SUNNI TAWAFUQ VOICES FRUSTRATION WITH GOI, CALLS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001364

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI TAWAFUQ VOICES FRUSTRATION WITH GOI, CALLS
FOR WITHDRAWAL

Classified By: Acting DCM Margaret Scobey, for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary: Statements by the Sunni Tawafuq bloc in
recent weeks have indicated it is considering withdrawing
from Iraq's national unity government due to its perception
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is not responding in a
meaningful way to Sunni concerns. These concerns include
their strong interest in replacing Tawafuq Minister of
Defense Abdalkader; a series of raids on the homes and
offices of prominent Sunni political and religious figures,
and what Tawafuq members call a lack of policy coordination
that leads to the exclusion of Sunnis from decisionmaking.
At this juncture, these calls may be more an expression of
frustration than an actual plan to withdrawal, and the Sunnis
appear open negotiation. PM Maliki's public statement asking
for suggestions to replace the DefMin may signal a
willingness to enter a dialogue. Movement forward on key
issues such as constitutional review, de-Ba'athification
legislation, and provincial council elections could also
address some of Tawafuq's core concerns. It appears Tawafuq
may seek to delay passage of hydrocarbons legislation until
there is progress on the bloc's political priorities. End
Summary.



2. (C) Since early April, Tawafuq contacts have been
signaling both publicly and privately that the Sunni bloc is
considering withdrawal from the government. Bloc leader Adnan
Dulaimi announced April 7 that Tawafuq had withdrawn from the
Ministerial Council for National Security (MCNS). (Note: This
announcement was largely seen as symbolic because long before
Dulaimi's statement Tawafuq representatives were rarely seen
at MCNS meetings. Sunni contacts had repeatedly told post
they saw MCNS as largely ineffective. End Note). IIP
spokesman Saleem Jabbouri told the media again on April 9
that Tawafuq "was considering a withdrawal" from the
government, because the bloc's participation had achieved few
positive results. Vice President Tariq al Hasimin told the
Ambassador April 16 the bloc was "seriously considering
withdrawal" because the Sunnis were achieving little in the
national unity government. (ref)

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SEEKING A ROLE ON SECURITY
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3. (C) At the top of Tawafuq's list of complaints is its
lack of influence on Iraq's security ministries. Tawafuq
contacts universally express dissatisfaction with MoD
Abdalkader's performance. While he is well spoken, a good
officer, and works well with MNF-I, they argue, in their view
he does not operate as an objective representative of or
advocate for Sunni security needs. However, they argue,
Itilaf has access to and influence on the rest of Iraq's
security ministers, up to Commander in Chief PM Maliki.
Conversely, Tawafuq bloc leaders have argued, if the choice
for MoD is truly the prerogative of Tawafuq, then the bloc
should be able to name Abdalkader's replacement. The PM's
firm stance of support for MoD has driven Tawafuq's refusal
to participate in cabinet reshuffle discussions and has
become one of the many roadblocks in the way of needed
ministerial changes.


4. (C) IIP contacts have also complained that although they
participated in popular mobilization and intelligence
gathering for the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) in good faith,
they were not included
in the decision making process with regard to operations and
targets. In fact, according to Tawafuq contacts, in March
and April a total of twenty homes and offices of senior
Tawafuq leaders
were the target of Iraqi Army cordon and search operations.
These operations included the red zone residence of prominent
figures such as Sunni Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi,
Tawafuq bloc leader Adnan Dulaimi, and Sunni Endowment head
Abdalghafour Al-Sammaraie, and were carried out without
MNF-I participation. Dozens of Tawafuq CoR members' personal
security details were reportedly taken into ISF custody;
the whereabouts of a number of them remain unknown. Still
others were
reportedly subject to physical torture, with a view toward
extracting confessions of wrong-doing by their employers.
Tawafuq members claim that IA soldiers behaved in an
extremely unprofessional manner as they carried out the
raids, cursing Sunnis in some cases, destroying and/or
stealing property, and money.


5. (C) Many of these raids were followed almost immediately
by an AQI attack, Tawafuq contacts observed, pointing to the
example of the AQI truck bomb that destroyed the IIP's
Baghdadiyah TV station April 5, just days after IA took away
most of its weapons and arrested several guards protecting

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the facility. (Note: The station has not yet begun to
re-broadcast since the attack. End note.)


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CONCERNS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, LOSS OF IMMUNITY
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6. (C) After months of rumors surrounding a possible warrant
for the arrest of 77-year old Tawafuq bloc leader Adnan
Dulaimi, the Higher Juridical Council on April 15 delivered a
"thick file" on Dulaimi which contained testimonies from
approximately eighty Iraqis complaining of harassment by
Dulaimi's bodyguards, mostly under orders from his son
Monqith. Sadrist Legal Committee Chair Baha Al-Ariji
announced to the media that the file had in fact been
received by the CoR and would be "closely scrutinized."
Deputy Legal Chair Saleem Al-Jabbouri (Tawafuq) told poloff
April 18 that the politicization of the issue cast doubt on
the legitimacy of the entire case. He observed that most of
the signed testimony did not implicate Dulaimi himself but
rather his staff or his children; moreover, many of the
testimonies appeared to have been written and signed at the
offices of leading SCIRI CoR member Jalal Eddin Al Sagheer.
Dulaimi claimed that members of his personal security detail,
who were arrested in December, were tortured for confessions
implicating him and his family in crimes.


