Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1392
2007-04-23 13:55:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

STAFF SHARE VIEWS ON IRAQI PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND

Tags:  PGOV PINR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO3715
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1392/01 1131355
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 231355Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0878
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001392 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO INR/B

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: STAFF SHARE VIEWS ON IRAQI PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND
TRAVEL PLANS, LEADERSHIP STYLE

REF: BAGHDAD 1293

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist per 1.4 (b)
and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001392 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS TO INR/B E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ SUBJECT: STAFF SHARE VIEWS ON IRAQI PRESIDENT'S HEALTH AND TRAVEL PLANS, LEADERSHIP STYLE REF: BAGHDAD 1293 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist per 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: In a meeting on April 11, members of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's staff told PolOffs that Talabani's HEALTH continues to improve, but his staff continues to try to limit his activities, including his desire to travel. His staff shared Talabani's techniques for fostering cooperation among the Presidency Council, as well as for creating an inclusive, intersectarian office. They hinted that Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih is being groomed for possible PUK succession and clarified some economic issues reported in septel. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Talabani's HEALTH Improving, Planning Trips to Asia, Mayo Clinic -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) Talabani's staff told PolOffs that Talabani's overall HEALTH continues to improve. The staff recounted that recently prior to a lunch Talabani hosted for the Ambassador on April 11, he spent 15 minutes arranging the place settings and food on the table, a habit that his staff later said stemmed from his days cooking for his Peshmerga. This prompted DPM Saleh to announce to the Ambassador and guests at the lunch that Talabani was "officially back to his old self." His staff, however, told us that they continue to try to manage the daily pressures placed on him by limiting his schedule as much as possible. They admit that they did not inform the President that the Ambassador had wanted to present his credentials the day before they were actually presented. They also are working to turn off some of his future aspirations, including a trip to East Asian countries tentatively planned for May that would include China, South Korea, and Japan before going to the US for medical treatment. They believe the multiple stops in Asia would be too fatiguing and are hoping to limit it to just ONE stop before arriving at the Mayo Clinic for a month or so of treatment. ONE staffer appreciated Poloffs' suggestion that they request U.S. assistance for this trip, but replied that he thought it was being taken care of (Note: in a subsequent conversation, another staffer told Poloff that the Asia trip had been postponed until July or August and Talabani would now trav
el to the UK to give a speech at Cambridge University before going on to the U.S.). -------------- -------------- The PUK and Talabani's leadership Style -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Staff told Poloffs that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is a reflection of Talabani's personality; likewise, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is a reflection of Barzani's - each has very different management styles. As an example of Talabani's style, ONE staff member recalled an impasse in 2003 when the Sunni and Shia politicians refused to talk to each other. He said Talabani instructed his staff to call 20 people from each side (Sunni and Shia) to attend a lunch at his house. They were instructed to say that due to security concerns, they could not discuss who was invited. When the guests arrived, they were ushered into separate rooms until all were present. Talabani personally invited each of them into the room for lunch because he knew they would not refuse the President. ¶4. (C) Acording to ONE staffer, Talabani used similar tactics with the current Vice Presidents; he looked for opportunities to bring them together. He would often play them against each other, i.e. "I'm leaving the country and I'm delegating Vice President Hashimi to act on my behalf. So, Adil, if you need something, please talk with Tariq," and vice versa. Through these confidence-building measures, Talabani's staff believes he was able to foster a natural collegiality among the two. Now, the VPs and President often eat and meet together without the need for Talabani to act as the catalyst. ¶5. (C) The staffer drew on Talabani's selection of Barham Salih and Kosrat Rasul as deputy Secretaries General of the PUK to illustrate that Talabani is grooming Salih as his successor. (Note: In the past, Talabani's staff has confided that Rasul's medical problems could prevent him from being the face of the PUK.) Salih was a student, or BAGHDAD 00001392 002 OF 002 protege, of Talabani's, and exhibits the same engaging personality, boundless energy, and ability to bring people together, according to the staffer. He joked about Salih's inability to sit still in meetings, often using his PDA and cell phones, or walking in and out of meetings while in progress. The staffer commented that Qubad, Talabani's son, was Barham's protege and also embodies a similar leadership and personality style. -------------- --- The President's Staff: Inclusive but Not Perfect -------------- --- ¶6. (C) According to the staffer, Talabani is inclusive - he employs Sunni, Shia, Yezedi, Turkoman, and Kurdish staff in the President's office on down to the cooks in his kitchen. Even the Kurds are from different areas. His method of hiring personnel was to go to party leaders and tell them that he wanted a Sunni on his staff -- and they selected this person for him. This led to better cooperation as the person was chosen by the party to represent them on Talabani's staff, and not vice versa. The staffer wondered why others, such as Maliki, had not used this model. He said that Maliki's immediate staff is especially sectarian and mentioned that Maliki had appointed 85 new Directors General and 650 military personnel working in some sort of capacity for the PM that were all Shia. He said that Maliki had begun his term in office in a more non-sectarian way, but was starting to approach the style of the Jafari government in its sectarian and isolationist leanings. ¶7. (S) Talabani frequently gets angry with his chief of staff, Kamran Karadaghi, because he works slowly and methodically, and tries to control things. The staff also gets annoyed with Karadaghi because he tries to do everything in a legal, proper manner. The way Iraq operates, this often takes longer and is less effective, Talabani's staffers claimed, hence the President's nickname for his chief of staff: "Handbrake." ¶8. (S) Another staff member noted that Talabani's friend and advisor Fakri Karim was enraged that he did not receive a blue badge because he considers himself first among Talabani's advisors. It is a status issue for him as the rest of the immediate staff has blue. The staff did not seem to think highly of Karim and noted that Karim is often not in country, as he spends much of his time in Syria. ¶9. (S) Comment: While the staff members painted a rosy picture of the collegiality of the President's staff, closer examination of his immediate staff exposes fissures. Although they show a good public face, privately, each voices frustrations about the others. At the same time, when it comes to Talabani's welfare they are in complete agreement. His staff takes turns taking the blame for things they know will upset the president so that no ONE gets fired. End Comment. CROCKER

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