AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES U.S. CONCERN ABOUT UNAMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES U.S. CONCERN ABOUT UNAMI
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT WITH SRSG QAZI


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador expressed strong concern with
UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) SRSG Qazi about content
of UNAMI's human rights report released August 25. The
report mischaracterized conditions for U.S.-held security
detainees, failed to note Iraqi progress in some sectors, and
unduly accused the GOI of withholding casualty figures. The
Ambassador expressed further concern about a general failure
by UNAMI to consult MNF-I in advance of the report. Qazi
said he took full responsibility for the content of report,
and welcomed U.S. feedback to incorporate in subsequent
reports. The Ambassador and Qazi also discussed preparations
for the upcoming Neighbor's Conference in Sharm al-Sheikh, a
possible role for the UN in facilitating a resolution on the
status of Kirkuk, and provincial council elections. End
Summary.

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UNAMI Report: Misrepresentations, Poor Consultation
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2. (C) The Ambassador began his conversation with SRSG Qazi
by noting U.S. surprise and concern with the content and tone
in of some parts of UNAMI's Human Rights report on Iraq,
released August 25. The Ambassador acknowledged that in
their telephone conversation the previous day, Qazi had
agreed to remove prior to release two objectionable sentences
which mischaracterized Coalition treatment of security
detainees. However, there remained a number of objectionable
assertions in the report that misrepresented conditions on
the ground, both in terms of facts presented and in tone.
The Embassy would be raising these issues with UNAMI with
more specificity in coming days.


3. (C) The Ambassador stated that given the productive
relationship between the Embassy and UNAMI, we would have
expected to have been advised well in advance of changes in
wording and tone in the report and given the opportunity for
input. Instead we were blindsided. The Ambassador
underscored that this concern was shared in Washington and
New York.


4. (C) SRSG Qazi said he took full responsibility for the
content of the report. UNAMI produced these reports on human
rights regularly and viewed them as an important component in
UNAMI's mandate in Iraq. UNAMI also saw the document as an
important vehicle to press for reconciliation and the rule of
law, and Iraqis should be encouraged to see it that way.
Qazi stated that the UNAMI team had consulted with MNF-I
throughout the drafting of the report, although not perhaps
on specific language. But the changes in the report were
"natural" -- it should be expected that language will evolve
as circumstances and UNAMI's understanding of the situation
evolve. Qazi agreed with the Ambassador that Embassy and
UNAMI staff should consult over differences in the document
in coming days, and UNAMI was prepared to make adjustments as
it prepared for the next report. The Ambassador reiterated
that there had been no indication to us ahead of time of the
changes in this report -- if UNAMI were, indeed, seeking to
use it to promote reconciliation and rule of law it would
have been more natural for UNAMI to have consulted and
coordinated with the Embassy and MNF-I.

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Neighbors' Conference
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5. (C) SRSG Qazi asked the Ambassador for an update on
preparations for the May 2-3 Expanded Neighbors' Ministerial
planned in Sharm al-Sheikh. He noted that Iranian Ambassador
in Baghdad told him they continued to seek movement toward
the release of the five Iranian detainees being held by
coalition forces. The Ambassador replied that Iranian
intentions remained unclear with regard to the conference.
Qazi also noted the recent refusal of the Saudis to receive
PM Maliki in Riyadh. The Ambassador characterized the Saudi
position as hardening towards the Iraqi government, although
they appeared prepared to sign on to forgiveness of 80
percent of Iraq's debt.

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A UN Role on Kirkuk?
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6. (C) Turning to the issue of Kirkuk, Qazi asked if the
Ambassador had heard of any new developments. He noted
indications by some Kurdish leaders that they might be
willing to forgo a referendum in 2007, but that nothing was
being done by these same leaders to prepare the Kurdish
street. He feared the end of the year could arrive without

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preparations for a referendum as required by the constitution
or with a format for moving ahead without a referendum. The
risk of deterioration in security remained high. Qazi cited
the lack of a UN mandate on Kirkuk as awkward, as it would be
natural for the UN to have a role on the issue. He noted
that his deputy had drafted a paper on Kirkuk, which the
Ambassador acknowledged the Embassy had received.


7. (C) The Ambassador replied that he had not yet raised
Kirkuk with Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) President
Barzani or with Iraqi President Talabani, but clearly the
time had come when the issue should be pressed. It does seem
like the UN could play an important role on Iraq -- although
UNAMI's mandate does not specifically include Kirkuk, it does
not preclude such agreement. The Ambassador suggested UNAMI
begin to raise the issue with the Iraqis in the context of
the referendum, and then move discussions further. He asked
Qazi for suggestions for a specific UN role. Qazi responded
that UNAMI would be holding a policy meeting on Kirkuk the
following day and he would provide the Ambassador with a
readout. He committed to putting ideas into a non-paper.

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Provincial Elections
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8. (C) Qazi pointed out progress made by the Council of
Representatives (CoR) toward appointing commissioners for the
new Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The CoR
was slated to vote that day on the nine appointees, who had
been selected through a transparent process proposed and
monitored by UNAMI. Qazi acknowledged that provincial
council elections remained possible in 2007, although it may
prove impossible to implement a district-based electoral
system for this vote in such a short time frame. There were
also broader political decisions to be made, such as
modalities for internally displaced persons to vote and the
configuration of provincial borders.


9. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the fundamental importance
of provincial council elections to national reconciliation,
particularly in Sunni-predominant provinces. He queried
notionally if it would be possible to have elections in some
provinces earlier than others. Qazi committed to look into
the issue. He agreed with the importance of elections, and
committed to increasing UNAMI staff in Baghdad further as
security conditions permit.
CROCKER