AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH UK OFFICIALS IN BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000138

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH UK OFFICIALS IN BAGHDAD


Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On January 12 UK Ambassador Asquith,
accompanied by Ambassador Simon McDonald, head of the UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Iraq Office, discussed with
the Ambassador the implementation of the Baghdad Security
Plan, the performance of Prime Minister Al-Maliki, the
detention of Iranians, and the planned British drawdown in
Basrah. End Summary.

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THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN
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2. (C) UK Ambassador Asquith inquired how Prime Minister
Al-Maliki would assign portfolios to implement the Baghdad
Security Plan. The Ambassador explained the PM would
distribute the five portfolios as follows: (1) security to
Vice President Abdul Mehdi (Shia),(2) economics to Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Saleh (Kurd),(3) services to Dr.
Salaam Zawba'i (Sunni),(4) military command of Baghdad to
General Abbud Qanbar Hashim Khayyun al-Maliki, with General
Razzaq as deputy, and (5) public affairs to GOI spokesman Ali
al-Dabbagh. When Ambassador Asquith queried why Razzaq was
not chosen, the Ambassador explained that PM Maliki felt more
comfortable with General Abbud than the other candidates.


3. (C) Ambassador Asquith asked about the Iraqi reaction to
President Bush's speech. It was uniformly praised, responded
the Ambassador. The only part that generated some concern
was the implicit threat behind the benchmarking.

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PRIME MINISTER MALIKI'S PERFORMANCE
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4. (C) Ambassador Asquith asked how did Washington view PM
Maliki. Ambassador explained that PM Maliki has been quite
strong on both the security front and the Iranian issue.


5. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that Maliki's weakness was
that he tended to downplay the need to engage other Iraqi
leaders on policies so as to give them a sense of ownership.


6. (C) Ambassador Asquith asked whether the U.S. had
alternative candidates for the position of Prime Minister if
Maliki does not succeed. The Ambassador called such
speculation "mischief making." The Ambassador said that "we
have to stand behind him," and that "any changes have to be
constitutional."


7. (C) Ambassador Asquith inquired about the effort to form
a moderate front. The Ambassador outlined his discussions
with Dawa leaders to form a "virtual" moderate front that
would operate in the Council of Ministers and the Council of
Representatives. The Dawa leaders seemed receptive and "the
idea is percolating," he explained.

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IRANIAN DETAINEES
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8. (C) Turning to the Iranian issue, Ambassador Asquith asked
for clarification of President Talabani's comment that he had
invited the recently detained Iranians, and of the status of
the buildings as consulates. The Ambassador recounted that
he had explained very forcefully to President Talabani that
unless the Iranians were invited by the Prime Minster, they
come at their own risk. The Ambassador also clarified that,
while there were routine discussions between Iran and the
Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on establishing
consulates general, the Iraqi MFA had not yet designated the
buildings as such.


9. (C) When Ambassador Asquith wondered if the detainees held
diplomatic passports, the Ambassador answered we were still
investigating the issue and trying to establish their
identities. The detainees, he added, are being difficult and
trying to be deceptive. The Ambassador pointed out that PM
Maliki told us to "take your time, there is no urgency," and
that PM Maliki had telephoned Talabani to tell him it was
unacceptable to invite people without informing him before
hand.

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BASRAH
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10. (C) The Ambassador observed that the Palace in Basrah
would be ideal for a future consulate general, and he asked
whether the British were planning to abandon it. Ambassador
McDonald explained that the upcoming conversion of Basrah to

BAGHDAD 00000138 002 OF 002


Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) would require the military to
relocate to the nearby air station. Once the military left,
there would be insufficient security assets to maintain a
civilian presence, and the civilians would also relocate to
the air station. Ambassador McDonald added that his budget
constraints gave him no option but to save costs, and Basrah,
rather than Erbil or Baghdad, was his best opportunity to do
so.


11. (C) Ambassador Asquith wanted to know how the U.S. troop
surge was compatible with the planned British transfer to PIC
and draw down in Basrah. The Ambassador noted that there was
only a short term incompatibility while we secure against
violence to re-initiate the political process.
Strategically, the U.S. is also seeking a reduction. The
surge of five brigades was only in theory, and if the Iraqis
contribute the planned troops, then our current plan requires
only two additional brigades.
KHALILZAD