7. (C) Jabbouri questioned why Adnan Dulaimi, who has lived
in the same neighborhood for thirty-five years, has all of a
sudden become such a threat to its residents. Jabbouri noted
that there were two other requests for lifting of
parliamentary immunity before the Legal Committee, one for
Iraqiya CoR Member Mufeed Al Jazairy (former Culture
Minister) and Sadrist Salam Al Maliki (former Transportation
minister) in connection to corruption charges, but this fact
had not been publicized in the media
in the same fashion. In the meantime, leaders such as
Dulaimi, Abdalnasr Al Janabi, Saleh Motloq and National
Dialogue Council (NDC) head Khalaf Ulayan also remain outside
Iraq because they fear politicized prosecution or for their
personal safety. Mohamed Tamim from Hewar told poloff this
growing phenomenon is not a good sign for Sunni participation
in government nor does it bode well for national
reconciliation.

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PRESSING FOR FASTER PROGRESS ON RECONCILIATION
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Tawafuq acknowledges that its access to the PM has
increased. Senior IIP members Ayad Sammaraie and Naseer Al-
Ani meet with him regularly for talks on Tawafuq concerns
with the GOI. However, contacts argue, this has not lead to
forward movement on the deliverables of national
reconciliation - another frustration of the Sunnis. A major
component of the PM's reconciliation plan was a commitment to
reviewing the status of Iraqis who worked at the 28
"entities" dissolved under CPA Order 1,
with a view to re-integrating them into society - either
through re-employment, recruitment to the ISF, transfer to
pension rolls, or other compensation. Naseer Al-Ani, high
ranking Tawafuq member and Deputy Chair of the National
Reconciliation Commission has frequently complained to
poloffs that the Dissolved Entities Bureau, an office
established under PM Jaafari to oversee this re-integration
process, is a "bureaucratic hole" where requests for service
disappear. In the absence of GOI movement to
address this concern, Sunni political figures have argued,
the insurgency strengthened and thousands of qualified Iraqis
left the country.


9. (C) Al-Ani recently told poloffs that the the
questionnaire distributed to former officers had been
edited; the new and improved questionnaire did not have
"provocative questions" seeking information on sect,
political party affiliation, and other "unnecessary
information". Further, PM had taken measures to minimize the
role of the Bureau in order to process cases faster, and that
some officers have even begun to receive pensions. Al-Ani,
who has been working closely with Da'awa insider and PM
confidante Falah Fayad on pensions, says he hopes to tackle a
mass education campaign on the De-Ba'athification law next -
but will need GOI support.


10. (C) While the PM has expressed concern over the
possibility of a Sunni withdrawal from government, it is not
clear what actual concessions he is prepared to make with
regard to the "security policy coordination" the Sunnis are
demanding. According to Iraqi media, the PM recently issued
a statement calling for Tawafuq to suggest replacements for
Abdalkader, a possible signal he is interested in dialogue to

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stave off the bloc's withdrawal.

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COMMENT: WHAT WOULD SUNNI WITHDRAWAL MEAN?
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11. (C) Few of our contacts foresee a full-fledged Tawafuq
withdrawal, at least in the short to mid-term. Rather the
bloc will use the threat to press for progress on key areas
of Sunni concern. Speaker Mashadani indicated to PolCouns
April 19 that any Tawafuq withdrawal would be "tactical, not
strategic," meaning that the bloc would use the doubts about
its commitment to the government as a means to achieve
concessions. To this end, Mashadani and other Tawafuq
contacts have indicated
they will push for the successful completion of
constitutional review, passage of compromise
De-Baathification legislation and an elections law. Some
have said they may even withhold support for pending
hydrocarbons legislation, a higher priority for Shia and
Kurds, in order to achieve these objectives. If a
"withdrawal" were to take place, it would most likely
resemble Tawafuq's October
boycott of CoR sessions which they used to push the CoR to
name the Constitutional Review Committee alongside passage of
the Law on Regions.



12. (C) No Sunni contact has been able to articulate what a
Tawafuq withdrawal would look like. However, if it were
actually pursued, it would clearly be a blow both to
reconciliation and to the
legitimacy of the national unity government. The GOI could
theoretically continue functioning with a working majority,
but the withdrawal wouldsever the fledgling relationships
between Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish GOI ministers, staff, and
CoR members. While Tawafuq as a whole is disorganized and
often appears to be dysfunctional, among the Sunnis there are
many capable operators; in fact some of the Embassy's most
proactive interlocutors on the Legal, Financial, and
Constitutional Review Committees at the CoR are from Tawafuq.



13. (C) On a broader level, a Tawafuq full withdrawal would
make it all the more difficult for any emerging and
relatively inexperienced Sunnis political groupings to enter
the GOI. Furthermore, those Sunnis who have been sitting on
the fence waiting for results from their representatives in
government could lose hope in the prospects for a democratic
Iraq entirely; they might leave the country or lend their
sympathies to the insurgency, or worse, AQI.


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