AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH UK OFFICIALS IN BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000138 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH UK OFFICIALS IN BAGHDAD Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On January 12 UK Ambassador Asquith, accompanied by Ambassador Simon McDonald, head of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Iraq Office, discussed with the Ambassador the implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan, the performance of Prime Minister Al-Maliki, the detention of Iranians, and the planned British drawdown in Basrah. End Summary. -------------- THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN -------------- ¶2. (C) UK Ambassador Asquith inquired how Prime Minister Al-Maliki would assign portfolios to implement the Baghdad Security Plan. The Ambassador explained the PM would distribute the five portfolios as follows: (1) security to Vice President Abdul Mehdi (Shia),(2) economics to Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh (Kurd),(3) services to Dr. Salaam Zawba'i (Sunni),(4) military command of Baghdad to General Abbud Qanbar Hashim Khayyun al-Maliki, with General Razzaq as deputy, and (5) public affairs to GOI spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh. When Ambassador Asquith queried why Razzaq was not chosen, the Ambassador explained that PM Maliki felt more comfortable with General Abbud than the other candidates. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Asquith asked about the Iraqi reaction to President Bush's speech. It was uniformly praised, responded the Ambassador. The only part that generated some concern was the implicit threat behind the benchmarking. -------------- PRIME MINISTER MALIKI'S PERFORMANCE -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador Asquith asked how did Washington view PM Maliki. Ambassador explained that PM Maliki has been quite strong on both the security front and the Iranian issue. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that Maliki's weakness was that he tended to downplay the need to engage other Iraqi leaders on policies so as to give them a sense of ownership. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Asquith asked whether the U.S. had alternative candidates for the position of Prime Minister if Maliki does not succeed. The Ambassador called such speculation "mischief making." The Ambassador said that "we have to stand behind him," and that "any changes have to be constitutional." ¶7. (C) Ambassador Asquith inquired about the effort to form a moderate front. The Ambassador outlined his discussions �00A;with Dawa leaders to form a "virtual" moderate front that would operate in the Council of Ministers and the Council of Representatives. The Dawa leaders seemed receptive and "the idea is percolating," he explained. -------------- IRANIAN DETAINEES -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to the Iranian issue, Ambassador Asquith asked for clarification of President Talabani's comment that he had invited the recently detained Iranians, and of the status of the buildings as consulates. The Ambassador recounted that he had explained very forcefully to President Talabani that unless the Iranians were invited by the Prime Minster, they come at their own risk. The Ambassador also clarified that, while there were routine discussions between Iran and the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on establishing consulates general, the Iraqi MFA had not yet designated the buildings as such. ¶9. (C) When Ambassador Asquith wondered if the detainees held diplomatic passports, the Ambassador answered we were still investigating the issue and trying to establish their identities. The detainees, he added, are being difficult and trying to be deceptive. The Ambassador pointed out that PM Maliki told us to "take your time, there is no urgency," and that PM Maliki had telephoned Talabani to tell him it was unacceptable to invite people without informing him before hand. -------------- BASRAH -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador observed that the Palace in Basrah would be ideal for a future consulate general, and he asked whether the British were planning to abandon it. Ambassador McDonald explained that the upcoming conversion of Basrah to BAGHDAD 00000138 002 OF 002 Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) would require the military to relocate to the nearby air station. Once the military left, there would be insufficient security assets to maintain a civilian presence, and the civilians would also relocate to the air station. Ambassador McDonald added that his budget constraints gave him no option but to save costs, and Basrah, rather than Erbil or Baghdad, was his best opportunity to do so. ¶11. (C) Ambassador Asquith wanted to know how the U.S. troop surge was compatible with the planned British transfer to PIC and draw down in Basrah. The Ambassador noted that there was only a short term incompatibility while we secure against violence to re-initiate the political process. Strategically, the U.S. is also seeking a reduction. The surge of five brigades was only in theory, and if the Iraqis contribute the planned troops, then our current plan requires only two additional brigades. KHALILZAD