PM ADVISOR SEES OPPORTUNITIES WITH THE SADRISTS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001389 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR SEES OPPORTUNITIES WITH THE SADRISTS, STATUS QUO WITH THE SUNNIS Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- The Sadrists -------------- ¶1. (C) Sami al-Askari, advisor to Prime Minister Maliki and member of the Council of Representatives (CoR),told the A/DCM on April 18 that the "withdrawal" of the Sadrist ministers was a good step because it would give the Prime Minister freedom to choose new and better ministers. Asked if the ministers had indeed resigned, al-Askari said that it was necessary they do so for their own safety and also for the Prime Minister's sake. "It was an order from Muqtada," al-Askari said. "If they stay, it is a challenge from the Prime Minister to Muqtada, and we do not want that at this time." Speaking of the Sadrists more generally, he noted that the Iranians were using the Sadrists for their own interests and that, if the U.S. or GOI took a hard line against them, they would be driven even more into Iran's hands. (Note: Though al-Askari claimed that no Sadrist ministers had appeared at the one cabinet meeting after the withdrawal announcement, we have not heard that any of them have submitted resignations, and we understand that the ministers of health and agriculture want to remain in their posts as independents. End note.) ¶2. (C) Al-Askari opined that there was a more "moderate" component of the Sadrists, including, for example, CoR members Salmn al-Maliki and Qusay Abdulwahab. These Sadrist "moderates" generally followed Sadr's orders because they feared being killed if they did not, al-Askari claimed. He advised that the best way to allow them to grow stronger was to let them take leadership roles at a local level, e.g. in Sadr city, to deliver services. He said that captured JAM leader Qais al- Khazaly was one of the moderates "except that he turned to Iran for support." -------------- DeBaathification - Not the Real Issue -------------- ¶3. (C) Turning to deBaathification reform, the A/DCM told al-Askari that it was an issue of both practical and symbolic importance to Sunni Arabs inside and outside Iraq. Al-Askari argued that "Arab regimes are against the new Iraq. Even if you solve deBaathification, they will find another reason to disagree with a democratic Iraqi government." Sunnis inside Iraq, al-Askari continued, were still hoping for a "Taif- like" power-sharing agreement. As a result, they were still not fully committed to the political process, and they were also spreading this hope to neighboring Sunni states. Al-Askari urged the U.S. to keep reaffirming its support for democracy in Iraq. The A/DCM emphasized that political progress inside Iraq was vital at the present time to make it clear to skeptics that Iraq's democratic system could deliver. ¶4. (C) Comment: Al-Askari's argument that reforming deBaathification will not change Sunni Arab countries' views on Iraq is the external BAGHDAD 00001389 002 OF 002 reflection of an argument we are increasingly hearing from Shi'a contacts, namely that deBaathification reform will not lead to a reduction in violence because it will not matter to terrorists. End comment. CROCKER