PM ADVISOR SEES OPPORTUNITIES WITH THE SADRISTS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001389

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR SEES OPPORTUNITIES WITH THE SADRISTS,
STATUS QUO WITH THE SUNNIS


Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

--------------
The Sadrists
--------------


1. (C) Sami al-Askari, advisor to Prime Minister Maliki and
member of
the Council of Representatives (CoR),told the A/DCM on April
18 that
the "withdrawal" of the Sadrist ministers was a good step
because it
would give the Prime Minister freedom to choose new and
better
ministers. Asked if the ministers had indeed resigned,
al-Askari said
that it was necessary they do so for their own safety and
also for the
Prime Minister's sake. "It was an order from Muqtada,"
al-Askari said.
"If they stay, it is a challenge from the Prime Minister to
Muqtada,
and we do not want that at this time." Speaking of the
Sadrists more
generally, he noted that the Iranians were using the Sadrists
for their
own interests and that, if the U.S. or GOI took a hard line
against
them, they would be driven even more into Iran's hands.
(Note: Though
al-Askari claimed that no Sadrist ministers had appeared at
the one
cabinet meeting after the withdrawal announcement, we have
not heard
that any of them have submitted resignations, and we
understand that
the ministers of health and agriculture want to remain in
their posts
as independents. End note.)


2. (C) Al-Askari opined that there was a more "moderate"
component of
the Sadrists, including, for example, CoR members Salmn
al-Maliki and
Qusay Abdulwahab. These Sadrist "moderates" generally
followed Sadr's
orders because they feared being killed if they did not,
al-Askari
claimed. He advised that the best way to allow them to grow
stronger
was to let them take leadership roles at a local level, e.g.
in Sadr
city, to deliver services. He said that captured JAM leader
Qais al-
Khazaly was one of the moderates "except that he turned to
Iran for
support."

--------------
DeBaathification - Not the Real Issue
--------------


3. (C) Turning to deBaathification reform, the A/DCM told
al-Askari
that it was an issue of both practical and symbolic
importance to Sunni
Arabs inside and outside Iraq. Al-Askari argued that "Arab
regimes are
against the new Iraq. Even if you solve deBaathification,
they will
find another reason to disagree with a democratic Iraqi
government."
Sunnis inside Iraq, al-Askari continued, were still hoping
for a "Taif-
like" power-sharing agreement. As a result, they were still
not fully
committed to the political process, and they were also
spreading this
hope to neighboring Sunni states. Al-Askari urged the U.S.
to keep
reaffirming its support for democracy in Iraq. The A/DCM
emphasized
that political progress inside Iraq was vital at the present
time to
make it clear to skeptics that Iraq's democratic system could
deliver.


4. (C) Comment: Al-Askari's argument that reforming
deBaathification
will not change Sunni Arab countries' views on Iraq is the
external

BAGHDAD 00001389 002 OF 002


reflection of an argument we are increasingly hearing from
Shi'a
contacts, namely that deBaathification reform will not lead
to a
reduction in violence because it will not matter to
terrorists. End
comment.
CROCKER