionable assertions in the report that misrepresented conditions on the ground, both in terms of facts presented and in tone. The Embassy would be raising these issues with UNAMI with more specificity in coming days. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador stated that given the productive relationship between the Embassy and UNAMI, we would have expected to have been advised well in advance of changes in wording and tone in the report and given the opportunity for input. Instead we were blindsided. The Ambassador underscored that this concern was shared in Washington and New York. ¶4. (C) SRSG Qazi said he took full responsibility for the content of the report. UNAMI produced these reports on human rights regularly and viewed them as an important component in UNAMI's mandate in Iraq. UNAMI also saw the document as an important vehicle to press for reconciliation and the rule of law, and Iraqis should be encouraged to see it that way. Qazi stated that the UNAMI team had consulted with MNF-I throughout the drafting of the report, although not perhaps on specific language. But the changes in the report were "natural" -- it should be expected that language will evolve as circumstances and UNAMI's understanding of the situation evolve. Qazi agreed with the Ambassador that Embassy and UNAMI staff should consult over differences in the document in coming days, and UNAMI was prepared to make adjustments as it prepared for the next report. The Ambassador reiterated that there had been no indication to us ahead of time of the changes in this report -- if UNAMI were, indeed, seeking to use it to promote reconciliation and rule of law it would have been more natural for UNAMI to have consulted and coordinated with the Embassy and MNF-I. -------------- Neighbors' Conference -------------- ¶5. (C) SRSG Qazi asked the Ambassador for an update on preparations for the May 2-3 Expanded Neighbors' Ministerial planned in Sharm al-Sheikh. He noted that Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad told him they continued to seek movement toward the release of the five Iranian detainees being held by coalition forces. The Ambassador replied that Iranian intentions remained unclear with regard to the conference. Qazi also noted the recent refusal of the Saudis to receive PM Maliki in Riyadh. The Ambassador characterized the Saudi position as hardening towards the Iraqi government, although they appeared prepared to sign on to forgiveness of 80 percent of Iraq's debt. -------------- A UN Role on Kirkuk? -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to the issue of Kirkuk, Qazi asked if the Ambassador had heard of any new developments. He noted indications by some Kurdish leaders that they might be willing to forgo a referendum in 2007, but that nothing was being done by these same leaders to prepare the Kurdish street. He feared the end of the year could arrive without BAGHDAD 00001439 002 OF 002 preparations for a referendum as required by the constitution or with a format for moving ahead without a referendum. The risk of deterioration in security remained high. Qazi cited the lack of a UN mandate on Kirkuk as awkward, as it would be natural for the UN to have a role on the issue. He noted that his deputy had drafted a paper on Kirkuk, which the Ambassador acknowledged the Embassy had received. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador replied that he had not yet raised Kirkuk with Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani or with Iraqi President Talabani, but clearly the time had come when the issue should be pressed. It does seem like the UN could play an important role on Iraq -- although UNAMI's mandate does not specifically include Kirkuk, it does not preclude such agreement. The Ambassador suggested UNAMI begin to raise the issue with the Iraqis in the context of the referendum, and then move discussions further. He asked Qazi for suggestions for a specific UN role. Qazi responded that UNAMI would be holding a policy meeting on Kirkuk the following day and he would provide the Ambassador with a readout. He committed to putting ideas into a non-paper. -------------- Provincial Elections -------------- ¶8. (C) Qazi pointed out progress made by the Council of Representatives (CoR) toward appointing commissioners for the new Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The CoR was slated to vote that day on the nine appointees, who had been selected through a transparent process proposed and monitored by UNAMI. Qazi acknowledged that provincial council elections remained possible in 2007, although it may prove impossible to implement a district-based electoral system for this vote in such a short time frame. There were also broader political decisions to be made, such as modalities for internally displaced persons to vote and the configuration of provincial borders. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the fundamental importance of provincial council elections to national reconciliation, particularly in Sunni-predominant provinces. He queried notionally if it would be possible to have elections in some provinces earlier than others. Qazi committed to look into the issue. He agreed with the importance of elections, and committed to increasing UNAMI staff in Baghdad further as security conditions permit. CROCKER