MAYSAN ON THE EVE OF PIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001390

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSAN ON THE EVE OF PIC

Classified By: PRT Maysan Team Leader Julie Nutter for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

This is a PRT Maysan cable.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) Recent intelligence assessments have described Maysan
province as ripe for continued violence, despite the
imminence of
transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). Maysan's
history
of inter-militia and inter-tribal warfare sets the backdrop
for
this assessment. However, there is a new element that bodes
ill
for provincial security. According to UK military sources,
the
Maysan Provincial Council has narrowed the choices for its
new
police chief to three individuals, and chances are good that
the
new police chief will be affiliated with the Badr Corps, the
armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in
Iraq (SCIRI). The fierce fighting that broke out last fall
in Al
Amarah was touched off by pitched battles between the Jaish
Al
Mahdi (JAM) and Badr, ceasing only when a Baghdad-appointed
emergency security committee intervened. We expect that if a
Badr-backed police chief is named, the potential for
continued
violence will intensify.


2. (S) Added to this, the potential for violence is
exacerbated
in Maysan by political, economic, and geographical factors.
One
of the poorest provinces in the country, it has a turbulent
history and has been the scene of repeated conflicts. Its
political relations with Coalition Forces, particularly with
the
British, have been tenuous and episodic. Many Maysanis will
at
first see the PIC handover as a step closer to ejecting the
Coalition, but the continued UK presence conducting border
operations will mute that elation. By all accounts, JAM is
currently in charge of Maysan and operates almost without
constraint, but the continued threat of Badr rivalry keeps
tensions high. Provincial politicians are keen to start
exploiting the province's reportedly rich oil and gas
fields,
but competing claims over who controls assets will be a
source of
friction., as will the presence of a significant displaced
population and generally poor economic conditions. Finally,
substantial political and economic ties to Iran, and alleged
official Iranian interference in Maysan will foment
instability.
End Summary.

--------------
Crossroads of Conflict
--------------


3. (C) Maysan is one of the most independent-minded provinces
of
Iraq, and the combination of Shia inter-militia competition,
Iranian historical influence, and tribalism provide a witch's
brew of instability for a province on the eve of Provincial
Iraqi
Control (PIC). Almost all of the province's roughly 800,000
inhabitants are Shia Muslim, perhaps two-thirds of whom have
tribal affiliations. Almost half of the province's
population
lives in the capital, Al Amarah, which itself is almost three
times as large as Majar Al Kabir, the second most-populous
city.
Like its neighbors Wasit and Basrah, Maysan has long
experience
chafing as a crossroads of conflict. It was a battleground
during the Iran-Iraq War and suffered the anger of Saddam
after
the Shia uprising in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm.
It
had also been a scene of conflict for the British, including
during World War 1, the Tribal Revolt of 1920, and Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF). During the opening days of the OIF
ground
campaign, Maysan's tribal leaders "liberated" the province,

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reportedly one of the first areas in Iraq to do so. Today,
Maysan distinguishes itself as a major transit point for
weapons
smuggled from Iran to Iraq, particularly the lethal
explosively-
formed penetrators (EFPs).

-------------- -
Bumpy Official Relations with Coalition Forces
-------------- -


4. (C) The province's relations with Coalition Forces (CF)
have
been bumpy, with security incidents and political irritants
leading provincial officials to often "disengage" for periods
of
time, while retaining informal connections largely through
the
Governor's office. One operation in particular (codenamed
Operation Dorado) led to the longest period of disengagement,
when UK forces detained reputed militia members during
limited
anti-insurgent raids. As a result, provincial officials cut
off
contact and effectively mobilized local press attention
against
CF, using video footage of a 2004 beating by British soldiers
of
Al Amarah youth demonstrating for jobs to punctuate the
claims of
abuse.

--------------
PIC: A Symbolic Ejection of the Coalition
--------------


5. (C) The effect of PIC in Maysan will be another symbolic
step
toward the complete removal of CF, which had started with the
British withdrawal from Camp Abu Naji in early autumn 2006.
However, the elation is likely to be muted, since the UK will
continue border operations. According to British military
sources, the PIC Memorandum of Understanding authorizes the
UK-
led battle group - at current strength - to remain in Maysan,
working
alongside the Iraqi Department for Border Enforcement.
(Comment:
Border enforcement is considered a federal function, allowing
the
British recourse to central - not provincial - authorities in
case of difficulties.) We anticipate continued militia
activity
and some militia-backed tribal activity against the border
patrols, since tribal leaders as well as militias profit from
border smuggling. End Comment.)

