IRAQI ARMY OFFICERS DISCUSS INTERNAL MILITIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000136 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI ARMY OFFICERS DISCUSS INTERNAL MILITIA INFLUENCE, U.S. TROOP LEVELS (U) Classified by Anbar PRT leader James Soriano, reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: In several discussions with Anbar PolOff in late December and early January, Iraqi Army (IA) officers based in the Fallujah area expressed concerns about Shia militia influence inside their ranks. If asked to fight the Mahdi Army (JAM) in particular, the officers said their units, effectiveness would be compromised due to the perceived dual loyalties of their soldiers, or fear of retribution. Although IA division commanders based in Anbar have not expressed such concerns, other officers say that 50-60 percent of their battalion,s soldiers have Shia militia ties. A Shia IA officer said that more coalition forces in Iraq,s capital might help stabilize the situation in the short term. He added, however, that American forces would find Baghdad,s current sectarian dynamic &very confusing,8 with many CF probably unable to differentiate between warring sides. END SUMMARY. -------------- MILITIAS INSIDE THE ARMY -------------- ¶3. (C) PRT Anbar PolOff met with approximately a dozen IA officers and enlisted soldiers in the Fallujah area late December and early January. Although Anbar province is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, the ranks of the two IA divisions based here are mostly filled with Shias. Three senior officers flagged varying levels of concern about Shia militia influence inside their units. One remarked that, &in some units, not even 10 percent would fight the militias,8 but he added that in his own unit, &70 or 80 percent8 of the soldiers would be dependable in fighting JAM. Two other IA officers we spoke with agreed that Shia militia influence within the ranks represents a serious problem. ¶4. (C) When asked, most of the enlisted IA soldiers in Fallujah, who in large part are Shia recruits from Baghdad or southern Iraq, were hesitant to openly acknowledge militia influence. Although Moqtada Sadr posters and pro-JAM graffiti may be found in some IA housing areas, the soldiers did not believe that sectarian antagonisms have not yet spilled over into IA operations in Anbar. ¶5. (C) An IA medic speculated that if Anbar,s IA units were deployed to Baghdad for security operations, the Shia soldiers would be intimidated. He said that many soldiers &fear that they would be recognized (in their neighborhoods) and would be killed, and their families killed later.8 A Shia IA lieutenant from Dyala province said that while only 10-15 percent of his unit had militia ties, some key leaders were JAM supporters. He said the commanders, biases made sectarian tensions worse. -------------- BAGHDAD &ALL MILITIAS8 -------------- ¶6. (C) Another IA executive officer (Shia from east Baghdad) said that he had been kidnapped by JAM several months earlier while on leave in Baghdad and that his release had only come after a member of the Council of Representatives requested it. He has since moved his family to another neighborhood. CF trainers verified his kidnapping story. The IA officer said that &all we have in Baghdad now is militias.8 He and his intelligence officer estimated that 50-60 percent of the soldiers in their unit had militia ties. The executive officer added, &some will try to cover up this fact, but they are lying to you.8 -------------- CAPITAL &CONFUSING8 FOR CF -------------- ¶7. (C) The IA officers said more Coalition Forces in Baghdad might lessen sectarian tension initially, but the underlying issue remained the weak central government,s inaction and questionable will to beat back militias. One officer questioned PM Maliki,s effectiveness, asserting that Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr is the power behind Maliki. He argued that any new CF troop plan would ultimately fail absent a change in government. A CF surge had to be accompanied by new political leadership. COMMENT: Criticism of the GoI is widespread among Fallujah-based IA officers, whether Shia or Sunni. They privately criticize the inability of MoD to BAGHDAD 00000136 002 OF 002 support IA units properly (pointing to equipment shortages, pay problems and lack of martyr payments for IA soldiers killed in action, etc. Many also see the GOI,s overall leadership as weak and sectarian. In one notable conversation in October 2006, an IA Division commander based in Al Anbar told Poloff that a military coup would be preferable to the status quo )- but that such a step would require U.S. initiation or acquiescence to be successful. END COMMENT. ¶8. (C) Several IA officers said that if more CF were sent to Baghdad, they would be best used at checkpoint areas, to ensure proper Iraqi police oversight. Some argued that Marines should be redirected to the capital, given their reputation for being the most aggressive part of the U.S. military. ¶9. (C) An IA lieutenant said that additional U.S. troops in Baghdad would find the capital &very confusing.8 For example, he said some militias were good and had legitimate support from the people. CF would find it hard to differentiate sides. ¶10. (C) Another enlisted IA soldier and Baghdad native warned: &If CF and IA fight JAM, Baghdad will be burned to the ground and Americans will be fighting there for years.8 He noted that some of his friends had joined JAM because it provided support to Baghdad residents that the central government had not. -------------- IN AL ANBAR, TOO? -------------- ¶11. (C) A Dyala province native (Shia) IA lieutenant cautioned against increases in CF troops in Al Anbar. He said that his home area, Dyala, represented an even greater threat to Iraq,s stability than Iraq,s western province, adding that if CF moved to bases in Anbar, while continuing building up the IA and IP, the &national resistance8 among Anbaris would lessen. NOTE: This theme is largely echoed by Fallujah leaders, who stress to PolOff regularly that an increase of CF in Al Anbar will produce more occupation friction. They favor sustained troop levels in Iraq,s west and ongoing ISF training and support, but not an influx of U.S. forces. Fallujah,s city council secretary, Abbas Ali Hussein, says that Al Qaida uses the U.S. military presence in Anbar as a point in its recruiting efforts among unemployed Anbari youths. Fallujah leaders also have argued to PolOff over many months that they believe GoI officials want CF to continue to be &tied down8 in Al Anbar, fighting Sunni insurgents while Shia militias consolidate control in the capital and southern Iraq. END NOTE. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) The IA units in the province to date have served away from Baghdad,s more high-tension, sectarian environment )- instead fighting alongside CF the Sunni-based insurgency in western Iraq. While anecdotal, the informal discussions with IA officers (most of whom are Shia) and some enlisted soldiers highlight genuine concern about militia ties in IA ranks. In their view, JAM influence in the IA may complicate ongoing and future efforts to bring stability to Baghdad. Although sectarian tensions are not an overt problem thus far among the IA units in Anbar, our informal soundings with IA officers and soldiers here point to this possible flashpoint. Heightened pressure by CF against the Mahdi Army may lead to a rise in sectarian tensions in the ranks of the Anbar-based IA units, and possibly jeopardize the safety of U.S. military trainers. KHALILZAD