UNAMI BROACHES POSSIBLE ROLE IN THE KIRKUK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001432 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2017 TAGS: PREL UN IZ SUBJECT: UNAMI BROACHES POSSIBLE ROLE IN THE KIRKUK REFERENDUM Classified By: Classified by Deputy Political Counselor Robert Gilchris t for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has suggested that it may be able to play a constructive role in resolving the final status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories as outlined in Article 140 in two "informal" documents given to poloffs by UNAMI Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General (D/SRSG) Michael Schulenburg. The analysis states that based on the December 2005 election results may be possible to draw a first indicative regional border line along the entire stretch of contested territories based on district level local majorities for or against the Kurdish alliance. End Summary. -------------- KIRKUK ISSUE NOT RIPE FOR A REFERENDUM? -------------- ¶2. (C) D/SRSG Schulenburg in several recent conversations with the Embassy discussed possibilities for a greater UN role in a resolution of Kirkuk and other disputed territories. He opined that a referendum (which under the Iraqi constitution must be held on Kirkuk by year's end) should only be the final affirmation of a successful political process. Schulenburg presented post with a document that he called an "informal and uncleared" analysis of Kirkuk. In the analysis, UNAMI has posited that a referendum on Kirkuk could only be successful if political decisions are made first on four critical questions: (1) what is the definition of "Kirkuk" - i.e. which historical borders will be used; (2) what is the definition of "disputed" territory - i.e. what dispute threshold must be met to qualify; (3) what is the definition of disputed "territory" - i.e. governorates, districts, or sub-districts; and (4) what is the precise wording of the ballot question. ¶3. (C) UNAMI's informal analysis points out that any political process which successfully answers these four questions -- to the degree that it achieves a consensus among the various sectarian and ethnic groups concerned -- will also solve the Kirkuk crisis. "I do not think they will resolve these issues by November, and to vote on a referendum prior to completing the political process will only make matters worse," D/SRSG Schulenburg asserted to post, a statement which has been echoed by SRSG Qazi. ¶4. (C) Although acknowledging that the Kurds have sought to move ahead with a referendum, in Schulenburg's view the Kurds "have the most to lose if they proceed precipitously" as they would antagonize the Turks as well as other Iraqis who have legitimate ties to Kirkuk. He believes they should suspend the referendum timing and engage in a process of negotiation. Obtaining a result acceptable to Turkey, Iran, and Iraqi Arabs would be critical to the long-term viability of the Kurdistan region. -------------- -- A DIVIDING LINE: DECEMBER 2005 ELECTION RETURNS -------------- -- ¶5. (C) UNAMI's analysis states that based on the December 2005 election results it may be possible to draw a first indicative regional border line along the entire stretch of contested territories based on local majorities for or against the Kurdish alliance. The December 2005 elections provide some guidance on what a solution might look like. In these elections about 90% of all voters voted along sectarian and ethnic lines. In addition, the high turnout out of 76% made those results fairly representative. These elections produced surprisingly clear majorities at the district level - in most cases as much as two thirds majorities. Along the contested stretch of border, only three districts had no clear majorities, and even those may be clearer cut at the sub-district level. ¶6. (C) UNAMI interlocutors have suggested the UN mediation contribute to this process, although they have not specified what this mediation may look like. Their analysis asserts that four pre-conditions should be in place to ensure the most effective UNAMI involvement: (1) UNAMI's role as an international mediator must be clearly defined; (2) the UNAMI must have international support to mediate an internal Iraqi regional border conflict, preferably through a new Security Council Resolution; (3) UNAMI must have the concurrence of Iraq's central and regional governments; and (4) UNAMI must be given the necessary financial, operational and logistical support to fulfill its tasks as mediator. -------------- COMMENT -------------- BAGHDAD 00001432 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) With little visible progress by Iraqis in recent months toward reaching decisions on Kirkuk, an enhanced role for the UN may be an option for spurring more dialogue. UNAMI has pledged to provide post with further suggestions in coming weeks. CROCKER