--------------
JAM in the Driver's Seat - For Now
--------------


6. (S) Since proving itself the stronger military force
during
the October battles between JAM and the Badr Corps, JAM and
JAM-
sympathetic politicians have gained control of major power
centers in Maysan, One recent intelligence report noted that
black-uniformed JAM members openly carry weapons during
patrols
in Al Amarah. The report also noted that JAM has taken over
the
police stations and even the local cell phone service
provider,
Asia Communications. They are reportedly closely connected
to
the Shia tribes, including the Al Muhammad' Awi tribe.

-------------- --------------
Pending Police Appointment: A Trigger for More Violence?
-------------- --------------


7. (S) According to recent intelligence reporting, Maysan's
Provincial Council has voted to appoint a new Provincial
Director
of Police (PDOP),and three recommended names have been
short
listed and forwarded to the GOI Ministry of the Interior for
a
final decision. There is reportedly a strong possibility
that a
Badr-sympathetic individual could emerge from this process,
an
eventuality that would certainly antagonize the dominant JAM

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forces and possibly precipitate a repeat of the sectarian
bloodshed seen in Al Amarah in October 2006.

--------------
A Poor Province
--------------


8. (C) Maysan is one of Iraq's poorest provinces and suffers
one
of the highest unemployment rates in the country. Its
economic
difficulties are structural, and the quality and availability
of
infrastructure and basic services are barely adequate. The
demand for electricity is three times the supply, potable
water
is available to about 60 percent of the population, and the
availability of health services is among the worst in Iraq.
There have been considerable numbers of returnees, both from
outside of Iraq and from within. The arrival of internally
displaced people seeking refuge in a very poor province like
Maysan is another destabilizing combination that will strain
the
capabilities of the provincial government. (Comment: One
person
explained that in the mid-1970s, financial incentives were
offered by the government to people willing to relocate to
Baghdad. Many Maysanis with tribal connections took this
opportunity and settled in (what is today) Sadr City, laying
roots and raising families there. Many of these still retain
close ties to family in Maysan, occasionally visiting and
providing support to them. Today, many such people from Sadr
City
are reportedly sheltering in the province during Operation
Fard
Al Qanoon. End Comment.)

--------------
Oil and Investment Aspirations
--------------


9. (C) The rich and as yet unexploited provincial oil and gas
fields represent the heart's desire of Maysani politicians.
The
GOI has reportedly extended invitations to foreign firms to
initiate drilling of 50 wells in the province, a move that
would
expand oil supply capacity in the rich southern fields.
(Comment: As an indication of Maysani enthusiasm about
resource
extraction, the provincial crest on the letterhead of
stationery
that we receive from them contains a large, flaring derrick,
underscored by an arm holding a sword.) However, the fight
for
control of Maysan's possible riches could be the source of
more
bloodshed, as militias and tribal groups compete among
themselves
for control of assets and perhaps eventually (depending on
the
final draft of the Hydrocarbon Law) for a share of oil
revenues.

-------------- --
Corruption - A Source of Political Instability?
-------------- --


10. (C) Added to these factors, the current Maysan government
is
attracting notice within the province for reportedly skimming
off
profits from reconstruction as well as cross-border trade.
Tribal leaders, both those affiliated with militias and
relatively independent sources such as Abu Muslim have
identified
the Governor and his staff as increasingly corrupt.
Corruption
could become a convenient excuse for rival militias and some
of
their tribal affiliates to replace the JAM-backed Governor,
whether the charges are warranted or not, and the ferment
could
be another source of continued instability. The Governor will
feel increasingly embattled, particularly with provincial
elections in the offing.

--------------
Big Brother Across the Border
--------------


11. (C) Iran casts a long shadow across Maysan. An extensive
shared border, profound cultural and religious affinities,

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family
connections, and centuries of trade with Iran have made it a
natural support structure, reaching far, far beyond simply
the
provision of EFPs or other lethal aid. Iranian companies are
active in the province and the cross-border import-export
business is thriving, much as it has for centuries.
(Comment:
While we have been unable to characterize the scope of the
official Iranian presence in Maysan, we expect that it is
pervasive. It is not uncommon for our interlocutors in the
government, including the Governor, to travel there for
business
or pleasure, and to regularly accuse the Iranian intelligence
service of interference in the province. End Comment.)

--------------
Conclusion
--------------


12. (S) While provincial authorities will seek to spin PIC
transfer as
testimony of their governing acumen, JAM and the people they
influence
will see it as another milestone on the road to concentrated
militia
power in the south. We anticipate an increase in JAM-Badr
violence,
particularly if a Badr-sympathetic Police Director is named.
This
could go beyond the scale of the October 2006 conflict, if
JAM seeks to
press its advantage and consolidate its gains unimpeded by
CF. With
the reported widespread penetration of the local police by
JAM and arms
support by Iran to both militias, this may herald a new era
of
instability in Maysan. The real challenge to the GOI is
whether it can
face this potential scenario head on, or whether it will
allow Maysan
to continue to its tradition, forged over many decades, of
violent
independence from central control.
CROCKER