SADRIST MINISTER OF HEALTH SAYS HE WANTS TO STAY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001366 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: SADRIST MINISTER OF HEALTH SAYS HE WANTS TO STAY REF: BAGHDAD 1309 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Minister of Health Dr. Ali al-Shammari detailed to the Ambassador on April 19 his efforts and reasons for wanting to remain Minister of Health, despite a call by Sadrist leader Muqtada al-Sadr for all Sadrist-nominated cabinet ministers to resign (reftel). Al-Shammari said he planned to notify the Prime Minister in writing that he was not resigning and intended to continue as an independent. Dr. al-Shammari outlined the various challenges he faced as Minister, most notably dealing with corrupt Dawa and Sadrist networks in his ministry. He described his association with the Sadr family and characterized Muqtada as a genuinely popular but hugely insecure leader who relied on a corrupt and ruthless inner circle of advisors. End summary. -------------- Seeking to Continue "Serving Iraq" -------------- ¶2. (S) Dr. al-Shammari told the Ambassador that he wanted to stay in his job "to serve Iraq." Dr. al-Shammari, one of the six Sadrist ministers in Prime Minister Maliki's cabinet, said that he planned to write the Prime Minister on April 22 a letter saying he was not resigning and planned to continue as an independent, rather than a Sadrist, minister. "It would be illegal for the Prime Minister to remove me if I do not resign or if the parliament does not vote me out," Dr. al-Shammari observed. The Ambassador noted to Dr. al-Shammari how critical it was that Iraqis in positions of authority work for Iraq's interest, not the interest of their parties. -------------- Challenges in the Ministry of Health -------------- ¶3. (S) Dr. al-Shammari outlined the many problems he faced as Minister. These included a brain drain of experienced doctors, poor incentive structures, slow GOI bureaucracy, and the corrupt and dangerous Facilities Protection Service. On the political side, Dr. al-Shammari characterized himself as "sandwiched" between Dawa and Sadrist operatives who had installed themselves in the Ministry of Health. The Dawa operatives, he said, were holdovers from the time of the first post-Saddam Iraqi Minister of Health, who was from the Dawa party, while the Sadrist operatives had installed themselves during his tenure. The Prime Minister, he claimed, would not allow him to remove the Dawa group. When he protested the Sadrists' economic committee's attempt to take contracts for themselves, Dr. al-Shammari continued, they told him, "We won't take money if the Dawa party doesn't." The worst Sadrist operative was Hakim al-Zamili, who had anointed himself the Deputy Minister of Health and who was arrested by coalition and Iraqi forces in February 2007 for a variety of illegal activities. -------------- The Sadrist Organization: One Man on Top -------------- ¶4. (S) Dr. al-Shammari said that his association with the Sadr family dated from 1996, when he treated Muqtada's older brother Mustafa, who was also friendly with his (Dr. al-Shammari's) brother, at his private clinic in Najaf. He became friends with Mustafa and also began to treat his father, Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr (MSS). When MSS, Mustafa, and another brother of Mustafa were assassinated in 1999 by the Saddam regime, Dr. al-Shammari continued, he was on call in the hospital and treated Mustafa for the half-hour before he died. Several months after MSS's death, Muqtada, then in his early 20s and with whom Dr. al-Shammari had no previous relationship, invited Dr. al-Shammari to visit him in his home. Shortly thereafter, Dr. al-Shammari left Iraq, not to return until 2006 when the Sadrists called him in Qatar and asked him to be their candidate for Minister of Health. ¶5. (S) Dr. al-Shammari spoke disparagingly of Sadrist leaders. He said that Muqtada was a "one man decider, like Saddam," who relied only on a small inner circle of corrupt and ruthless advisors for information. He claimed that Muqtada, although genuinely popular, was an epileptic, taking medication that caused sedation. "He is very jealous and does not want anyone to look smarter than him," Dr. al-Shammari continued. Most Sadrist leaders had not graduated from school, he said, but "had become mullahs and now tell people what to do." As examples, he cited a cleric BAGHDAD 00001366 002 OF 002 named Ahmed al-Muteibi on the Sadrists' political committee and a delegation of three "nothings" he met with from the same committee, who included "a sheikh, a refrigerator salesman, and a junior grade doctor." The political committee, he said, transferred information to Walid al-Zamili (relative of Hakim) in Najaf, who in turn relayed it to Muqtada. ¶6. (S) Comment: Dr. al-Shammari's comments track with other characterizations we have heard of the Sadrist organization, namely that decision-making authority is tightly controlled by Sadr and a small group of Najaf-based advisors. Dr. al-Shammari's willingness to break from the organization is another indication of its splintering. End comment. CROCKER